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I'M NOT JOKING

Metaphysics as Physical Comedy and the Derivation of Epistemology, Logic, & Ethics from Humor

:: Introduction ::

"A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes."
Ludwig Wittgenstein

This is an epistolary work and addresses a broad set of technical topics in philosophy. This book is somewhat opaque and difficult to understand, with a Flesch reading-ease score of around 35, or a 16th-grade reading level, considered very difficult to read.[1] A formal education in philosophy or an obsession with reading academic journals from related fields is expected and probably required to follow most of this book. Just as every other field of study has become entrenched in technical abductions of terminology and content, so too has the progenitor of most of those fields of study.[2] So if the awkward and abusive use of language in this work bothers you, don't hate me, hate the game.[3]

While I wrote most of this book a decade ago and have taken a long time by most standards to edit and publish it, I believe this very slow approach was the best since the only ideas left in this book now are the ones that have remained after roughly a decade a thought and active debate on them. Lots of other contemporary philosophers write great volumes of work, easily dwarfing this book's content in terms of quantity, but often their views will change drastically over their careers whereas what is presented in this book is the exact opposite – views that have withstood a small test of time – and so I posit that this book dwarfs the others in terms of quality.

You'll notice an unsatisfying lack of details or counter-considerations in some sections of this book – I have always been a miner of ore, I have never managed to refine it.[4]

Despite *I'm Not Joking* being a work on comedy, it isn't very funny. If people read things like the *Bible* or the *Critique of Pure Reason* in an attempt to have their questions answered, then appositionally people should read *I'm Not Joking* in an attempt to have their answers questioned. If you're not used to academic philosophy, don't worry, it gets significantly more obfuscated from here.

I'm Not Joking is a book about all the meta components of philosophy and advances a framework called formal absolutism, then shows that a complete and consistent framework isn't enough to sufficiently describe reality, resulting in the conclusion that reality could not in principle exist. This apparent contradiction is resolved by another framework, jesterian mechanics, that posits existence as a function of comedy. We also go over how a sense of humor relates to cognition and culture as a true epistemic measurement, how formal logic is a function of humor (not the other way around), how jokes create ethical context (also not the other way around), and how they all support a metaphysics entirely existent in comedy. With this we can cut the perennial Gordian knots of philosophy, the

[1] The Flesch-Kinkaid scale doesn't take technical vocabulary into account, so the reading difficulty of this book is probably a good deal higher than the noted 16th-grade level.
[2] James Ladyman suggests that philosophy has become more technical simply because it tracks other fields of academic study, all of which themselves have become more technical in recent history — https://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/69-in-praise-of-specialisation
[3] And either way, it's probably not very valuable to be delinguinated by the incompetence of others, so I'm going to write how I write.
[4] A quote I steal wholesale from Nishida Kitarō's preface to his 1958 work, *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*.

transcendental horizons, the epistemic nihilisms, the Stirner and Žižek memetics. This is done with insouciant regard for the anodyne, so don't take this book too seriously.

This introduction is an introduction to a philosophy book about all the meta's of philosophy, so I figure this introduction should be an introduction to philosophy itself. Philosophy is the first, oldest, and largest discipline, leading to the founding of the first university by Plato and the formalization of logic and science by Aristotle, as well as spawning many other fields of study with recent major additions being psychology, sociology, the philosophy of mind frameworks used in AGI research, and so on.

Philosophy concerns itself with the broadest and most general of questions. Philosophers do not study how rocks be or how living organisms be, as those are what geologists and biologists study, respectively. Instead the philosopher studies the nature of being itself, without specificity. In a sense the philosopher studies the unlimited, as any specificity of study limits the nature of the study. Where all other disciplines are narrow in their scope and application, philosophy is broad and universally applicable.

It is easy to argue that philosophy is the most practical of all studies, since an application of philosophy is 'the good' and knowing what 'the good' is means you will know what is good to do in any particular situation.[5] It is also easy to argue that studying philosophy is the most important thing you can do, since asking the question of what importance is, deliberating its answer, and analyzing its accuracy, are all part of the philosophical practice such that we could not define importance or grant anything as being important without philosophy, making philosophy the mother of important things.

Congratulations, it's your first day of PHIL 101. Let's start by defining Truth. If you're one of the people that says, "Truth is subjective," you will have a hard time here. Believing the thing that grounds the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is itself subjective is deleterious.

Too many dilettantes, the pseudo-intellectuals, too many state, "*My* Truth is different than *your* Truth." Intended or not, this is dishonest and harmful. It is done for the sake of diminishing conversation, to be contrarians. The implications of objectivity being subjective are overlooked by these fakers; what the Russians call the *obrazovanshchina*.[6] The first statement that Truth is subjective asserts that it is true that Truth is subjective. What directly follows is that it's subjective that Truth is subjective, so it's subjective that Truth *isn't* subjective, which means that it's true that Truth isn't subjective. This standard reductive technique is called transitive casing. So we know Truth isn't subjective, but this still doesn't give us the definition.

The not-too-narrow and not-too-broad definition of Truth is, "what is," as in what is the case. A common objection to this is, "That is not what Truth is." The self-defeating nature of this objection is its use of the initial definition, "That is not **what** Truth **is**."[7] This might be what we call a recursive or self-actuating definition and lets us know the latter of the two initially quoted statements, that perception changes Truth, cannot be true thanks to the apodictic definition we just established. "Meaningless word-games!" Cry subjectivists, nihilists, and anti-cognitivists; they tergiversarily claim that any meaning they ascribe to subjectivity wouldn't feature the same word-games as well. But maybe it really is unfair to assume objectivity exists in the first place, so we'll engage in the travail of subjective prestidigitation and denounce objectivity to see where it takes us.

If you claim that what we call objectivity is itself subjective, as we can only know things through sensory data that is indirect and inaccurate, or further that perception is all you experience and therefore all you can know, then it seems to follow that there is nothing truly objective we could ever know. Ignoring the objective we create by saying perception is all we could ever know (and thus ignoring the initial self-defeating natures of these kinds of claims), we might struggle admitting to objectivity that arises from the possibility of direct self-knowledge or intersubjectively accessible knowledge, given some limitations. Self-knowledge and intersubjectively accessible knowledge are built off agreement amongst subjects, acknowledging that agreement between the self or group-selves isn't itself

[5] This is of course a paraphrase of Socrates and I expect that many who have read the ancients will have seen this before, but it's a nice quick argument worth giving for those who haven't heard it yet.
[6] Meaning the class of society that has higher education but not higher morals.
[7] Mather, Lucas J.; lecture in the month of September, 2014.

objectivity, but posits regardless that in a completely subjective pool you can aggregate subjective things to create objectivity.[8]

You could not take this as meaningful or helpful of course, for inter-subjective knowledge is inter-*subjective*, self-knowledge is knowledge of the *subject*, and the contrarian, whilst trying to instantiate conscription of obsequious polemics for his sophist army, would argue that it has all remained subjective. But now we can just ask where subjectivity comes from? Or better, from where comes *perspective*?

Philosophers like Markus Gabriel or even Chomsky seem to have a hard time with this when talking about the derivations of the objective from the subjective. If it's a problem to say objectivity comes from a pool of subjectivity, as again it would be subjective, then how could the reverse *not* come to be? How can you have subjectivity if not from a pool of objectivity? Subjectivity could not exist unless there was something by which to relay the subject, kind of like an *object referent*. More poignantly, your awareness is of objects, not of yourself having experiences of objects.[9]

This is not to suppose that imagining an opposite to something makes the opposite exist, we are not proving existence by negation here; this is instead to say that subjectivity could not come to exist without an objective basis for the subject to derive its properties or relations. And for the perspectivists, how can perception be all that exists if there was nothing external to perceive in the first place?[10] Worse still, scientific explanations invoke things nobody will ever perceive. E.g., nobody has ever seen a dinosaur, only dinosaur skeletons.[11] Perception is clearly not the basis of knowledge.

Something more fundamentally objective than perception exists, and therefore we can also know 'Big-T Truth' must exist as things must be the case independent of the subject, else it would not be the case that there is a subject, only the subject, and that would not be the case. The failure of many to grant these apodictic positions is the same failure we observe in children who throw tantrums after learning that they can't jump to the moon.[12] Subjectivists are just solipsists in disguise.

If the objective thing is the way the world actually is, then the subjective thing is the way the world isn't. So then, crucially, subjectivity is just the capacity to be wrong. Saying Truth is subjective or art or math or whatever is subjective, just means you could be wrong about something, not that those things are in themselves un-objective. Being subjects ourselves, beings with the capacity to be wrong about something, is quite useful since it allows us to suppose things that are not the case; imagination and creativity hinge around this capacity and we would be worse off without it. However, while we have the capacity to be wrong, to be subjective, this does not mean we lack the capacity for objectivity, which is the capacity to know things in a totalizing way with no absence of detail, no lack of context or information. This book is a discussion of the objective — an examination of reality with no loss of detail or lack of context.

The initial exercise here, this verbal bivouac stationed to dissuade mid-wits, is to demonstrate that many of the perennial issues in philosophy don't need to be disregarded as unanswerable or, "beyond our comprehension," as mental midgets keep saying, but rather that there are affable frameworks that already exist in formal philosophy that let us work these issues out like we just did with Truth and its objectivity. It's hoped the perspicacious readers see this as the necessary initial ablution this kind of work requires. Any clumsy wording up until this point was just to annoy the people who weren't serious about reading further. Any clumsy wording after this point is because I'm a bad writer.

I provide here an up-front appendix to some of the terminology made technical throughout this book. The term *comedy* will usually refer to the metaphysical umbrella or over-arching domain that the ideas discussed in this book fall under. *Jokes* are ontological instances, particular instantiates of existent things. *Humor* is the epistemological framework used to distinguish true things from false things in the world. *Amusement* and *boredom* are the antipodes of the ethical framework developed in the latter half of the book.

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[8] An informal reference for objectivity and intersubjective stuff — http://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/

[9] This is a general sentiment Husserl writes a lot on.

[10] David Banach gives a good account of the perspectivist fallacy here — http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/berk.htm

[11] Paraphrased from the top answer on https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/17959/why-is-the-brain-in-a-vat-scenario-meaningful, and yes stack exchange has a philosophy section, as bad as it is.

[12] "So then, have I become your enemy by telling you the truth?" — Galatians 4:16

As a final introductory note, I claim this book does real work for our discipline. I repudiate the idea that everyone stands on the shoulders of giants. The saying that there is no longer such a thing as an original thought is fantastically small-brained and the amount of misplaced ego it takes to claim one knows this — as if you personally have exhausted thought and know everything left is predicated off a prior thinker — is staggering and worthy of violent removal. The time for weakness and indecision is over, this work was a long time coming and no one is prepared.

Most contemporary philosophers believe philosophy will never come to an end.[13] People outside of academic philosophy look on this as a reason to avoid it — that it will just go on forever asking ultimately meaningless questions like, "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?"[14] And worse, that it will arrive at even more meaningless answers like, "42."[15]

While I am personally inclined to believe philosophy is a project that will eventually come to an end, I also don't really care. It's far more interesting to point out that these idiots have solved their own problem and are complaining about a great accomplishment as if it were a grave defeat. Philosophy goes on forever? Oh, so we'll never run out of ideas to explore and we'll have infinitely inexhaustible amusement? What a tragedy. Let me light a candle for your loss.

This chapter is about the place of philosophy, what we do with it, and how to do it right. In that order. I also briefly address why I think philosophy will come to an end in the closing section.

:: What Philosophy Is ::

"Too much or too little philosophy too early or too late in life makes monsters and mavericks out of men."

Friedrich Nietzsche

I wish to open by establishing what philosophy is not. Philosophy is not about being open minded. It's far too easy to open your mind to something and it's much more difficult to correctly parse the information you open up to. This means philosophy is a practice of learning what to *close* your mind to. Almost everything everyone says, and all of what most people say, is nonsense baby-talk garbage that doesn't mean or track anything at all. You have to learn how to shut out all the noise in order to find the signal, and if you can't learn to do this then you forfeit your mind and die like a dog in the street.

Philosophy is not about asking questions. This would imply a sort of uselessness and triviality to philosophy that unsubstantially debases all the participants of, and commentators on, the field — an *incuria sui* for those reading. The cliché definition of philosophy says that philosophy is about trying to find fundamental truths of reality or existence; this means the answers are more important than the questions. Asking questions is important only as a means to find answers, and so the answers hold significantly more weight. Many people object to this without realizing that if the answers weren't more important, then there wouldn't be a need to ask the questions to begin with. People don't study Descartes' *Meditations* because he asked what he could ultimately know about reality — plenty of people have asked that — instead people study his *Meditations* because of how he answered. Failure to understand this will mean not only that the discussion ends here, but that you've failed to recognize that this work itself answers a small few questions (including but not limited to why you started reading it in the first place).

Philosophy is not the love of knowledge. Philosophy literally translates to the love of wisdom, and wisdom means applying knowledge in the right way, a form of *knowing better*. This is not a minor detail, it is the main distinction which sets the study of philosophy aside from all others. Listing facts

[13] The short article *Will Philosophy Ever Come to an End?* by Eric Schwitzgebel lays out some standard views on this topic.
[14] I believe it was one of Plato's *summoners* in which he asked why a mirror swaps things left and right but not up and down. The takeaway here is that these questions are not meant as an ends to real knowledge, but a means for thinking about more important things.
[15] I have no sympathy for people who believe the works of Douglas Adams are deeply philosophical.

about the world is something anyone could do, but determining what the nature of facthood is, and who ought to do what with them, is the exclusive privilege of the philosopher.

So philosophy is not the practice of concerning yourself with delineating the set of facts for particular beings or to which conceptual categories those facts should be grouped, this is instead the boring task of taxonomists. But philosophy *is* about *this*, the thing we've been doing in the last few paragraphs, the **meta**. And while again we are looking for fundamental truths about reality, it is more accurate to say we look for *why* they are true. In this we find the best definition of philosophy to be the practice of discovering why there are fundamental truths to reality, if there are any at all.

What is the status of being such that we can or can't say anything about its being? By what modes, mediums, or relations can it be, and what are the properties or state of affairs whereby anything can be granted or given? This is the domain in which philosophy most deeply operates. Given this definition of philosophy it should become clear to you, the reader, that questions people pose as supposedly philosophical wherein they repurpose definitions against themselves, or say that social justice is a philosophical concern, or whatever else, are all in actuality wholly unphilosophical. Arguing against this is antithetical to doing philosophy, which would be a sort of, I don't know, anti-philosophy. And how meta it is that I, the writer, just referenced you, someone who has yet to even read this. It was not possible for me to know with certainty ahead of time that you would read this, and yet here I have already addressed you — reification of the meta.

Every chapter after this one is about the logical end to the meta in philosophy: what is the absolute and totalizing first point in thought, or time, or being, or whatever, and whereby does anything derive itself past that point? Anyone who thinks people like Kant, or Hegel, or Wittgenstein, or whoever even remotely tried to answer this question would be wrong. I will be writing on these topics *as if no one had written on these matters before.*[16]

While I used this chapter to open questions about the placement or purpose of philosophy, I am not going to question it further; the other chapters of this book will position answers to the questions I just outlined and won't waste time on opening further questions about the status of philosophy since the work of philosophy is not to open questions but to close them.

Finally this means metametaphilosophy, the study of the study of philosophy, ironically does not fall under the definition of philosophy, as metaphilosophy is a study of a specific nature of being, namely the nature of philosophy's being. Since philosophy is the study of being without specificity, the study of the meta, this makes metaphilosophy useful only in directing the philosopher on what is worth cathexis.

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:: The Methodological Direction Of Philosophy ::

"The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Alfred North Whitehead

Philosophy traditionally has a clear progression through its three primary fields — metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, in that order. You first try to figure out what exists and the basis for that existence (metaphysics), how you can know things or how anything can pass information to another thing (epistemology), and how any of this or anything else ought to be practically applied to the world (ethics). In this order almost every philosopher of the pre-modern world, meaning antiquity and the medieval eras, developed systematic frameworks for explaining and probing the world.

It wasn't until the modern era, and fully adopted by the existentialists, that a different order was successfully completed for creating a rigorous systematic worldview. The existentialists and their progenitors work backwards, starting with what is supposed to be actionable in the world given your own particular and subjective position in it (ethics), what they could know or find to be actionable (epistemology), and then discovering what systems or laws governed the world they act in

[16] Yes this is a reference to Descartes' quote, yes it's a really clever joke, no I won't marry your daughter.

(metaphysics). The former traditional method is also sometimes called a 'top-down' approach with the latter modern method being a 'bottom-up' approach. There are pros and cons to both approaches, but neither is what characterizes post-modernity so I'll skip ahead.

I believe it is the singular work of Nishida Kitarō from 1911 until around 1946, which was the period of time his books were being written, who came up with a 'middle-out' system.[17] Nishida starts with epistemology (specifically in unifying the subject-object distinctions between methods of logic, solving problems with its formalizations by Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel) and then derives ethics and metaphysics outwards from that central position. Among other things, it was also Nishida that was the first to successfully formalize the unity between eastern and western modes of thought into an internally consistent, rigorous, systematic framework, far more robustly than Heidegger or Husserl achieved, and by the admission of his contemporaries was also the first 'real' philosopher of Japan.[18] This is important because this was roughly the same period of time that the modern scientific method became the most popular explanatory method for phenomenon in the world, which is itself an epistemology-first view of the world.[19]

All of these approaches to explaining the world are interesting in their own right, and I personally believe Nishida's approach was the most revealing, but all of them fail to be completionist frameworks, meaning that by having separate and distinct fields of philosophy whereby metaphysics only at some distance informs epistemology and epistemology only at some distance frames ethics, or any other arrangement of those studies, you lose the game and fail at explaining the world with totality.

While most of the history of philosophy has been spent on discovering the proper distinctions between categories of things in the world, I think it's far more valuable now to demonstrate what distinctions are *not* proper and to do the work of collapsing distinctions instead. Just as Maxwell collapsed the distinction between electricity and magnetism into electro-magnetism, or as Einstein collapsed distinctions between space and time into space-time, we ought to continue this trend and reduce more of the world.[20]

This book is divided into chapters named after individuated fields or studies within philosophy, but my approach is very much one of unity; I believe there is a true, ultimate, and totalizing basis, grounding, or predication for all of existence, reality, and being, and this singular grounding, this predicate of predicates, is the thing from which all others are derived. So as we develop the arguments in the rest of this book keep in mind this is all working towards a singular unifying explanation for all things and that if we succeed in doing so then we will have discovered a 'theory of everything' wherein when we give an explanation for something we indistinctively give the thing in itself.

This is not like Chomsky's sophistic ideas of the world existing as language (and yes this is his real ontology, I know it's disappointing), nor is this to confuse a thing itself for the symbolic representation of the thing. We wouldn't want to confuse the map for the terrain. Rather, we find that an explanation is predicated by its being and therein being is not totally distinct from its explanation.

To clarify what this means and the problems it would solve: if we have something truly fundamental, then we have the derivation of formal logic, of space and time, of all enumeration (meaning all mathematical relations), and any further explanations derived by those things, all given in a single instantiate indistinct from each other. This would be a powerful tool for explaining the *why* of the world, concomitant to the *how* and the *what*.

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:: What It Means To Be A Philosopher ::

"Think lightly of yourself and deeply of the world."

[17] Yes, that was a *Silicon Valley* reference, and while I'm usually unapologetic about bad jokes, I am sorry for this one.

[18] Many sources from the time and many more since then consistently report Nishida as being Japan's first 'real' philosopher. It's so ubiquitous in fact that there's no proper singular source for this; you can read almost any formal history of Japanese philosophy and will consistently find this claim being made; Tanabe Hajime was debatably the first.

[19] As a side note I think there is irony here since the scientific method does not 'explain' anything but instead verifies or falsifies explanations; this is an important distinction if you make the mistake of thinking science has the capacity to directly inform you on how the world works.

[20] And probably by Hegelian dialectical method, "Creation through destruction."

ietzsche said whatever doesn't kill you makes you stronger, however I've found it's often the case that what doesn't kill you significantly weakens you instead. Syphilis, for example. Of course Nietzsche was talking about mental strength, not physical, but I would argue the syphilis weakened him mentally too.

It seems clear to me that it is precisely what *does* kill you that makes you stronger. The philosopher's whole world will die a hundred times a day before a real thought produces itself. It is in the death of many ideas that real thinking does its job and knowledge is attained.

As philosophy is the love of wisdom, the love of applying knowledge in the right way, it's not enough to know, you must also do. Therefore, if you don't apply your knowledge to the world, you are not doing philosophy. Doing philosophy is work, it gets something accomplished in the world, it murders the world a hundred times a day in fact. If you study philosophy but are not getting anything done with it, you are not a philosopher.

Those who are really serious about pursuing philosophy will end up alienating many people in their lives.[21] Family is always the first casualty, friends follow shortly after that. This is not just because people find philosophers highly annoying, which Diogenes would counter with, "Of what use is a philosopher who doesn't hurt anybody's feelings?" It is also because anyone obsessively involved in studying methods towards Truth will find that no one in the world other than philosophers have any that work.

All the religious people, all the scientists, all the sophists the world over will become unimpressive to you, worthy of comprehensive derision when you discover how all of their confidence is unearned and backed by a kind of pathological ignorance that systematically infects their cognitive capacities, making them fundamentally as reasonable as rocks.[22]

Now I'm no better than anybody else, but no one is better than me. As for an introductory exegesis on the only valid mode of the contemporary pursuit of philosophy and also for my personal impulse, the late W.V.D. Busby has said that there is no reason to do philosophy anymore, or think at all, unless you honestly believe you have the biggest dick of all human history and for all time to come. This is a very serious notion, "Unless you really believe you're better than Hegel, then shut up and stick to reading your betters." And more sharply, unless you really believe you bring to the game something fundamentally devastating that no one else has ever considered or even had the capacity to consider, then you bring absolutely nothing.

To fight this would be an admission of your ineptitude, and we're short on time. The field of philosophy is so absurdly over-saturated, contains so much noise, that any sign of a signal has been lost. So it's time everyone stop talking because there can only be one philosophical messiah, *and the title is mine*. I have the biggest dick. I am the signal. And claims at pretention aside, to dismiss me for saying this is to deny the necessity of thinking this way if anyone is to say anything at all on the topic of philosophy in these trying times.[23]

Not only does the rest of this book meet these Icarusian claims, but it was easy for me to do. I have solved all perennial problems of philosophy, obviating entire fields of study yet to even be invented. If you think it is only in some thin sense of 'forever' that I will remain the champion, then this is a challenge to you — step up or forever relinquish the title.

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:: Eschatology ::

"Extreme boredom provides its own antidote."
François de La Rochefoucauld

[21] Including other philosophers.
[22] "A beast is driven to pasture by blows, *and blows alone*!" - W.V.D. Busby
[23] The pretzeling of thought many tie themselves in while trying to deny this is a taste of a greater salting yet to come.

In the opening remarks to this chapter I said I believed that philosophy is a project that will eventually end. I want to describe why I think this is true, and then also prove that it will become untrue.

Philosophy has most generally tried to answer the questions, "Why is there stuff? What kind of stuff is it? How do we learn about the stuff? What should we do with the stuff?" This is a pretty finite set of questions that almost self-evidently would have a similarly finite set of answers. In fact, one might surmise that the whole of the world then is exhaustively explained in four sentences.[24]

I truly believe this is the case. Those four questions have definitive answers and the answers are ineluctable. However, humans also make games. Sometimes we make games that contain entire worlds which operate under fundamentally different laws than our own. A game is like a problem we invent just to see if we can solve it. So after we have gone to the ends of the universe with our minds, we can simply use those same minds to extend the universe in whatever ways we see fit.

It is clear to me philosophy has an end and just the same it is clear to me that the end of philosophy is but the beginning of the real work.

[24] There is stuff because of comedy. It is the joke kind of stuff. We learn about stuff through humor. We should do amusing things with the stuff.

Wouldn't it be funny if not a single person knew anything at all about how the world fundamentally works? Wouldn't that be something? This chapter opens two cases, one against the possibility of creation schema in religion and one against the possibility of the multiverse in science. This is done to undermine both religion and science as authorities on issues of existence, issues that have otherwise historically been the purview of academic philosophers. If there are serious fundamental concerns with the epistemic structures of both religion and science, then it follows that a wholly separate and distinct architecture is necessary for understanding reality.

:: A Case Against Creation Specific to Externalization Schema ::

"God is a comedian playing to an audience afraid to laugh."
Voltaire

From down the hall in your university buildings you can hear idiots say, "You can't prove or disprove the existence of a god." A similar line and just as intransigent, "We can't know if there's ultimately a creator or not." But you can't prove or disprove that the universe was created fifteen seconds ago. How do you know that we weren't created fifteen seconds ago with memories of existing longer than fifteen seconds ago?[25]

These statements are so common for what I imagine to be the stranglehold on reasoning society has given to induction over deduction; it should be understood that inductive reasoning cannot possibly answer questions like this and the reliance on inductive forms of reasoning for both scientific and religious debates are suicidally boring for this very reason.[26] No, really, here's another — you can't prove or disprove that you can't prove or disprove the existence of something that you can't prove or disprove. And before you swallow that revolver, do you know why you can't prove or disprove this? Play the obvious and I'll tell you that it's because these questions are predicated on the most debased form of reasoning; all not to mention these are obviated by the discoveries of the private language arguments.[27]

I believe all the major existentialist and meta-religious texts in recent history, *Fear and Trembling* as the biggest example, are overly emotional, too 'dark like my soul' yet ironically end up being brightly optimistic in their conclusions, as if it was *because* of these hyper-emotional responses to experience, *because* of these extremely dark and hyper-individualized packages of ennui that they know, "It was all worth it." Life is suffering and that's supposed to make it worth living or whatever they say. I believe these are anodyne views and wholly unoriginal, so for the rest of this essay I'll be pushing the exact opposite — that life is actually great and full of worth, but you should kill yourself anyways. Take this as, "It's good enough to die for."

The half-in positions taken as whole, their agnostic *can't-prove-or-disprove* arguments, only serve as a weak try at skepticism, saying that there are things that are the case that we cannot know to be the case. Thankfully these arguments are not ineluctable, you can dismiss them quickly and as concomitant return with arguments *a fortiori*. Pain is life for those who assert the agnostic position regarding square circles and married bachelors; an external creator is no different.

[25] This is also directly in line with what are called Boltzmann brains and if you want a good counter-argument to them, check Sean Carroll's *Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad*.
[26] *Ad suicidum*?
[27] Specifically remarks 243-304 in *Philosophical Investigations* by Wittgenstein.

The idea that we can't know if there was a creator also makes it so that the one asserting is okay with making claims to existence without justification but denies it is okay to dismiss the same claims without justification. As the popular saying goes, "That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence,"[28] but a much better saying is, "It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatsoever for supposing it is true."[29] To make this very clear, all the atheists that say something like they don't believe in a creator but that it's possible one exists, you are boorish agnostics and nothing better.

This fake middle used to abate the problems of holding a real position is cowardly and intellectually defeatist. If you think it is even possible a creator exists, then that possibility is enough for a creator to actually exist, and it pains me to mention this form of the ontological argument in my approach because it has been beaten so strongly by so many notable philosophers in history that if I also include a citation for it additional to its mention I might follow through with *actual suicide*. It's not roulette if every chamber is loaded, but it is pretty Russian.

As the final nail, and complete sacrifice of having this essay be any good, I invoke the wager. Pascal's Wager posits that humans all bet with their lives either that God exists or not. Given the mere possibility that a god actually does exist, and assuming an infinite gain or loss associated with belief or disbelief in said god (represented by an eternity in heaven or hell), a rational person should live as though a god exists and seek to believe in said god. If a god does not actually exist, such a person will have only a finite loss (some pleasures, luxuries, etcetera). As an atheist you can't claim that there is no creator and simultaneously claim that you can't know, as that leaves Pascal's Wager *a fortiori*.

To anticipate a counter-point on Pascal's Wager being in a Christian framework, and its infinite gain/loss being specific to the Christian afterlife, you could just as easily pick any other religion. To anticipate yet a further counter-point on the infinite gain/loss being under different contexts for different religions (or not infinite at all in their frameworks), the problem here would be in assuming that there *needs* to be spiritual reward in order for this issue to still exist. You can remove religious framework entirely from Pascal's Wager and the infinite gain/loss becomes an epistemic representation of perma-death being satisfied or dissatisfied by known truths. This means Pascal's Wager remains irrespective of religious or spiritual implications.

Philosophy, and human existence most broadly, is about trying to discover truth, and death puts a finality to your discoveries. When you are dead you are dead eternally, so under my stripped version of the wager there is eternal (read: infinite) gain or loss if you died right or wrong, respectively.[30] It doesn't matter what kind of creator god you posit or what consequences follow from that god's rules, the matter of truth still remains. If you die correct, then you will have died being correct for an infinite amount of time, and if you die incorrect, then you will have died being incorrect for an infinite amount of time. Think of this like the line from *A Scanner Darkly*, "we'll wind up dead this way, knowing very little and getting that little fragment wrong too."[31] In this sense, Pascal's Wager is still a valid concern for the atheist that asserts s/he cannot know if there was a creator god, regardless of what religious framework does or does not back the wager.

But this is not just an attack on atheists — no one is safe — we will gut all the theists as well. We can know definitively if there was an external creation force or not, and we conclude definitively that it's impossible for an external creation force to exist.[32]

"Hold on," you might be saying, "you're only just now about to start the actual argument in this section?" Yes, and remember suicide is *always* an option. "Stop joking about suicide, my best friend commi-" If talking about suicide is too much for you, then the horrors of pathological adherence to doctrine, scientific or religious, should have been what set you over the edge since those paths perverse your capacity for personhood so regularly that they're the same as *actually committing suicide*. If you've already lost patience for this, finish the job, stop reading and kill the last thread by not bothering to test it any further and then ask if it would it be *right over their heads*, or *right through their heads*?

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[28] This is commonly known as Hitchen's Razor.
[29] This is uncommonly known as Russell's Razor.
[30] Counters like Pascal's Mugging are sidestepped since there is no longer 'magic' involved — https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/pascal-s-mugging.
[31] Philip K. Dick has probably produced the greatest number of works to which we can confidently say the movies were better than the books.
[32] Since someone asked, this is not a kind of solipsism. Solipsism fails any kind of internal consistency test as Schwitzgebel & Moore demonstrate in *Experimental Evidence for the Existence of an External World*.

I want to really drive in a side-point here that there is little meaningful distinction between the scientist and the theist: physicists commonly point to the notion that there may have never been a point in time that the universe didn't exist (dangerously similar to *'an eternal God'*), and similarly between the two worldviews, this still does not satisfy the question of existence, as with limited concepts of time they still desire to know when there became something instead of nothing. Is it not strange to think there would be a point in time when time didn't exist? We learn nothing here about the nothing from which we have something.

Okay, who cares, I get it, was there a creator or not? There are two standard definitions of an external creation force for the universe and neither pan out. In religious framing we call these two options non-deistic and deistic, which means a perfect and imperfect god, respectively. If we start with the idea of a perfect god, the standing objection is with the logical conflictions of how perfection is defined (see: *Perfect Island Argument*). Perfection defined as having all three characteristics — omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence — leads to saying that you cannot be both omniscient and omnipotent at the same time due to the fact that either you are all-knowing and thus know the future, meaning the future is predetermined and you are powerless to change it, **or** you are all-powerful and have the power to change the future (read: free will), meaning the future is not predetermined and so you cannot know what will happen. This is an old argument, I know, but it means you cannot be both omnipotent and omniscient at the same time.

The recourse to this is in limiting your definition of gods to that of a deistic, meaning imperfect, one. This limited version is one who is capable of 'all possible' knowledge, 'all possible' power, etcetera, which is close to the original definition but is intended to disallow for logical inconsistencies. Even granting *this* fails, because it would still be possible to know the future (see: *Laplace's Demon*) or merely predict it through sufficiently advanced mathematical models.[33] It's not impossible for an all-knowing (all *possible* knowledge) being to know all *possible* futures and thus accurately predict outcomes; and having all physical power (all *possible* power) does **not** make changing the future possible because the laws of physics would be the limitation on *possible* power and thus the limitation on change, yet you would also know exactly what to do to avoid the predicted outcome. So despite their try at claiming gods cannot know the future or change it, only 'all-possible' futures and changes, the illogicism persists; you have predetermined futures that can be undetermined, *ruh roh*.

An objection that I haven't see anyone else make yet is with the problems of an in-practice omnipresence. The definition of omnipresence as being all-present is too broad and the better definition (as the theists retract into their modal 'possibilities') would mean to be in *all possible* places at once.

The following may seem like a reach, but hey let's see if our hand makes contact with anything. It seems obvious to me that this definition mates omnipresence with the idea that for every possible action that could happen in the universe, there are an infinite number of parallel universes where the alternate possible actions did occur.[34] This seems like a requirement of 'all possible' omnipresence because all possible places would have to exist in order for it to be possible to exist in all possible places. So infinitely many modal or parallel universes would have to exist in order for omnipresence to be possible.

The problem now is that any logically possible place you can describe would have to be an actual, existent place, and so if there are two places who are both logically possible individually, but impossible together, we get a contradiction and the multiverse implodes. An example of this is a universe where you kept reading this book versus a universe where you stopped reading it; you cannot both be reading it and not reading it at the same time in the same regard, so only one of those universes can be actual and yet both must exist for omnipresence to exist.

If you think I skipped a step here or this just isn't true, the latter section in this chapter on modality in physics fleshes this out in much greater detail. So before you say this is losing momentum or that my writing is just so awkward and contrived that it's become impossible to follow or agree with, then okay nerd whatever, where's *your* book?

[33] Summarizing these standard positions is painful for me and I'd much rather kill myself than actually cite a source for it.
[34] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/

I'm writing on science and religion as if they are the same thing — if this is confusing then it might be that you aren't removed enough to understand that this is the correct way to talk about these topics. Remember, "When in doubt, zoom out."[35]

No one has ever read this far, congratulations. I'll close the arguments now. The demonstration that perfect gods don't exist leads to theists retreating to imperfect gods, and by then you know they were really hurting anyways. So we can't posit a god (or whatever you want to call it) as the external creation force, which means we don't have a creator qua external creation force. This probably sounded like words in a blender but it's important to understand since it disallows popular ideas like Nick Bostrom's simulation theory.[36]

And either way, at least now we're past the over-simplification of the last 2,400 years of theological metaphysics and the threat of suicide has been made salutary; at least now we can start talking about the thing itself — the possibility of creation itself, without relation to religious or scientific schema.

"What if god is the universe, or the universe is god?" You ask like an annoying nu-age hippie. That would not be an *external* creator force for the universe since things are not outside themselves with relation to their being (unless you're Derrida or something). The physical universe is not besides itself in terms of existence. If the universe was god, then god creating the universe means the universe created itself, which again is not an *external* creation force but rather an internal, self-actuating one. Further, this is hardly god-like by almost any imagining of gods, save maybe Fichte's or Spinoza's. No, this looks more like actuation itself than anything else.

This is all to say that so long as religions posit creation qua an external creator (which they almost universally do), then they offer no definitive, ultimate, totalizing, or significant answers to the question of how reality came into existence. We now lay bleeding out from this self-inflicted wound, with no religious recourse to examine the question of being and while this section has made arguments against the problem of creation in religion you will find in the last section of this chapter that science does no better at examining this problem.

Let's say, given what was presented, that you accept that the universe has no external creation force but you believe that the universe created itself, i.e. you believe in something like the Big Bang as the ultimate progenitor — this leaves us asking why? If we can know *how* it can exist, this still tells us nothing about *why*. So why does the universe exist? Because we wouldn't be here to ask if it didn't?[37] If we have the worldview that the universe is a *something from nothing* (and spare me, I know things are posited as having existed before the Big Bang), then a gaping hole is still left in the metaphysics of that worldview.

The answer this book arrives at is 'cosmic comedy' because cosmic comedy ends the generation of questions like, "Why does the universe exist to begin with?" and "Where does my spirit go after I die?" As these questions are no different than asking, "When snow melts, where does the white go?"

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:: The Impossible Simulation Theory ::

"Capable of warmth, courage, friendship, decency and creativity, the species too often opts for amorality, cowardice, aversion, self-indulgence, and vile mediocrity."
Harlan Ellison

[35] Instead of fellating your audience, insult them!
[36] Lex Fridman's interview of Bostrom is an accessible way to get exposed to this idea — https://youtu.be/rfKiTGj-zeQ.
[37] The anthropic principle is tired and circular.

This will be a short piece bridging the religion and science sections since I believe simulation theory is itself only pseudo-scientific and mostly blind faith. Simulation theory as originally formulated and popularized by Nick Bostrom says roughly that just as it is becoming easier for us to simulate small universes inside computers, it is also becoming increasingly possible for us to simulate large universes inside those same computers, ultimately culminating in the ability to simulate many galaxies with complete detail. Further, that since this is possible, then it is similarly possible that the simulated people who evolve out of our simulated universes would themselves acquire enough intelligence to simulate universes on their simulated computers, ad infinitum.

The thesis of Bostrom's paper is that since there is not just possibly, but probably, an infinite series of simulated universes, the likelihood that we occupy the original one is vanishingly small, making it so that we essentially have a one-out-of-infinity chance of not being simulated ourselves.[38]

To quickly obliterate this idiotic idea that has gripped so many otherwise intelligent people, many of whom I deeply respect (including Nick Bostrom himself), our universe, by almost ubiquitous contemporary consensus, is infinite. To simulate infinite space you would need infinite processing power, a feature that would itself require infinite space. So for simulation theory to be true, the universe doing the simulating would have to dedicate the entirety of its existence to the singular task of simulating. This is obviously not possible, so simulation theory can't be about an infinite universe.

Nick would probably agree, and he says that these other civilizations, "would have enough computing power to run hugely many ancestor-simulations even while using only a tiny fraction of their resources for that purpose."[39] His point being that you don't need to simulate an infinite universe, you could simulate a finite one with less detail than the simulating universe itself had, and you would only have to simulate a bubble around a group of people that made it look as if their universe was infinite but in actuality ended only a few feet out of their collective reach.

The critical failure is that this is ultimately no different than Descartes' evil demon who systematically deceives all your senses and mental faculties. Just the same it is semantically equivalent to the brain-in-a-vat premise.[40] Both of these have large bodies of literature that have piled up around them showcasing how they are structurally incapable of justifying themselves, and as consequence means simulation theory is structurally incapable of justifying itself too.

Notably, Descartes' evil demon was first disproven by Descartes himself, as his *Meditations* is explicitly about how you could discover all the truths of the real world despite being completely deceived about them initially. The literature around brain-in-a-vat arguments is muddier since it is syntactically more clever and has therefore tricked more people into believing it is possible, but Putnam himself was also the first to disprove brains-in-vats and it's analogue to the all-deceiving demon means it can be dismissed in a similar way.[41] Not to mention there is no reason to believe something without any evidence whatsoever supposing it is true.[42]

As a much worse problem, if somehow I'm wrong and Bostrom is right, not only do we live in *The Truman Show*, we also have a new and improved form of Aristotle's prime mover to contend with. Forget trying to determine the first cause of our universe, *our* prime mover was *simulated*, so now we have to determine our prime mover's prime mover! Talk about turtles all the way down.[43]

In turn, simulation theory doesn't have any legs left to stand on and I'd really press any contemporary philosopher on this if they still believed it since, past these critiques, belief in the theory becomes dogmatic.

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[38] Like all of Nick's papers, this one is immaculately written, which makes it painful to me that I have to argue against it — https://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Pulling, of course, from *Reason, Truth and History* by Hilary Putnam.
[41] Specifically, here is a diagram of the problem Putnam describes — https://snerx.com/img/BrainsInVats.png.
[42] A recapitulation of Russell's Razor.
[43] I feel absolutely no shame or regret in making these horrible pedantic dad jokes and any cringe or confusion people feel when reading them only makes me feel justified in forcing them on you.

:: A Case Against The Multiverse Specific to Infinite Multiplicity ::

"People who are ignorant of their religion (the non-religion religion of the West), and of the nature of society, laugh at the Indian for having slaves in a caste system, unawares that modern day vegans are walking Chandalas. The vegan doesn't sacrifice the cow because the cow is their Totem Animal, but Westerners, unable to think anything besides utility, understand as 'they worship the cow because it gives them useful milk'."

W.V.D. Busby

o those who dogmatically hold on to science as an explanatory framework, I'd like you to consider that the laws of physics are just tautologies. This is the greatest reductio and if you got it then you can skip the rest of this chapter but if you didn't get it then keep reading.

A multiverse capable of infinite multiplicity with respect to fully paralleled universes (from here on called the infinite parallel) is *a priori* impossible. There are three main reasons the infinite parallel cannot exist, the first being the argument of contrafinity that says potential infinity is necessarily actual infinity and actual infinity is impossible, the second being the causal collapse argument which says that there is a metaphysical and epistemic dilemma, and the third being the impossibility of identity distinction which demonstrates issues resulting from Leibnitz's Law. From these arguments amalgamated I argue that the infinite multiplicity of universes is in principle impossible, and that because multiverse theory by its nature requires an infinite multiplicity of universes, that the existence of the multiverse is in principle impossible.

Multiverse theory gained traction as an aftereffect of quantum theory, particularly after Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger both independently discovered models for quantum interpretation. This is important because the discoveries from quantum theory, which deals with the smallest scale in physics, were then applied to the largest scale — entire universes.

Heisenberg's formulation of quantum theory was such that physical variables used in equations for particles never have static values but instead deviate within a given range; Schrödinger's formulation of quantum theory was such that particles' paths were described by a function detailing dynamically shifting waves. In both cases quantum theory is principally founded on a multiplicity of data that exist per object-event because the objects' variables or wave functions (respectively) contain values for multiple instances at all times.[44] Experimental work like this may bend metaphysics to further understand the subject of their study, and so it is understandable that these theories as just defined were bent into the metaphysical view of modal realism, but they were never bent back and this is the core problem.

Modal realism is the view popularized by David Lewis that all possible worlds are actual worlds, and therefore anything that is nomologically possible is something that is actual and currently existent.[45] Since both the variable ranges and wave functions of the respective QM theories suppose a real multiplicity of states, or modes of being, this can be called a sort of modal Platonism. There are lots of possible things that could be said about this view, but the actual thing to be said is that Neil Sinhababu wrote the greatest unintentional reductio concerning it titled *Possible Girls* which is a paper wherein he argues that if modal realism is true, then you can enter into meaningful romantic relationships with specific people in other worlds to maintain a trans-world relationship.[46]

Sinhababu believes in modal realism, but his paper serves as an example of the absurdities that modal realism generates, so the reductio wasn't intentional, but it's there. I don't want to lay into him too much but it would be worth reading his paper for comedic value. The tie-over here is that physicists did the exact same thing that Sinhababu did, except their trans-world lovers are entire other universes.

More accurately, modal realism was applied to quantum theory by the physics community due to the response around quantum interpretations originally prompted by Niels Bohr. Ironically, Bohr's view explicitly excludes modal realism, even though it gained the most traction during the time and it's the view that lead to the direct application of modal realism in quantum theory. Bohr's view is now

[44] Deutsch, David. "The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World." pp 333-334.
[45] Lewis, David. "Convention." 1968, p 208.
[46] Sinhababu, Neil. "Possible Girls." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* (2008), 89: 254–260. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00319.x

more popularly called the *Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics* and it asserted that quantum theory was a complete description of reality, even though the two quantum frameworks used, Heisenberg's and Schrödinger's frameworks, were not consistent with each other.

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics was widely purchased when it hit the scientific markets due to what David Deutsch describes as a rapid retreat of the theoretical-physics community into instrumentalism, which was the popular philosophical disposition of the time (and remains fairly popular), positing that it didn't matter *why* something worked, only that it did, and so there was no real reason to pursue the *why*, only use what works (as an instrument, hence the name) and participate in the, "shut-up-and-calculate interpretation of quantum theory."[47] Deutsch also notes there were structural failings with the Copenhagen interpretation, namely that it created what is known as *the paradox of Wigner's friend*.

The paradox is generated when you apply quantum theory to quantum-level observations on another observer, for example: if Schrödinger's cat experiment is carried out, and you have a friend that knows the results and is happy or sad depending on if the cat is alive or dead, then is the resultant state of the system, that the cat is alive and your friend is happy, or that the cat is dead and your friend is sad, determined only after your friend tells you the outcome or was it determined prior to you being told? The question is meant to show contradictory views about whether another observer can fall into the same quantum duality that non-observers in the experiment can fall into. Because of this failing and the retreat into instrumentalism, Bohr had cast a dangerous veil over the study, which Deutsch characterizes explicitly as 'bad philosophy', not merely because it was outright false, but because it, "actively prevents the growth of other knowledge."[48] And this is where the last relevant historical point, Hugh Everett III, comes in.

Juxtapositional to the problems created by the largely adopted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, Hugh Everett had an alternative interpretation for quantum mechanics that was believed to avoid the aforementioned problems. The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that all possible states, or all histories of a wave-particle, are all *actual* and never 'collapsed', which means that for every possible particle state or history, there is a universe in which that state/history was carried out, which is where the more popular name of *Many Worlds Interpretation* comes from.[49] This is also where modal realism infected physics proper and began the pit-spawn of contemporary theory regarding the multiverse. I don't mean to accuse Everett for the entirety of the popularity of modal realism in multiverse theory, as Everett was dealing with quantum theory and not the multiverse, but the adoption and popularization of modal realism in physics is largely due to Everett's work and it shows up in all contemporary formulations of the multiverse, so he played a large hand in this, intentional or not.

Additionally, there is a nuance to Everett's work that is important, namely the explicit inclusion of uncountable infinities. Everett himself explicated this feature of his view by responding to Boris Podolsky's remark at a conference on the foundations of quantum mechanics held at the Xavier University of Cincinnati in 1962.[50] After Everett had stated that "it is tenable to assert that all the elements [of superposition of states] simultaneously coexist," Podolsky returned with, "It looks like we would have a non-denumerable infinity of worlds," to which Everett answered, "Yes."[51] That statement right there, that inclusion of infinite multiplicity *ab initio*, of an infinite modal realism in quantum theory, is the source of much of the frustration many people have with these views in theoretical physics, and in particular the frustration I have with multiverse theory as I believe this makes it bleed into absurdism.

So what is the multiverse? We should be careful here so as to not confuse a possible simulacrum to be invectively annihilated. In the contemporary standard model of physics, there are four main kinds of multiverse theory, as outlined by Max Tegmark,[52] but we will only be looking at the first two, as they are the most commonly discussed and accepted. The first is called 'level 1' multiverse theory and it

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[47] Deutsch, David. "The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World." pp 333-336.
[48] Deutsch, David. "The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations That Transform the World." pp 334-335.
[49] Everett, Hugh; Jeffrey A. Barrett (Ed.), and Peter Byrne (Ed.). "The Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Collected Works 1955-1980 with Commentary." 2012, pp 57-60.
[50] As a fun fact: Podolsky's work with Einstein and Rosen also refuted the Copenhagen interpretation; the same work known as the EPR paradox.
[51] Osnaghi, S., et al. "The Origin of the Everettian Heresy." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* (2009), doi: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.10.002, footnote 280 of p 24.
[52] Tegmark, Max. "Parallel Universes." *Scientific American* (2003), doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican0503-40, pp 2-3.

states that the universe does not end at its observable edge about 42 billion light-years out (the observable radius), and therefore there is no reason to think matter doesn't extend indefinitely out just like space does. That's level 1. Level 2 multiverse theory says that the universe creates 'pocket' or 'bubble' universes, either by way of *'micro-level quantum dimensions'* or by black holes segmenting new universes with properties derived from their parent universes. This simply means that new universes are spawned and are seated inside of their parent universes, or are spawned and are seated inside of some multiverse medium of existence.[53]

Tegmark also includes Everett's interpretation of quantum theory explicitly as 'level 3' multiverse theory, its entire own category of multiverse theory, however I don't believe Everett envisioned his view to extend quite fully to multiverse theory proper, and even if he did I don't believe attacking his view directly will yield any results different from attacking level 1 and level 2 multiverse theory. The first two explicate an infinite multiplicity of parallel universes and therefore run into the same problems as the other versions. I'm saying this to clarify that the arguments in this paper are general arguments that are applicable to all versions of multiverse theory even though we only look at two versions with particularity.

With regards to level 1 or level 2 multiverse theory, we aren't worried about saying that an anthropic universe must be the only kind, or that we can only *know* of one universe (as Ross and Turner demonstrate that the multiverse could in fact be empirically detectable[54]), but that of the *multiverse*, the other universes must be significantly different, either in properties or outcomes, in order to claim those universes are distinct from our own. This means we are critiquing the components of both 'level 1' and 'level 2' multiverse theories that suppose **infinite** numbers of universes, as those would be sets of universes with repeats or exact copies. But these critiques will come later.

As a reiteration, both kinds of multiverse theory being discussed do indeed make explicit that there is an infinite series of universes either already instantiated or continuously being instantiated. In level 1 multiverse theory, an infinite series of matter would mean an infinite combination of matter, as well as infinite repeats of each combination.[55] In level 2 multiverse theory, an infinite set of spawned universes with inherited properties from their parent universes would mean an infinite combination of matter with infinite repeats as well.[56]

Specific to 'level 1' multiverse theory, which says that the universe does not end at the observable edge about 42 billion light-years out (George Ellis notes that the universe was found to be a flat plane and flat planes don't have ends[57]), the notion is that infinite matter means infinite combinations of matter, even infinite repeated combinations. This view is predicated on the same idea that monkeys slamming on a type-writer for an infinite amount of time will at some point produce the works of Shakespeare due to sheer probability of letter combinations and infinite time for those combinations to propagate no matter how improbable this would be otherwise.

Specific to 'level 2' multiverse theory, which says that the universe creates pocket or bubble universes, either by way of micro-level quantum dimensions or by black holes creating (or segmenting) new universes with properties derived from their parent universes, the notion is that an infinite set of spawned universes also creates infinite combinations of matter and even infinite repeated combinations spawned from the parent universe. Both 'level 1' and 'level 2' multiverse theories fall under what I call the *infinite parallel*, as they both suppose an infinite multiplicity with regards to the number of possible parallel universes and number of possible combinations of matter and spatial relations.

Now that we have context for multiverse theory, I need to do the same for infinity. The classical definition of infinity by Aristotle is as a series of becoming, or as a process whereby one thing always follows after another.[58] This is also a distinction he draws as being the difference between *actual* and *potential* infinity. For the purposes of this essay, you can think of actual infinity as akin to the modal realism described earlier, where all possible things, an enumerable set of things, is all-at-once

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[53] Tegmark, Max. "Parallel Universes." *Scientific American* (2003), doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican0503-40, pp 3-7.
[54] Ross, Peter W., and Dale Turner. "Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science." *Synthese* 190, no. 18 (2013), pp 4254-4256.
[55] Graphically illustrated by Tegmark here: Tegmark, Max. "Parallel Universes." *Scientific American* (2003), doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican0503-40, p 4.
[56] Graphically illustrated by Tegmark here: Tegmark, Max. "Parallel Universes." *Scientific American* (2003), doi: 10.1038/scientificamerican0503-40, p 6.
[57] Ellis, George F. R. "Does the Multiverse Really Exist?" *Scientific American* 305, no. 2 (August 2011), p 43.
[58] Aristotle. "Physics." Book 3, chapter 6.

instantiated, and potential infinity as being continuous instantiation of states through time rather than all at once.

Aristotle believed infinity was only potential, never actual. But people like Markus Pantsar elaborate on Aristotle's view, saying Aristotle's conception of infinity as *potential*, as a *process*, was the conception of infinity used for two thousand years until Georg Cantor proved that there are infinities *strictly larger* than others, meaning infinites could be treated as actual rather than merely potential, at least in mathematics.[59] While this only proves actual infinites in mathematics, it still means there *are* actual infinites, and this gave a lot of people hope for actual infinites to exist as physical instantiates as well.

As an additional qualification for the discussion around infinity, the philosopher Gilbert Côté argued, like many, that mathematical infinity (read: actual infinity) is not applicable to the concrete world due to the contradictions that arise (which he gives as *Zeno's dichotomy paradox* and *Torricelli's Trumpet*). Despite this, because mathematical infinities are still valid, there is then a hard divide between the abstract mathematical world and the concrete physical world.[60] This is not surprising, and certainly not a new view, but it highlights the question regarding what the metaphysical status of infinites really is, for to say that mathematical Platonism is true is to say infinite sets are not properly applicable to the material domain, the same domain where an infinite number of states and universes are supposed to exist, and the same domain which is known to us almost exclusively by mathematical principles. This should be prompting you, the reader, to ask an obvious question — whether this is possible in principle.

Côté believes he has an answer to this problem, at least regarding quantum theory, as he says that where classical physics truncates infinites and imaginary numbers are used merely as mathematical tricks to solve complex problems, quantum physics necessarily includes infinites and imaginary values as inescapable essential components for the theory's comprehension and ontology; this is where he believes there is a bridge between the abstract and the concrete worlds.[61]

Unfortunately he takes no time to actually draw out the ontological status of such a bridge nor detail the features of quantum theory that would make this possible, but even if he was right, it wouldn't explain the jump from the smallest scale, quantum theory, to the largest scale, multiverse theory. That would be a jump from what he admitted as being an abstract realm to a concrete realm where he believes infinites are impossible.

If we return to Pantsar, we find him arguing that actual infinites aren't a problem for the concrete world because actual infinites are epistemically hidden from us, as concrete beings are *finite* and as such can only ever transition *potentially* infinite space, not transition *actually* infinite space. This is a conceptual confusion, but Pantsar recovers his argument by saying that mathematical infinities are *all* potential, and therefore can all be known by finite beings.[62] So either Côté's view was inconsequential or the mentioned paradoxes are inconsequential. What this means is that we can include all previously defined versions of the multiverse as domains in which we could intelligibly speak after granting potential infinities, but not after granting actual infinities.

With all the overview of this literature out of the way, I will now apply strong pressure on what infinity means for the concrete world and how infinity is itself problematic even when divorced from the concrete world.

For the purposes of attacking the infinite parallel in multiverse theory, we'll attack the principle of infinity itself and begin on what I call the *argument of contrafinity*: that potential infinities presume actual infinities. This is a big claim, but by simply drawing out distinctions between their definitions we will see that potential infinities make themselves actual infinities. If I succeed in doing this, then any type of infinity applied to multiverse theory is inherently malformed in its application, despite what Côté, or Pantsar, or even Aristotle would believe.

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[59] Pantsar, Markus. "In Search of Aleph Null: How Infinity Can Be Created." *Synthese* 192, no. 8 (2015), doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0775-4, pp 2489-2490.

[60] Côté, Gilbert B. "Mathematical Platonism and the Nature of Infinity." *Open Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 3, Issue 3 (August 2013), doi:10.4236/ojpp.2013.33056, pp 373-374.

[61] Côté, Gilbert B. "Mathematical Platonism and the Nature of Infinity." *Open Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 3, Issue 3 (August 2013), doi:10.4236/ojpp.2013.33056, pp 374-375.

[62] Pantsar, Markus. "In Search of Aleph Null: How Infinity Can Be Created." *Synthese* 192, no. 8 (2015), doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0775-4, pp 2490-2491.

Starting with the definition of potential infinity, to restate as being a *process of continuation* or where one thing can always follow another, which can be symbolized as the standard Dedekind-Peano axiom "n + 1" where n is a natural number and its successor "+ 1" is also a number (meant to imply that there will always be *one more number*, an infinite series),[63] we see laid full and bare before us two words competing for devastation, namely 'continuation' and 'always'. A process of 'continuation' means an uninterrupted process, a process of *forever*. 'Always' also requires a *forever*. There is no well-formulated definition of potential infinity that doesn't require the use of at least one of these three words (continuation, always, or forever), all of which require an actual infinity such that they have an object referent by which they meaningfully relate. This means that for any potential infinity, there is a presupposed actual infinity of time required to allow for an event-series or a process to take place by which the potential infinity can chug along. Here we find there are no such things as potential infinities, only implied actual infinities.

If you try to salvage this problem by splitting time between two frameworks, infinite and finite, you do not escape the problem. Infinite time is what gives us these other infinites, these indefinite sequences, but is also what gives us the impossibility of potential infinites. You could then argue that time falls into the finite frame and is itself finite; the *forever*'s and *always*' referent is to a finite system of time. The problem now should be even more obvious — that you couldn't keep adding one past a certain point in time, for the thing by which events have the capacity to occur, time itself, has ceased, and therefore no more numbers in any sequence or series or process have any chance of furthering their increase. So in finite time, there cannot even be potential infinities, the Dedkind-Peano axiom no longer applies, and in infinite time there can *only* be actual infinities. Either there are no infinites at all of any kind, or there are only ever actual infinites.

We are left with only the actual infinities of math to apply to our concrete domains, which means we are left then with only the actual paradoxes and absurdities of such an application. But let's say that you were not convinced by the arguments so far, and that you don't believe the traditional paradoxes (again as being Zeno's and Torricelli's paradoxes) to be really problematic. That's fine, for there are verdant complications still.

Since many people believe the multiverse exists with infinite parallels, and presumably many people would continue believing despite the *argument of contrafinity* just given, I will now go into further arguments regarding problems of the infinite parallel in multiverse theory, granting either form of infinity (pretending as if I had not just committed myself to disbelieving in such a possibility to begin with), and demonstrate particular metaphysical oddities that arise if there is a multiplicity of worlds anyways.

For the 'level 1' multiverse, which says that the universe doesn't end at the observable edge and that infinite matter outside the observable edge means infinite combinations of matter (and even infinite repeated combinations), we will start by putting to rest some nomological concerns. When dealing with 'possible worlds' there are concerns of distinctions between worlds that are *logically* possible versus *practically* possible. All speech of 'possible worlds' here are of worlds that are *both* logically and practically possible. This eliminates potential nomological errors in multiverse theory drawn from notions like spaces that you could logically travel to but couldn't practically travel to.

To clarify once again, 'level 1' multiverse is a grid or a quilt of separately observable universes stringed together, all next to each other, all being different combinations of matter, until all possible combinations of said limited matter (and space) run out and a repeat set of these *all possible combinatory universes* is then also laid out on a grid of separately combinatory universes stringed together, all next to each other. Think of this as a procedurally generated video game environment, where there are a million different map-layouts that can possibly be generated, and so the game feels new and different every time you play until you play for the millionth time, where you finally come across the same map again.

This is how 'level 1' multiverse theory is supposed to pan out — if you were to travel in a straight line indefinitely through space you would eventually come across a 'universe' that was exactly the same as your original observable universe, and further that you would come across an infinite number of these exactly similar universes.

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[63] Pantsar, Markus. "In Search of Aleph Null: How Infinity Can Be Created." *Synthese* 192, no. 8 (2015), doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0775-4, pp 2489.

As to the 'level 2' multiverse, which says that the universe creates pocket or bubble universes, there would be an infinite set of universes with an infinite number of galaxies in a fractal-like-generate. Level 2 multiverse theory iterates the same results as level 1, where there would eventually be a universe spawned that was exactly the same as your original observable universe.

In any kind of multiverse theory there is still a proposed infinite set of *token* universes similar to our local universe's *type*. This means there are an infinite number of me's writing this essay to an infinite number of you's, in the exact same manner as I am now, right down to... *that* pause.[64] So infinite means infinite; there's an infinite number of copies of you sitting in *this* room reading exact copies of *this* book.[65]

Without referencing any traditional or standardized definitions for causation, we can infer that causation or *causal power* is the relation by which one event necessitates the occurrence of another in a temporally contiguous manner. Many people would accept this definition of causation modulo that it be limited to *material* causes, meaning only between matter or material instantiates, and usually only regarding two *direct* events in which no events occurred between.

However, if the definition were modified in this way, it would disregard the causal power of knowledge-based interactions, which is a problem in a physicalist worldview as there would still be *indirect* events that could be considered causally linked qua epistemic conditions. For example, I can know of the number 2 and infer then that there could be two 2's, which would make 4, and further, beforehand when I decided I would try to deduce numeral existents, I made a rule that if I was correct I would correlate the number to the concrete world by extending the digits of my hand proportionate to the numbers I deduced. I do this. I hold out four fingers. I *intended* to do so, even if my intent was directly materially caused, and yet it is a contingent causal chain predicated on an indirect happenstance of knowledge, *concreta relata abstracta*. This would make knowledge, an immaterial substance, a causal force. We are not talking about memory, we are talking about *knowledge*, and further knowledge of *numbers*, both of which the physicalist cannot contain in their definition of the real.

You don't have to agree with this, but just keep it in mind that epistemic conditions are being considered for causal relations because a question will arise regarding whether we can know of existent things if we have no material causal relations to them.

In the multiverse, when I raise my hand, so do an infinite number of token me's in other similar token universes, because all the copy universes do the exact same things as ours. This means I can knowingly choose to make the other token me's raise their hand by raising mine. Which means I can causally effect other people in other universes. But, they would also be thinking to causally make my hand raise, as they have the same token thoughts of my specific type, so they would all be thinking the same thing that I am. So it's no longer clear if my particular token is doing the causal work or if their particular tokens are doing the causal work. The only way this works is if my general *type* is orchestrating us all, like a Platonic form-particular system. The problem with this is that either there becomes no meaningful distinction between type and token because tokens are no longer individuated and are only meaningfully referred to by their type, or personhood is located across multiple unconnected spaces, which would also mean there's a material causal chain that is materially unrelated. In either case direct causation is lost.

In the first case, causation is lost because there is no longer meaningful *relata* between the tokens, and in the second case we lose causation because we have caused matter from an immaterial source, which isn't empirically valid. All we're doing past this conclusion is trying to save intuitions, which is a tired game.

An objection to this argument is that this is clearly not how causation works. Several of my peers have argued for causation to be purely within the domain of material forces and have said that this is clearly just a confused misunderstanding of causation. But typically and intuitively it is the case that if the conscious me, the mental me, the me that is me, decides to raise my hand that is right in front of me, we attribute the raising of my hand to the *me that willed it*, not some material-amalgam-that's-not-actually-an-amalgam-because-amalgams-aren't-individuated-material-parts-*me*. Even if we ascribe physicalist views of the mind, there is still a meta-object that is the sum of a material system we are

[64] This is a reference from the *Rocky Mountain High* stand-up special.
[65] Eric Schwitzgebel has interesting musings about this—https://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2020/05/your-infinite-counterparts.html

calling my mind, and it has causal powers over my hand, not the reduced particular neural chain (which is still only at best a conceptual amalgam) responsible for hand movement.

Further, if I want to slap myself, I can. I can knowingly cause myself harm and humiliation (both of which are more examples of immaterial entities) by making my hand slap my face. This is also true of things that aren't my hand or face, as I can reach out and knock over the bottle before me. At no point here would any standard framework say causation was inappropriately invoked, especially not material causation. I argue now that there is no meaningful difference between the me that is slapped in this universe versus the me's that are slapped in the other universes, as the me's in the other universes are still known objects that I can intentionally incur action towards, the relation of which is entirely predicated and reliant on me intending the action here in this universe, just like it was for the bottle. So we find that clearly it is the case that if there is a misunderstanding of causation, it must be a systematic one that extends to all standard causal frameworks. Again, this is a tired game.

If the conclusion of lost causation is right, then either it is because the causation simply doesn't exist, which I believe self-defeats for the reason I just gave, or there isn't an infinite multiplicity of tokens in multiverse theory, which is a safer bet. Note this doesn't annihilate causation itself, it only gets rid of it for this specific case, which means that you may now be asking, "So what if you can't cause some other dude in another universe to do something? Why does that matter?" It's because this issue has devastating consequences in other areas.

If I can't cause other exactly similar copies of myself to commit the same action, then how could I *know* there are other exactly similar copies? If I knew there was another exactly similar object as myself, then I would also know that everything I do, it does, and could therefore share in a causal relation with it (by knowingly making it do things like slap itself). So there is a philosophical divide made here. Either there is an epistemic sacrifice, whereby if there is no causal relation to exactly similar objects then we couldn't know them to be exactly similar and we couldn't then know that exactly similar objects exist in the first place (i.e., we couldn't know that exactly similar universes exist), **or** there is a metaphysical sacrifice, whereby if there is causal relation then we can't distinguish the identities of these objects.

The third and final main argument I will make here is about the *impossibility of identity distinction* of multiple exact copies of the same universes existing. The previous few paragraphs don't rule out the possibility of paralleled universes, they only state that there would be an epistemic or metaphysical problem. An infinite number of universes may still be possible given what's been said so far, but the impossibility of identity distinction becomes a real issue here since potentially there are an infinite number of *exactly similar* universes, without distinction whatsoever.

A simple invocation of Leibniz's Law, which is also known as the *indiscernibility of identicals*, says that any two objects that have exactly the same properties are the same object, or that there are no two objects that have exactly the same properties without being the same object.[66]

In obviation, I am aware that Max Black gives a strong critique of Leibniz's Law using a thought experiment involving two black spheres in an otherwise empty universe. The spheres share all properties in common: size, color, shape, etcetera, with the exception that they are in separate spatial locations.[67] The concern that Max Black tries to raise is that we would have no way of distinguishing the spheres from each other without adding a new thing to the proposed universe, namely an observer (us) which would create an external reference point by which to relate the spheres. Without a third party, the spheres exist alone and one sphere could not be referred to in a meaningful way that wasn't equally descriptive of the other sphere (as 'left' and 'right' require a third party and spatial measurements are equivalent between the two), yet they remain as separate individuated spheres. This seems to suggest that there could be objects that have exactly the same properties without being the same object, a counter to Leibniz's Law.

To counter-counter, Charles B. Cross draws a very important distinction for creating this kind of thought experiment, showcasing that Black exploits the notion of characters in the framing of stories. Cross says that by removing external relations as properties, like 'being Caesar' or 'not being in London',

[66] Forrest, Peter. "The Identity of Indiscernibles." *Stanford University*, (1996). Accessed March 15, 2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/

[67] Black, Max. "The Identity of Indiscernibles." 156-158. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/analytic/blacksballs.pdf

the principle of identity distinction becomes weakened.[68] Cross makes clear that Black's example is not a counter-example to Leibniz's principle, but rather a counter-example to the actual world. He then uses this to demonstrate the oddity of saying that no observer sees, visits, or even thinks about the two spheres, and yet Max Black clearly thought about them many times, as did the characters in his thought-experiment.[69] Max Black seems to be exploiting the notion that worlds inside of thought experiments can lack properties that our actual world has in order to prove that our actual world also lacks these properties.

What if Cross is wrong? Fundamental particles in physics supposedly share all the same properties after all, one quark can have no distinction from another quark save their place in space,[70] so this real-world example is the same thing as Black's thought experiment. If you are convinced by Max Blacks' arguments, then an interesting thing Max Black seems to succeed in here is in showing that external relations are not required to prove that objects are distinct.

I personally believe that Max Black is wrong, for a universe without a distinguishing party is truly a universe without distinction. If there are numerically distinct objects, then they are distinct in number, meaning there is more than one object, and therefore there are objects by which to *count*. This is not to say that a person needs to be there to count them, but that numerical distinction (read: the possibility of individuation) is only possible if for one object there is a second, and if for a second object there is a third, etcetera. This means both logical and temporal sequencing are required for numerical distinction, as there could not be a second object following a first if there was nothing meaningful in *being the second object*.

Since Max Black doesn't believe a universe without observers only has one object, he must admit of a meaningful distinction between the objects such that they are individuated by something, an internal relation if no external relations are allowed. Between the two spheres they could have a distinct relation in their temporal placement (since that needs no third party where spatial placements do) and this would be an internal relation by which the spheres could be individuated.

What then if the two spheres were spawned at the same time with all other properties being the same, could they not distinguish between themselves? Since Black excludes third parties from relating to the spheres and individuating them, it's not up to the third party to confirm the spheres are distinct, there is no external relation allowed, so there would have to be internal relations between the spheres themselves that distinguished them, and if this cannot be done temporally or spatially, then they truly share all properties. No one could enter as a third party to assert that there are two spheres instead of just one, and neither of the spheres could assert there is another sphere besides itself, for to share in *all* properties would be to share in the assertion, which would necessarily then refer to yourself.

Therefore, Max Black leaves us with a thought experiment that fails in countering Leibniz. Instead, he succeeds in demonstrating that there is only one sphere. To make impossible the distinction between objects is to make possible the distinction that they are the same object. With that in mind, there is no way to internally distinguish between our universe and another exactly similar universe.

You might say there is some spatio-temporal relation whereby we can distinguish the universes, that there may be dissimilar 'bubble universes' or localities between our universe and the exactly similar one, so by way of that relation, we are distinct, but how do we know which is distinct from the other given this relationship? How would it even be possible to know our universe is the one that relates down through the pocket universes and not the other universe that relates up to ours? Sure there may be dissimilar universes in-between, but that doesn't mean we haven't just looped back to our same universe again. As we just proved, without some internal distinction of universes, there is no external distinction that justifies the universes as actually being relevantly distinct. So the impossibility of making significantly relevant identity distinctions between these similar universes (an infinite number of them, mind you) makes it seem much more likely that there is simply one universe exactly similar to ours, which is the one we inhabit, and there are no copies.

More formally the *Impossibility of Identity Distinction* can be written as:

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[68] Cross, Charles B. "Max Black on the Identity of Indiscernibles." *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 180 (Jul. 1995), pp 350-351.
[69] Cross, Charles B. "Max Black on the Identity of Indiscernibles." *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 180 (Jul. 1995), pp 354-355.
[70] Unless, I suppose, the alternate universes in DS9 are meaningfully distinct, then you can in fact distinguish one Quark from another.

P1: If infinitely many universes are seated in/around ours, then there are infinitely many similar universes.
P2: If infinitely many similar universes exist, then there are infinitely many exactly similar universes.
P3: If the distinction of exactly similar universes is by external relation, then there must be a third external universe that we inhabit by which we can relate the two exactly similar universes.
P4: If the distinction of exactly similar universes is by internal relation, then there must be something internally dissimilar between the two universes.
Sub-conclusion 1: We are not in a universe that isn't the one we're in so there is no relevant external differentiation that can be made between our exactly similar universes, and the exactly similar universes are not dissimilar so there is no relevant internal differentiation that wouldn't disqualify the universe from being exactly similar.
Sub-conclusion 2: If there is no relevant distinction between exactly similar universes, then they are the same universe.
P5: There is no relevant distinction that can be made between these exactly similar universes; they are the same universe.
Sub-conclusion 3: There are not infinitely many exactly similar universes, only dissimilar universes.
P6: Multiverse theory requires the possibility of infinitely many exactly similar universes.
∴ Multiverse theory cannot be correct.

Given the three main arguments, we know that the infinite parallel's existence is impossible, and therefore multiverse theory, that by its nature requires the existence of the infinite parallel, is impossible as well. So the most widely-held contemporary theory in physics for describing the upper bounds of reality doesn't have a valid base and this should make you highly skeptical about whether physics can give any ultimately meaningful insights on reality at all. It's time to move on.

Most people believe we exist within the domain in which problems have solutions, and how fortunate we would be if all of life's problems were salient. However, if there is anything to be learned from Deleuze, it's that real problems are problems precisely because they have no solution.[71] Instead of delineating what the problems of the world are, figuring out why it is that problems can exist to begin with is more important.

If you think this topic is dumb and claim that metaphysics is nonsense, that's a claim that requires metaphysical justification. If you think like Richard Dawkins does and say, "The 'why' question is just a silly question,"[72] then you bear a dogmatic cognitive curse. Scientific positivism cannot validate its own methodology.[73]

This chapter opens with arguments against the impossibility of any standard dualism to drive a wedge between the idea that reality is explainable as some set of categories of things or as lists of items and properties. This is used as contextual conditioning for why we need an ontology that is not predicated on objects or properties, and leads to the section giving an ontology, all extant things, as instantiates of jokes. *Why* something is becomes more important than *what* something is.

This chapter proposes a framework describing how reality can exist and give being to entities like physical objects and abstractions like math before those things themselves exist. This is a kind of theory of everything but it doesn't require any maths or physical world to exist first — a true end to metaphysics. The chapter closes with an overview of a not-yet-existent field of study, *problemology*, and how we can derive a telos from it.

:: A Fast Formal Proof for Relational Objects as a Distinct Ontological Category ::

An empiricist walks into a bar, substance abuse follows.

Dualism classically divides the world between the abstract and the concrete, or between form and matter, or noumenal and phenomenal, or type and token, or mind and body, and so on. This essay exploits a perennial issue with many different dualistic frameworks that have a binary divide upon where *concreta* and *abstracta* both operate by means of some *relata*. By incorporating some maths, I give argumentation that *relata* is a distinct ontological category necessitated by any dualism, muddying the traditional dualistic frameworks and forcing either a pluralistic or monistic case for reality.

The transitive property in math, which is that if A = B, and B = C, then A also equals C, demonstrates that multiple abstract objects can be equivalent or made the same as concomitants. I open this topic with the question as to what the status of this object of equivalence itself is. If we take the identity property in maths (which is semantically equivalent to tautology), where simply A = A, and ask if either A or A are also equivalent to their equivalency, to the relation that coordinates their shared properties, which is to say equal to the equals sign itself, then we return strange answers.

Starting from the assumption that yes, A and A are not only qualitatively indistinct from each other but also from their relational capacities (necessitated by their equivalence), then it is the case that

[71] It'd be more accurate to say Deleuze thought that solutions re-inscribe their problems back into the world — that what it means to be a solution is precisely that there is some problem — making it so that their problems never really go away but instead continue in a way that is removed from our noticing.
[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6tIee8FwX8&t=1938
[73] *Critique of Positivism* by Peirce — https://peirce.sitehost.iu.edu/writings/v2/w2/w2_11/v2_11x.htm

A = = = A. This can be verbalized as, "A is equal to the equivalency of being equal to A." We can then raise the question of whether A or A is also equivalent to this new relation (= = =), and the initial assumption says that the answer would be yes again, resulting in the new statement that A = = = = = A. The problem with this should start becoming clear now, as it is infinite regress; we can always create a relational equivalency to the relational equivalencies between A and A if we start with the 'yes' assumption.

As we also know from maths, as a value asymptotically approaches zero, an infinitely small value becomes functionally and semantically equivalent to zero (barring debate on infinitesimals). Another way to say this is that the number $0.\overline{00}1$ is equal to 0. I posit that by adding relational equivalencies between A and A we are increasing the literal conceptual distance between A and A, which means the normally close and strong conceptual bond that relation maintains is getting weakened. Since the conceptual distance between these conceptual objects is infinitely expanding, their relation is also infinitely weakening, and analogous to the asymptote example, we can know that an infinitely weak relation is the same as having no relation at all. We somewhat quixotically find now that A ≠ A.

This not only breaks the law of identity in maths, but the law of non-contradiction in logic since from 'A equals A' we derive that 'A does not equal A' at the same time and in much the same regard. This makes it the case that the initial assumption was wrong and that instead A must be qualitatively distinct from its relational capacities. I believe this is clear demonstration that *abstracta* and *concreta* are qualitatively distinct from *relata* such that *relata* is its own category of being.

In anticipation of a quick objection here, the same problem occurs whenever you have more than one of the same kind of concrete object, e.g. two tables — for by what means do we relate these concrete objects as being the same kind of object? In traditional dualism we say the ideal form, or the type of these tokens is what coordinates them, but of course abstract types are objects unto themselves and the *relating action* between the type and its token is known to be problematic by almost every major metaphysician in history, so universally that it would be almost wrong to include a citation for it.

So we have a third category of being called *relata*, or relational objects, but by turning dualism into a pluralism I don't think we solve any classical problems, we make it worse instead. This is because the same argument I used to tease out the existence of relational objects can be applied back onto itself. Formal proof itself is a relational organization between several objects, making formal proof *relata*. Is one relational object equivalent to any other relational object? If we say yes, we get the same derivation as two paragraphs ago, so we find that we must say no. An obviation — if a table holds some relation to the chairs seated around it, this is a different *kind* of relation than the table's relation to its maker, or its location in the room, etcetera, making *all* relations individuated as unique in kind.

Ultimately, I believe this applies to all individuated objects in the world, no matter how we formalize their categorical multiplicity of kinds, but I haven't actually done that work here, so I'll let someone smarter than myself respond to this with a more comprehensive view. Until then, my intuition says pluralism explodes the same way dualism does, and infinitely so, until we have nothing but one single amoebas category of all individuated things, landing us ultimately at a monistic architecture for reality. But we don't have to play the game of saving intuitions.

***

:: Predication ::

"Asdf."
asdf

rom the last section it should follow that all concreta and abstracta is necessarily predicated as relata, but since that's probably not obvious, I'll do my best to convince you.

For every abstract object and concrete object pairing, there is no distinction that would make either function differently than if they were unpaired, therefore there is no valid distinction between abstract and concrete objects. This is more or

less (probably less) what Aristotle argued for, but hopefully the conciseness of my version gives it salience.

It is important to understand that in formal logic when you make an assertion the assertion isn't a mere reference to a purely abstract proposition that exists solely in your mind, but rather that you are asserting something as actually being the case 'out there' in the world. So all existent things, concrete or otherwise, require logical predication. If you say that they exist, have some cause, observe some property, etcetera, then those are all predication values of the object, meaning you have said something was the case. All casing is an assignment of some truth value to a state of affairs in the world; there's logical predication involved at all steps of this process.

If there is no valid distinction between abstracta and concreta, and the only things that exist are things that are the case, then there is also no distinction between objects and their logically stated instantiates. Here we have also collapsed the distinction between relata and any/all other categories of objects. It's all one single amoebas category, a monistic architecture for reality.

If there is no valid distinction between objects and their logical predications, between objecthood and its casing, then logical predications are what objects are, and they are the only kind of object. Therefore, the world is entirely logical predication.

This is not quite like positivism, as it's not true that everything is *reducible* to formal logic but rather that everything is *predicated* by it.[74] This *absolutism*, as I call it, can be thought of as logical realism plus a form of atomism. While the general content I am arguing for in this section is dangerously similar to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, it's important to note I am demonstrating the character of logic to be fundamentally different. For example, Wittgenstein explicitly states in 4.441 that "There are no 'logical objects'," where I am saying they are the only kind of object, making this quite different.

There is an extra component I want to add to this, that the world is finite. I do this to save absolutism from potential problems that should become obvious later. I formally outline the argument leading to finitude here:

> P1. Things that are not the case are not the case, and things that are the case are things that exist, making things that are not the case also things that don't exist.
> P2. Properties or relations that are not the case are non-existent properties and relations, thereby making the world limited in both properties and relations to only things that are the case.
> P3. For any finite number of objects, there is also a finite number of existent properties or relations concerning those objects, so for any one particular thing that is the case, it is the case finitely.
> C. For any set of objects, including the set of all objects, which is a single particular existent thing, there is a list of those objects such that the list is finite (otherwise the list could never be given).

It would follow from the above that the world must be finite, but you may notice that it says nothing about the status of finitude regarding things that are *not* the case. One could make the argument that the set of things that are not the case could be infinite since from any one thing that is not the case you could inexhaustively list other things that are not the case and make ever more complex combinations of non-cases.

For example, a possible question here could be what happens when you speak about something that doesn't exist. Can you have a non-existent idea in your mind? If you speak of something that is not the case, as if to imply the existence of its non-case-hood, then that thing would have to be the case, right? This is weird because it's like saying that it is the case that something isn't the case, or a non-existent thing exists as the non-existent thing, or that, "it is true that something is false." This may seem like a problem but there are many impossible things that we speak on regularly. We only ever speak about them as indirect syntheses of two possible things like square-circles or married bachelors, but just the same we speak about them. Maybe logical contradictions, things that cannot exist in reality, are also

[74] After all, "It helps no one to be reductive." - *XRA*

literal gaps in our minds where we try to cognize them. Who knows, I don't really care, it's not important here.

The point of this is to say that if the world is entirely logical predication (or logic-objects), and objects are finite, then the world is finite too. From that point I argue that any given instantiate of a finite set of logical predicates will be larger than their uncombined existence a moment prior, and larger still as a combination the moment after that, since the instantiation is a new relation between the grouping that doesn't exist without the instantiation. So there is a smaller set every moment back in time such that eventually we would be left with the minimal possible amount of logical predicates, or a singular predicate that predicates all other predicates. Like a purely abstract version of the Big Bang.

There is of course an intentionally vague use of 'moment' involved in that description, and the actual procession of one event to the next, the generation of objects or properties (what I have said are all logic-objects), and anything else we would care about, are all yet unexplained by such a view, and while I show in a later section how things like space, time, multiplicity, identity, and anything else can all be directly derived from this, the point for now is simply that all instantiation, all logical actuation, requires an internal self-actuation as a predicate. We develop here the 'actuator' as *thee predicate* of predicates, the start of this logical Big Bang. Because of this, it should be that all things are the spawn of this actuator, making all things explained through a singular logical predicate.

If this is accepted, then it is clear that formal logic is truly something fundamental to reality and that it supersedes everything else, including space, time, maths, or whatever. It could also help to collapse many distinctions in the study of subjunctive possibility due to casing always being essential. Because of this, I believe the correct description of the world is a formal absolutism — that metaphysics is formal logic working by way of actuated predicates.

For any good counter-argument against logic being fundamental to reality — tell me again what an argument is. Something that follows, obeys, and is beholden to logic? In arguing against the fundamentality of logic to reality you must first assert the fundamentality of logic to your argument. In virtue of what should your argument's logic map onto a reality fundamentally devoid of logic?

This is incredibly trappy and highly tactically exploitable. I almost don't like that it works because while it's an obvious attack in retrospect, it took an embarrassingly long time for me to find it.[75] Anyways, here's the formalization of the argument:

> Premise 1: An argument is something that follows, obeys, and is beholden to logic.
> Premise 2: In arguing against the fundamentality of logic to reality, one must first assert the fundamentality of logic to their argument.
> Conclusion: Any argument against the fundamentality of logic to reality must assume the fundamentality of logic to be logically consistent, therefore you cannot argue against the fundamentality of logic.

The above argument can be symbolized as:

> Premise 1: ∀A (Arg(A) → (Follows(A) ∧ Obeys(A) ∧ Beholden(A, Logic)))
> Premise 2: ∀A (Against(A, Fundamentality(Logic, Reality)) → Assert(A, Fundamentality(Logic, A)))
> Conclusion: ∀A (Against(A, Fundamentality(Logic, Reality)) → (Fundamentally(Logic, A) ∧ ¬Arguable(Against(A, Fundamentality(Logic, Reality)))))
>
> *Where "Arg(A)" means "A is an argument", "Follows(A)" means "A follows logic", "Obeys(A)" means "A obeys logic", "Beholden(A, Logic)" means "A is beholden to logic", "Against(A, Fundamentality(Logic, Reality))" means "A is against the fundamentality of logic to reality", "Assert(A, Fundamentality(Logic, A))" means "A asserts the fundamentality of logic to itself", "Fundamentally(Logic, A)" means "Logic is fundamentally present in A", and "Arguable(Against(A, Fundamentality(Logic, Reality)))" means "Against the fundamentality of logic to reality is arguable".*

The only possible counter here is to deny the validity of logic itself and assert that formal logic is broken in some systematic way. But then the counter is not an argument in the traditional sense, because it does not follow, obey, or is beholden to, logic. In this case, the original argument's conclusion that you cannot argue against the fundamentality of logic would still hold, because the counter would not meet the criteria for an argument as defined in the original premises.

Since logic has to be fundamental to reality, this means reality is fundamentally logic. Congratulations, we just discovered what the true nature of reality is. If you want to understand what

[75] Maybe four minutes.

logic and its workings entail, skip to the metalogic chapter. If finding out reality is just logical actuation feels underwhelming, then you can skip to the metaesthetics chapter instead.

***

:: World Without A Cause, An Anti-Etiology ::

"asdf"
asdf

Causation is given as a force to which we say there is a before that *makes* some after, a cause and effect. We say there is a cause that precedes and makes its continued state its effect, or by which there are physical antecedents and consequents, and this makes it so that all effects have causes and all causes have effects.

By the same description it is also the case that every effect is itself some cause in the world and every cause was at first an effect of some prior cause (modulo a first cause, I suppose this is also a weak point towards backwards causation[76]). Since every effect is also a cause and every cause an effect, there appears to be no meaningful distinction that determines which one some state of affairs in the world is, since it is always both cause and effect.

E.g., if we had a slice of time where we see a ball two feet above the ground, it would not be obvious if the ball is falling towards the ground or bouncing back up, only that it is two feet above the ground, and further, it would not be obvious if the ball itself was the cause of its position in space, or an effect of that position. We are thereby informed that there is no real distinction between the two. It follows that there simply is no causation in the world nor effectual mode for its description.

An easy way to salvage causation from this proposed problem is to just appeal to other frameworks, like the classical non-material kinds of causation identified by Aristotle (formal, efficient, and final causes). But the modern era did everything it could to deny the existence of those so maybe we shouldn't be using them here. In that case you could appeal to wholly new frameworks for causation, like how I gave knowledge as a causal force in the multiverse section of the second chapter. Or don't appeal to non-material causes and just be stuck in limbo, I don't care.

Either way, it is not very original to say that causation has problems, so I am not posing this as something new; my hope is just that this directs people to read more on the metaphysics of causation since it is so poorly understood by most people, even those with advanced training in it. My hope is also that people find that causation, in all of its varieties, is a *making* of things in the world, a *relation* between entities, which means, yes, it ultimately only makes sense to describe causation as pure logical predication.

***

:: Nothing Functions ::

"There is only one way to avoid criticism: say nothing, do nothing, and be nothing."
Aristotle

The following chart is a basic breakdown of the way philosophers have generally tried to argue for the existence of the universe. Either we have something or we have nothing. The top row has received the most attention by far, but a quick walk through all four categories makes it apparent that some of the fundamentally more important views have received little to no attention. This lets us turn the question of something versus nothing on its head.

[76] A mildly interesting idea that usually does less than the minimal level of work required to truly justify itself — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/

	Something	Nothing
Something	Something from Something	Something from Nothing
Nothing	Nothing from Something	Nothing from Nothing

Something from something (SFS) is tautologically fine, but gets you infinite regress. If our universe is a SFS, then it always existed, there was never a time it didn't, since before our something there was something else, and before that something else there was yet another something, and something again, forever. There is no start to a SFS universe. An infinite amount of time must have passed before now in order for that to be true, and an infinite amount of time must have passed before five minutes ago, and before five trillion years ago. Infinite means infinite after all, and since an infinite amount of time is required before now, it also hasn't finished coming to pass yet, which means this present moment in time hasn't come to pass yet, nor any of the moments in time for any finite measure before us, and so billions of years ago hasn't happened yet, meaning we don't exist yet to have this conversation. Ruh-roh, paradox, the universe implodes. For this reason we can't have a SFS universe.

Something from nothing (SFN) is where Aristotle and many others wind up with his first-mover argument. This is also the intuitive view most people have by default — that the universe was created — either by some physicalist means like the Big Bang or some religious means like God. But nothing comes from nothing. Nothings don't spawn somethings. Ruh-roh again. This is a serious problem that needs a lot of rigorous and technically-driven hand-waving to circumvent, yet nonetheless most philosophers have settled on SFN because to them it is clear the universe is a something and they don't want the paradox of infinite regress like we get with SFS. However, I want you to strongly consider that we might exist as a nothing instead. I don't believe we end up sacrificing very much to make this happen, as nothing about the world stops getting explained if the world does not exist.[77]

Nothing from something (NFS) works in the way SFN doesn't. SFN entails that you can magically bring into existence something from no source whatsoever, but NFS means that if you have a something then that something can result in nothing. 'Nothing' is a positive ontological phenomenon in this view. In fact it's happening all around us for most somethings most of the time. Take for example that your atoms are comprised of >99% empty space, to which we could confidently say you are made more of nothing than something. The volume of space your atoms occupy is mostly empty; your body is at least 99% nothingness. Moreover, a something can simply *do nothing* for a great period of time. Getting something to *do something* takes quite a bit more work, like energy or some causal force. This is all to say that if we start with a nothing then we can't have a something, but if we start with a something we can definitely have a nothing. So critically, if we have something, we also have nothing.

This bring us to nothing from nothing (NFN), which has the same tautological consistency of SFS but without the *turtles-all-the-way-down* of infinite time requirements. How was the universe created? It wasn't. How do we exist? We don't. They seem like unintuitive and unsatisfying answers, but there is no overt inconsistency in a NFN view of the world like we had with SFS or SFN.[78] The paradoxical question we must attenuate is that if we don't exist, if we aren't something, then how are we here to talk about it? Following NFN reasoning, we do exist, as nothing, a functioning nothing. Little nothing functions. If the universe doesn't exist, if the universe isn't something, then what space are we occupying to talk about it? Well, the universe does exist, as a functioning nothing. Big nothing function.

What is probably the more interesting thing to be observed in all this is that we can just as easily describe the existence of an entity as a function of something the same as we can describe it as a function of nothing, which does more work in demonstrating a non-distinction between the two than not. So if we want to really flip the something vs. nothing distinction on its head, then we do so here by simply articulating that they are not distinct. Describing them as distinct does no meaningful work for us. The question of existence, or being, is not answered by assigning the property of 'something' or 'nothing' to it.

[77] If additional supporting evidence is really needed for this then have a glance through Markus Gabriel's book, *Why The World Does Not Exist*.
[78] It might also be worth noting that there are a growing handful of philosophers in post-modernity that have started siding with the NFN worldview, like Nishida, Heidegger, and contemporaries like the already-mentioned Markus Gabriel.

To muddy this further, defining 'nothing' as, "the lack of something," or to give any definition to it at all, is to give it a something-ness, so nothing would be something that exists.[79] What's more is that something, *some* thing, is not *a* thing, and not-a-thing is nothing. So we also find that something would be nothing that exists. Hopefully this was an adequate demonstration that these are simply not useful terms and that we should move on to ones that are.

***

:: Ontology Is A Joke ::

We live in the funniest of all possible worlds.

his essay is built around explaining its title. The statement that ontology is a joke is a reified instance of the meta, both as a joke and as a recursively self-actuatory instantiate utilizing the meta-reification process discussed in the metalogic chapter. They say if you have to explain a joke then it isn't funny, and how funny it would be if reality was indeed a very unfunny joke. We should explain the joke after all. Ontology being a joke would explicate that such a thing is objectively so and hereby makes its explanation an instantiate of the joke (read: existence itself), the description of which I just gave being its own instantiation, meaning the joke has just been self-actuated through its own meta-reification.

This second paragraph is dedicated to explaining the joke about explaining the joke. The nature of being itself as described to be a joke would mean describing the study of the nature of being itself would itself be a joke, meaning it is self-explanatory. Not sure if I clarified it or made it worse, but hey you chose to read this, not me.

Given that ontological items tend to exist and the base item of this category may exist out of its own volition, making it self-actuatory, we might say the self-actuation would validate any real-world or reified instantiate of it its own meta-instantiate, or versa vice (which is the vice versa of vice versa). This means we can go back to the non-figurative and say a literal form of the joke was just invoked to prove that the joke exists, making existence as a joke its own joke about existence and its own validation outright, further justifying that the base item (or most fundamental aspect) of ontology is literally a joke.

I'll be less verbally tergiversatory, but note that ontology as a humorous function would play into our recognition of failed logical systems as such; it could overtly be the case that existence is a joke, which we know because jokes are specific instantiates of humor and humor is any specific instantiate of amusement, which is known not just for it now being stipulated but also because otherwise it would not be amusing and as such would not be anything to muse about. So ontology being a joke would be an apt joke as it would have to play into its own comedic values, and further that this manner of speaking about it would not be circumlocution but rather a proper full explanatory framework necessary for showing the absurdity of it. So with that said, let us continue now to explain the joke in full and push forward to cases of absurdity and argumentative pretzeling to showcase that humor instantiated as such is demonstration that it is only through such instantiation that things can ever be said to exist.

A substantial amount of work has been written on the subject of existence being absurd, with Thomas Nagel being a decent example of metaphysical framework hinging on an ontologically absurd pin. Most notably his work, *The Absurd*, exemplifies where the notion may even come from by relating the sense of the ill-comprehension of time back onto itself when saying, "It is often remarked that nothing we do now will matter in a million years. But if that is true, then by the same token, nothing that will be the case in a million years matters now. In particular, it does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."[80] Nothing mattering doesn't matter, which should not be taken as a paradoxical statement, and is what Nagel uses as an argument that nothing mattering in a million years is not a valid absurdity. But this is only the opening statements of the work and as Gallow notes in his summarizing of *The Absurd*, the argument is not that nothing mattering doesn't matter, but rather

[79] Gorgias was the pre-eminent philosopher on these kinds of arguments, I highly recommend looking him up if you want to read more into this.
[80] Nagel, Thomas. "The Absurd." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20 (1971): 716. Accessed October 30, 2015. https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/The Absurd—Thomas Nagel.pdf

that it does not matter now that our lives will not matter in a million years.[81] This is not a further absurdity given to showcase that our existence must not be absurd. Both Nagel and Gallow note that the absurdity itself stems from the recognition of our existence as being contingent and yet we persist taking it (our existence) seriously even though any justification for our commitments can only be circularly reasoned past that contingency, as our commitments' legitimacy can be pulled into doubt by said contingency of our existence. This failure in ultimate or totalizing consistency on the part of the human is the labeled absurdity, and as a more nuanced case, where existence becomes humorous.

Humor being defined as a recognition of a failure in logic (in any form) and the sense of humor being the amusements of a perceived or expected (or even self-invoked) failure in/of a logical system, leads us to say that human existence is inherently humorous, especially after considering that we place value in something inherently valueless (or at the very least, contingently valuable). This is not to say that things inherently valueless necessarily be incapable of attaining value after their existent creation, as things that are arbitrary before their existence are not necessarily arbitrary after the fact, but this is to say that we recognize our contingency and no further than that do we still feel apt to assume a meaningfulness in our lives. This is a rather baseless assumption when no further justification is presented, which is why Nagel correctly attributes this as the source of absurdity when discussing our existence. The recognition of this absurdity is then itself the recognition that existence in a contingent state is the failure to place justification for existence in a mode that bestows meaning or actuates a logical consistency beyond simply that *something exists*. This is also to say that all things that exist contingently do so for 'absurd' reasons and therefore are humorous in the fashion we've just ideated.

But of course this is not about our own existence, rather existence itself, and so why would *existence itself* be a joke? If all things that exist, that is to say all existence, is contingent, then all things existing do so as instantiations of jokes, which is to invoke our other definition and to say all things that exist are jokes- making this cosmic jest an amusement when its inconsistence is realized. But why would we say all things that exist fall into that framing? We would have to prove that all existence is contingent in order to prove that existence itself is absurd, that it be some kind of joke. But what if this task is not as difficult as ones so humble as ourselves may think it to be? Late to the game but already in uniform a definition for existence-itself arrives, taking Wittgensteinian form, the category of real objects — that is to say existence is things that make up what the case is, as the constituent parts of reality. So starting with some common fundamental principles regarding existence, we should see if anything amusing arises.

Creation of reality itself is the first place to start, literally, as nothing could be said to exist before it. If you're of the inclination to suppose that time existed forever then you might risk the metaphysical hypothesis that there was no creation to the universe (read: reality). Starting then with this metaphysical risk that time is infinite, we would risk no further our careers as philosophers in understanding that time being infinite means the universe would have to have had existed for an infinite amount of time before now, which is problematic since there would not be a first state of affairs and therefore no second state of affairs etcetera, as well as an infinite amount of time needing to have passed before our current instantiate. To word it more clearly, we would have to say an infinite amount of time needed to pass before this specific moment, which is to say that since it would be infinite, the end of it has yet to come, which would mean this moment is yet to exist, which would mean not only this moment but the current universe has yet to come about, as an infinite amount of time is still in the process of occurring beforehand. So to say time is infinite is to submit that the universe doesn't exist, or more charitably, that it has yet to exist. This is clearly self-defeating as an argument for time's infinite parameter would disallow you the state of affairs where you've currently come about existence to argue for its infinite parameter.

If we were to then take the argument that time is finite, we would be led down the path of arguing that there was a definite start to reality, to all of existence, and therefore there is a point wherefrom nothing existed beforehand. But if nothing existed beforehand, then whence cometh existence? Especially if there was a point when time didn't exist, as nothing at all was yet to exist, then how could it be the case that there was a *point in time* that time began to exist? The self-defeating nature of the notion of finite time becomes apparent in these malformed questions, all being akin to

[81] Gallow, J. Dmitri. Umich.edu. Accessed October 30, 2015. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jdmitrig/1 Meaning—Nagel.pdf

other nonsensicalities like, "Where does the white go when snow melts?" And yet this is no false dichotomy, time is either finite or infinite, both cases of which lead us into paradoxical understanding of our universe, and both of which without being logically inconsistent result in it being the case that the universe cannot exist. If you are to make further attempts at approaching existence within the framework of time by saying things like *time is a flat circle* then you will also make futile attempts at justifying how this flat circle of time came to be in the first place much like the previous two frames we worked in.

To construct another counter to time being used to frame existence and thereby showcase existence should not be framed by it, note no future object can be demonstrated to exist in the present, and that no past object can be shown to exist in the present, as only objects existing presently can be shown presently, and so it can therefore be said that no objects exist outside of the present, or rather that the only 'time' is current, and as such any abstractions from the present give rise to false reality (this is of course a form of presentism — one that I don't actually think is true).

This next paragraph is redundant, inconsistent, doesn't even reflect the point of what I'm really trying to attack here, and no longer aligns with my actual views.

A distinction between 'false' and 'true' in relation to its use as a modifier of reality here should be made, a distinction in which we are saying reality is 'false' when our descriptions of it do not conform to the truth; truth being defined as, "what is," as in what is the case. Common objections to this definition of truth run along the lines of, "That is not what truth is," but the self-defeating nature of this objection is made explicit in their use of the initial definition by saying, "That is not ***WHAT*** *truth* ***IS****." Any further definition given for truth is to invoke the semantic that truth is what the suggested further definition be. So now that we have a self-actuating definition for truth, we will say our descriptions of reality are true when our descriptions conform to what is the case. Our definition for reality then would follow that reality is the category of all truths. We would say anything that is not the case also is not, so anything that is not the case cannot be said to exist, and more acutely would be said to not exist, thus actuating our definition that reality is the category of all things that are the case (Wittgenstein's version of reality[82]), necessarily meaning that reality is all current instantiates of cases. This demonstrates that anything non-current or anything not presently instantiated does not exist and that the framework of time is an invalid and malformed mode of understanding existence.*

- Thing about space also being bad here —

Should we deny however that either it's the case that reality exists or it's the case that reality doesn't exist? You may recall works regarding Gorgias which have famously toyed with these particular paradoxical issues of existence stating, "More specifically, the nonexistent does not exist; for if the nonexistent exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar as it is understood as nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as it is nonexistent it will, on the other hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely absurd for something to exist and at the same time not to exist. The nonexistent, therefore, does not exist."[83] So without violating the law of non-contradiction, we must take the strong stance and say that things that exist, exist, and things that don't, don't. But Gorgias also argued that things simply don't exist[84], so we might note that when saying it is absurd for something to exist and not exist that this is a nuanced way of accepting a failure of logic, as it was stated that insofar as something is nonexistent it will exist as such.

I would like to make the case now that this failure is not in our invocation of language but in our very framing of existence. Logical inconsistencies froth up from the crashing tides of existence no matter how many times philosophers set out to surf them. The only thing consistent about these metaphysical frameworks is their inconsistencies, an absurdity which serves as nothing other than to be another drop in the bucket of cosmic farce. This is not to say we can never understand reality, but simply that framing it under the architecture of things like 'existence' are problematic. We should also say that this is not to denounce the law of non-contradiction, as abandoning logical framework do us as much disservice as relinquishing our pursuit for the truth of the matter would do. So while accepting logical framework in our architecture, we must repudiate the cantankerous ways these previous philosophers have gone by setting us up with faulty ontological equipment such as 'time' and 'existence'.

[82] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
[83] Jowett, Benjamin. Gorgias: line 67. Champaign, Ill.: Project Gutenberg, 2008.
[84] "Gorgias." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed October 30, 2015. http://www.iep.utm.edu/gorgias/#SH2a

An aside: time may still be a valid framework when considering human cognition and our general framing of *day-to-day* interactions, as Kant indeed described time as being a base component for our understanding of things[85], but unlike Kant I don't believe the correct understanding of reality independent of time's invocation is outside our comprehension.

If nothing exists, then how do we go about discussing the nature of existence, as surely it has yet been said to whence cometh existence? It seems that without invoking creation (as we've discussed that creation would require a starting point, meaning time), and without invoking existence from non-existence, we can maintain logical consistency by saying nothing exists. Again, we shouldn't throw out the law of non-contradiction, and so to stay contradictorily safe, we would not say that existing things don't exist, rather to make this intelligible we would simply say that what appears to exist does so only as an aspect of non-existence. If it is the case that nothing exists, it would non-contradictorily be the case that nothing exists, and so reality would be nonexistent as reality is the set of all current truths, meaning all things that are the case, and verily it would be the case that nothing exists. This is not to then say non-existence exists, as that would be harkening back to Gorgias, so clearly it is the case that non-existence is simply non-existence and further that non-existence is what we are loosely existent as. Half-seriously now, we would only be allowed to say we 'exist' as an aspect of non-existence, making 'existence' just a malformed way to frame reality.

It should seem now that things that exist do so in reality as reality is the category of all present instantiates (and our definition of existence was the constituent parts of reality), but we must not confuse this with the notion that 'existence' is a super-structure of reality, rather a structure *inside* reality, and to reiterate our previous definition, reality is simply all current truths (all present instantiates) and so in this architecture we simply do not need 'existence' to frame reality itself. You might argue then that we're saying truths don't exist, as reality doesn't exist and reality is the set of all truths. However again, in the same fashion that it is malformed to ask how much time passed before time existed it would be malformed to ask if things exist in a non-existent architecture, meaning it is not being said that truth doesn't exist as the question is inherently nonsensical. I hope the absurdities around the framework of existence are more overtly apparent now. You must admit at this point that existence itself is slightly absurd, as it is contingent to reality, due to it being unnecessary to invoke *reality existing* making 'existence' humorous within this architecture.

Given the definitions presented in this work, we know that a joke is a specific iteration of humor, and humor is of the category of amusement, the broad categorization of which we are to say allows us to muse about things and the narrow categorization of which we are to say is a recognition (or possible self-invocation) of the failure in a logical system. So if we were to try to salvage a traditional view of ontology and say that a reworked definition of ontology as the study of 'being' itself is that which all philosophy hinges, and if 'being' itself is what's most important here, then the study of it, and of the modes of being, must be somewhat self-referential, as being itself is what the ontological does. That is to say, 'being' itself must be a meta-abstraction, as being itself is what a being does, and so out of its own volition, it is. However, we are not speaking of *a* being, but of 'being' itself, and so it seems that only by its own meta-invocations does it be. A bad phrasing, as 'it' is 'being' itself, and thus any modes of it being is an abstraction from the 'being' itself, so allow me a rephrase then to say that 'being' itself *is* amusement, as it would follow 'being' can only be said to be due to its meta-reification which could itself only be as a recognition of such, meaning a meta-invocation of a failure of logic had to be had, making being itself, ontology, a joke. So even by shifting ontology from existence to being we still return to the same semantic driving ontology, that all instantiates of it be humorous in nature.

I realize that last paragraph may have just won me the word-games championship. I may have also asserted quite a lot while failing to properly justify much of it throughout this work, but this could easily be said is the case for any other basket-chosen framework for understanding the nature of existence as most if not all other frameworks are either properly unjustified or outright wrong; this work itself then would be a meta-abstraction from the case that all framework for understanding the nature of existence is problematic, meaning this meta-abstraction is itself a framework for understanding our understanding of the nature of existence but only through recognition that it be properly unjustified or fallaciously so. Would this not then be an instantiate of the case that ontology is a joke? Without further

[85] Janiak, Andrew. "Kant's Views on Space and Time." Stanford University. September 14, 2009.

pretzeling us back through the arguments of this work I state that at no less it must be admitted, "Ontology being a joke is self-explanatory," is non-figuratively the most meta joke of all time.

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:: A More Modal Modalism ::

"Asdf"
Asdf

odalism is the view that there is a hard distinction between possible worlds and actual worlds, sometimes softening the distinction, as David Lewis does, to argue that all possible worlds are actual worlds in some physicalist or idealist space.[86] No matter what the ontological status of modality is, I think there is an interesting consequence of looking at meta-modals. We can look at the traditional 'possibles' and 'actuals' as *possible actuals* versus *actual actuals*, and the new meta-modal distinctions as *possible possibles* versus *actual possibles*.

	Actual	Possible
Actual	Actual Actuals	Actual Possibles
Possible	Possible Actuals	Possible Possibles

Just as an acorn is a possible tree and not an actual tree, there are possible states themselves that are possible and not actual. An acorn is actually a possible tree — as the world is currently configured, an acorn could really become an acorn tree. This is an actual possibility. But an acorn does not have the possibility to become a dog. It does however have the possibility to enter into a world configured such that acorns do become dogs — a possible possible. What it would take for that to happen would probably look something like significant genetic augmentation and a lot of environmental change to suggest the acorn become something other than an acorn tree, but it is possible that the world could change to allow this possibility. So not an actual possibility, but a possible possibility.

Similarly, it is not an actual possibility that you can jump to the Moon from Earth, but it is possibly possible given the world augmentation of millions of years passing where the Moon's orbit degrades and it falls towards Earth until eventually it is so close to Earth that you could jump up a few feet and touch it. A few moments after that would probably be a cataclysmic impact, but the point is that this would still make it possible to jump to the Moon. A *possible possible*.

Using meta-modals, I think there is legitimate grounds to attack whether modal realism itself is possible or actual. The modal realists have not determined whether their 'possible' worlds are actual possibles, possible possibles, or possible actuals, only that they aren't actual actuals. But if a possible world is a real, existent world, as modal realism argues, then that starts to sound awfully a lot like an *actual world*. So if possible worlds are actual worlds, then at the most benign it defeats the purpose to call them possible, and at the most malignant it completely eliminates the distinction between possible and actual. People dumb enough to be convinced by David Lewis become bewildered when presented with this.

The fix is probably something like fictional realism — the idea that fictional worlds are real only given their seating inside the actual world. For example, Harry Potter is male and attended Hogwarts. You would be wrong to say otherwise, but Harry Potter is also not a real person and so none of the facts about his person are facts about a real person, yet they are still facts. You can be objectively right or wrong about descriptions of fictional things since fictional things are real objects in our actual world.

If modalities are collapsed to something like the above, then it is much easier to argue for them as ontologically sensical. What we call a possible world is then a fictional object we instantiate purely for

[86] N.b., David Lewis' version of modal realism is not meaningfully distinct from Platonic dualism but because it has a different name everyone has been fooled into thinking it's something new—https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/#6

use in modal discussions, to which we can make objective, factual claims about, but to which have no ontological status outside our actual world. This saves the distinction between 'possible' and 'actual' while also keeping their use in things like modal logic alive.

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Demetri Martin's question of, "How long is the present?", the present, even in a time-positive framework, does not have extension into time.
https://twitter.com/DemetriMartin/status/309024797944332290

From Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter I, section 5; translation by Helen Zimmern

" That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are — how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are, — but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths," — and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule."

In none of Nietzsche's works does he fail to follow his stereotype of asserting much, justifying little, and concluding nothing; yet many people are convinced by these baseless assertions, or rather, in honesty and charity, it's more like these are maxims or general observations about society that many side with out of reclined observation. This goes to show that Nietzsche was a rhetorician, not a philosopher, as he has clearly stated here (and a few other places) that he does not have direct impulse for Truth.

Time dilation proportionate to zoom scale of a 3-dimensional fractal can create a "forever jail" of infinite exploration because you'll never be able to get to the center, and can only get out by going back the exact way you came. Example — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E91yxk_pT_A

"One who aspires to wisdom above that of the common man disgraces himself by deriving doubt from common ways of speaking." — Rene Descartes, Meditation II

Combine the three free will sections into a single section about randomness vs. hard determinism.

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:: Physicalistic Monism as an Anti-Determinism Schema ::

"When I asked if she was free that evening I didn't expect her to reply: 'No, but I'm reasonable.' " [87]

Almost axiomatically, people think that if Physicalism is true, that if the Monist wins outright, then a physical universe working under completely determinate laws must mean Determinism is true, that everything that ever happens was entirely predetermined to happen. They think it is the case that not only that be true, but that from that it would follow that Free Will becomes non-existent, as everything you will is predetermined, and therefore no responsibility follows.[88] But fear not, my little loci of knowledge, because I'm here to tell you, "Nah."

Aside from offensities to physicists that occur when you say all the laws of the physical universe are completely deterministic (as Quantum Mechanics explicitly illustrates strong indeterminate qualities innate within the universe[89]), there is a more efficient way to be wrong. To illustrate, we will assume deterministic framework to show how by its own volition it implodes. I do this not only to stay in character with what will be noted in a later section about not trying to mesh opposing frameworks, but also to keep in line with the idea that the best way to destroy a system is from within.

Let us assume Hard Determinism is true, that all time and action within reality were entirely predetermined. All that has ever been and will ever be are set and as such things like Free Will do not exist. Let us assume this Deterministic framework and then continue inspecting the supposed completely-determinate laws that underpin the universe. If it was true that reality is completely determinate, as clearly Physicalism must assert to be true, then at some point Physicists would have predictive models that aren't just probabilistically accurate, but completely predicatively accurate. We can know this to be the case as a completely determined universe can be completely predicted, otherwise one can ask whence the determinism cometh.

Having predictive models with high functionality paired with supercomputers (and this will likely be a real thing once the technological singularity hits) we can then simulate large models of parts of the universe with complete, or near-complete, predictive power. At some point we could have the processing potential to simulate our universe in its entirety[90], but even only with certain sectors of space being simulated, all we have to do is say, "Look at this grouping of atoms we call JD, who we know for a fact, because of the deterministic powers of both nature and our models of such, will become a doctor in five years." Once a prediction of a person is made, after getting some measurement of a predetermined instance, all you would have to do is show it to the person and that person could then just choose to not to do the thing that was predetermined (hold your accusations of begging the question here, we'll get back to it). Show JD that he is predetermined to become a doctor and then have him not become a doctor. Having knowledge of things predetermined to happen allows us to un-determine them in this sense.

You might then say that if the universe were truly deterministic (as we must assume since it's the framework we're using) that the device that's making the measurements, when measuring before and after the knowledge of the determined outcome was given, would show the same outcome. We'd then be quite literally forced to follow through with the predicted outcome regardless of our knowledge of it (we'd be doing what we're told essentially). As we start to see the fallacies pop up, we find that this is not actually the case. When shown that we are forced to do something, even if it be something we otherwise want and enjoy, some people will often discourage themselves from doing the thing they found themselves forced to do (not saying emotions trump Determinism here). If this prediction device then predicts that using the device influences decisions and thus you are still following what the device shows you are predetermined to do, then why not still choose to deny what you've been told to do? Because it wouldn't be your choice, right? The problem that pops up with these foreknowledge devices is that you're lead through infinite recursion as you try to determine what it is you're destined to do and at which juncture you were forced to be aware that you were forced to be aware to do it (I hope the recursion is becoming more apparent).

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[87] http://www.insults.net/html/genre_insults/x-rated_insults.html
[88] http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determinism.html
[89] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics
[90] https://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html

Even in speaking of the subject, you must say that it's difficult to 'determine'. You'd think that a deterministic universe would not be difficult to determine as such. Let's say then that the readings before and after the knowledge of the determined outcome was given shows different outcomes; the inconsistency proves the universe to not be deterministic (at least not until awareness of aspects of it arise). Knowledge of predicted events can then be said to accurately un-determine them, if willed.

What if the universe is still totally determinate and we just can't make a device that accurately predicts determined outcomes? No device, no measurements, the schema falls deaf. But even if the laws that govern our physical universe are completely deterministic (which again, I remind you they actually aren't according to Quantum Mechanics) there's nothing that says we can't create a bubble of space-time outside our universe for us to escape into (substantiated by the references cited in the previous section) and hand-engineer physical laws to our liking. We will one day have the power to leave our universe as our understanding of physics steadily increases and we will be able to create secondary universes at will. So if you truly wanted to break Determinism, you could just leave into a universe with non-deterministic laws. In this way we can know that Determinism only leads to an indeterminate universe.

Maybe the thoughts on the matter are confused, the wordage used so far is clearly problematic. How can this even be proper philosophy without defining that which is determined to be? We should really be clear on what is meant by 'determined' things. *That which is determined to be* is defined as an action or event that occurs instead of another action or event because of some preceding action or event.[91] For example, looking at your phone instead of not looking at your phone. Did you choose to look without it being predetermined, or was it predetermined all along that you would look? Even without it being 'predetermined' you are still asserting that something was *determined*; this is to say that between options, one was done over another, that one was 'chosen' (even if the choice was not made by a free agent). In viewing the semantic of the word itself we would think Deterministic framework self-defeats as things being 'determined' still explicitly require options to choose from, meaning the options existed to begin with. Or maybe yet all other imagined options are nothing but imagined and only one thing was ever going to happen, but what then about scenarios where two possible events both occur from a single preceding action like the placement of certain particles as being existent in two places at once?[92] [93] There's that sneaky quantum mechanics debasing determinism again.

All scenarios, even with a deterministic framework assumed, allow us to reach a non-deterministic reality. What then if I might be totally wrong and simply have a misinformational view of both physics and determinism? All things factored in, I probably do have a fallacious view of the matter, right? Maybe 'probably' isn't the right word, because surely if it were true that the universe were deterministic, then nothing would be probable, only certain. So certainly my view is wrong. And yet I doubt such a thing. How can something be so certain and yet doubted at the same time? Unless in doubting certainty, you certainly doubt, but then couldn't you call into question whether it was so certain you doubt to begin with? Maybe you are then to say, "Certainly, the doubt will be, and as such I am not responsible for that." The properly peppered mis-colloquialism here would be, "Take that as you willed." The argument is pretzeled now and my head hurts so I'm given to quitting, but enjoy not having the freedom to ponder the subject, contrarians.

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[91] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determine
[92] http://phys.org/news/2015-01-atoms.html
[93] http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/45041/can-an-electron-be-in-two-places-at-the-same-time

:: Freely Willing ::

> *The assumption that free will has mechanisms implies that it is the effect in a causal chain. If you don't assume it is mechanistic then the search for a cause of free will disappears.*

Hume single-handedly got empirical evidence disqualified from being proper justification (known as the "problem of induction" — which has remained a problem till this day), placed 'self' into the category of illusion, and said 'will' is what you were free to define it as, all of which has consistently continued to cock-up contemporary philosophy despite what Kant and others tried to do, which was to fully reconcile the fundamental issues Hume originally pointed out with each of these subjects. Hume might as well have been a master comedian, he so presciently predicted dissent that he included in his frameworks the means by which to self-defeat attacks on his frameworks, as shown by the self-referential nature of the paraphrasing of 'will' being defined as what you were free to define it as. Disagreeing with the definition actuates the definition, as suggesting another definition (or even no definition at all) would mean that since no uniformity of opinion exists then you were free to choose to disagree on the definition, meaning the definition is what you were free to define it as, thus completing the actuation of his framework.

Viewing his arguments on free will in this way quite clearly illustrates what we know by the initial definition list to be a bastard framework. While superficially problematic, as one might think that free will cannot exist if your will is predetermined, you find through his framework that what you will is what you were capable of doing, what you are literally free to do as nothing stopped you from doing it, meaning all matters of will be "free will" regardless of whether or not it was predetermined. A master comedian indeed.

This look into Hume's free will raises a few questions though, like if he was simply massaging definitions into pretzel'd language games or if he actually demonstrated that free will exists despite a deterministic framework being assumed (as an empiricist he surely believed in determinism). Even if it's simply language games, language still conveys meaning, and what is meant by both 'free' and 'will' is directly conveyed by Hume, so his game is still a valid framework for analyzing the issue. That being noted, the critiques of his work tend to pose dissent along the lines of, "If your will is predetermined, then you did not will your will."

problem of induction shows that causation is not actually observed, making it so there is no directly observable cause for actions, this absolves free will and defeats determinism and fatalism
Causation backwards, effect then cause, etc.
determinism is also defeated when you defeat time's existence, meaning if time doesn't exist, then there was no past to predetermine the future, as the only things that exist do so presently and lack classically deterministic powers

If free will does not exist, as we are all predetermined to do what we do and had no real choice in the matter, then it is indeed the case, despite arguments that it is not, that 'we' are not responsible for what 'we' do. People worry that what follows from this are things of legal nature, that criminals are not directly responsible for their actions and are thus not worthy of being punished, but the thing is the people that lock them away are also not responsible for the actions of locking away the criminals, and thus are not worthy of being relieved of their jobs.

All kinds of contradictions and paradoxes pop up when you assume everything is predetermined. The biggest problem of fatalism is that even under a completely determined universe, we'd still be acting and doing things as if we had the free will to act and do them. The knowledge of fatalism doesn't affect anything substantial in how we treat our daily lives, as the knowledge of free will also doesn't affect anything substantial in our daily lives. The whole thing becomes inconsequential, since again, we still act and do things as if there was no determined factor in them outside of our wills to do so.

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Quantum indeterminacy is said to be inconsequential to *solid-level* phenomena, meaning that even though there are non-deterministic aspects to our universe on the quantum level, that said non-deterministic aspects do not bubble up to macro-scale objects that we observe on a day-to-day basis, which means that every aspect of the universe we would ever directly experience or interact with is completely predetermined as per our contemporary understanding of physics. I'm here to tell you that even with a macro-scale hard deterministic universe, we can utilize micro-scale indeterminacy to create non-determined solid-level events, making our universe no longer hard-deterministic, and further, that not only is this possible with our current technology, but that this is imperative to do and necessary for making contact with intelligent extraterrestrial life forms as a human interest.

The simplest way to view this is within the context of devices that measure quantum states. We know quantum-level events are not all predetermined as there are a great many quantum-level events that are indeterministic in nature (and *a priori* cannot be known given the laws of quant). If we had a solid-level machine that output a different number of actions proportionate to the different number of actions a quantum-level function could collapse into, then tying that machine to a device that measured quantum states and reacted in accordance to which quantum state was measured, would mean we have a machine who's outputting actions on the solid level that is doing so in an indeterministic way. A single case of indeterminate action on the solid level means hard determinism cannot be correct, and further that a machine like this that outputs many ultimately non-predetermined actions would mean there are many cases to the contrary of hard determinism.

Of course, this is a misunderstanding of quantum measurement devices, as once a quantum state is measure, the function is collapsed and is no longer non-deterministic. But as we know from more recent experimentation around the double-slit test, even if quantum states are measured, that does not mean the function is necessarily collapsed; it is only after the data recorded is accessed (and I have a suspicion that this may be due to a quantum entanglement or some sort of connection established between the particles used for the measurement and the particles measured) that the viewable pattern past the double-slit changes.[94] So simply measuring a quantum state does not collapse the function, it is found then that the measurement must be utilized or accessed itself in order for the quantum state measured to be collapsed. Even if this is not the case, it's still true that a device could be set up past a double-slit, or similar arrangement, where instead of a surface that allows for viewing of patterns created by particles fed through the double-slits, that a reactionary device be placed, allowing for a pure input-output system whereby the patterns created by the particles being input through the double-slit would have direct effect on the output of the device without ever needing to measure the quantum state beforehand.

Going back to making this curt and accessible, this means we could see indeterministic quantum output on a solid-level scale due to never directly measuring the quantum state and therefore never collapsing the function. This would make our usual deterministic world have non-deterministic events occurring in them. This can be done, as the technology making this thought experiment possible is the same technology used to invoke the possibility of such a state of affairs, and so we could very well make a device that does what I've just now described.

You could argue that this indeterministic thing was created in a deterministic solid-level manner, which would mean it only has surface indeterminacy, that it actually still be ultimately predetermined despite appearing indeterminate, much like the Littlebits Arduino Knife-Wielding Tentacle.[95] But making it predetermined to exist only means its existence would be the predetermined aspect, its output as solid-level functionings would not be ultimately predetermined, as non-deterministic probabilistic functions are controlling the output, meaning that while its output is determined by a non-deterministic thing this does not make its output pre-determined in the same manner everything else at the solid level is considered to be.

But the question then turns to the classic, ancient, mystic- why? Let me ask you a better question in return- why not? This would be the greatest exercise of both scientific and philosophical understanding to date in that it would be the very instantiate of a fundamental change to the

[94] https://www.youtube.com/v/T1vYHOPFgcg?start=1296&end=1979
[95] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQ2dI_B_Ycg

functionings of our universe that we ourselves created, even if on our level we were predetermined to so do. We would then be the conduits by which the universe makes components of itself non-deterministic on a solid-level scale. So I'm not even arguing for this on the basis of free will or freedom at all, I'm merely saying that this could be used to prove hard determinism is not the case and that this be a great demonstration of our understanding and interactions with fundamental properties of existence. It is this great demonstration of our understanding that would be necessary for proof of uber-level intelligence and thereby necessary to generate interest or acceptance of our species by other uber-intelligent species.

Lower-level intelligence is scaled by an object's awareness of its relation to other objects (sentience), higher-level intelligence is scaled by an object's knowledge of the natures of both of those sets of objects as well as the nature of their relation to each other (secondary theory of mind) and the ability to think about and physically instantiate a change to those relations (long-term planning), and uber-level intelligence would be scaled by an object's or group of objects' (collective consciousness) ability to think about and physically instantiate a change to the fundamental nature of both of those sets of objects as well as the fundamental nature of their relation to each other. This means that while yes we humans as a collective species are close to uber-level intelligence, that no we have not obtained it yet and no matter how many spaceships we send off Earth, no matter how many particles we shoot at each other in an underground collider, no matter how many new and exotic maths we invent, that none of that will ever bring us closer to uber-level intelligence and only serves to strengthen our higher-level intelligence as they are all means for understanding or changing relations between objects.

Without a meta-physical invocation, without this cuil-esk abstraction into the nature not of just objects but also their relation's nature and then the reification of this meta-level framework, we cannot say we have done anything truly intelligent on a scale that would demonstrate more than just surface level understandings of our universe or certainly demonstrate a mastery thereof. It is for these reasons that such an experiment be necessary to make first contact with an ultra intellectual 'other' or an alien species that would have the powers to travel anywhere instantly (which would be required, or something like it, for travel between galaxies).

Consider our understandings of the quantum level of the universe to be our exposure to the universe's source code, in this way we can think of it as the means for changing the way our universe functions, and it is because of this that we should. If you would like to participate in the universe's reprogramming, you can contact me at Snax@Snerx.com, or you can use that to send me pictures of tin foil hats, whichever you think is more reasonable.

Metaepistemology

:: It's Always Better to Know Than to Not Know ::

"And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?"
Plato

ften repeated in philosophy, it is better to know than to not know. However, contemporaries like Madva will point out that there is a great wealth of useless knowledge, bits of information that have no meaningful or practical purpose. An example he gave me — is the number of oxygen atoms in the room even or odd? There is seemingly no possible application this could ever have. But we also have no way of finding out. It's not currently possible for us to find out how many oxygen atoms there are in a room. This is important to note because the knowledge that would be required to determine this piece of information justifies its pursuit many times over, and *that* knowledge has near-endless practical and meaningful uses, making it better in *capacity* to know than to not know.

I.e., if we had the understanding necessary to invent a device that could reliably and accurately determine exactly how many atoms of a certain type were occupying an arbitrarily-sized space at any given time, then we would also know how to gain atomically precise measurements for just about anything else we would ever want to measure. This would probably be the greatest measuring instrument humans ever attain, and that is justification for its pursuit.

As a simpler example, it seems meaningless to know precisely how many hairs are on the head of a random person picked off the street, but I contend that, given a full head of hair, this too is outside our current ability to find out. By the time you finished combing through an average head of tens of thousands of hairs, the number will have changed. You would not know how many old hairs had fallen out and how many new ones had sprouted, changing the total count by an amount you could not know the quantity of. However, if you had access to a device that could accurately track all the hairs on a head at the same time, then you could know what the total was, whether it was even or odd, and so on. But we don't have this technology, and the knowledge required to attain it would again justify its pursuit many times over. So it doesn't seem totally useless to have the capacity to know how many hairs are on someone's head.

In fact, were such measurement devices to be invented, we could surely expand their usefulness by turning them into game shows or something similar. How many hairs are on this contestant's head? Closest estimate wins. Is the number of atoms in their hair even or odd? The right answer wins you a billion dollars, or whatever. You can set the stakes to be however high you desire if this knowledge is actually attainable. A man holds you at gunpoint in a grocery store, he wants to know the exact number of fish in the Atlantic. Stranger things have happened. This kind of knowledge is only useless so long as you deign it useless.

Moreover, it seems to me that all knowledge that people generally agree on as completely useless or impractical rests fundamentally on premises we don't currently have access to. Every example I have seen people give of knowledge they claim to know is totally useless has always been something trivial for me to find a use for. This even includes the long list of 'useless information' in pure mathematics, as what was for two thousand years considered totally unimportant and meaningless number theory is now the basis of all of computing, encryption, banking, and so on.

Where you fall on this issue is a litmus test (yet another thing that would have been considered useless knowledge for all of time before its modern application) of whether you are a sophist or a philosopher. The distinction here is in whether you think knowledge *needs* an application in order for it to be worth pursuing versus whether you pursue it for its own sake.

The philosopher doesn't need knowledge to be practical and the sophist doesn't understand why you would bother with information that didn't have any purpose. This becomes a serious epistemic problem. The sophist is not *capable* of learning how the world works for its own sake, which ironically means they are missing a critical tool for learning how the world works at all. This is probably why sophists will often use linguistic reductionist arguments or become violent in the face of anything self-evident that runs counter to their claims. But who knows. If only *that* piece of knowledge was useful, right?

To anticipate an objection, that there are examples where it is *worse* to know something, which is called an information hazard, it is simply not very valuable to believe in information hazards because information is only ever hazardous if you don't know what you ought to do with it — a problem solved by gaining even more information. The real hazard is acting without thinking.[96]

It is always better to know than to not know; in capacity, and probably in particular. There is an easy yet strong case that can be made for knowledge as an inherent good — that anything that can be known is also good, without hard distinction between the good and the knowable — we go over this in the metaethics chapter.

***

:: Subjection ::

"asdf"
Asdf

f there are 'objections' having to do with objects and objectivity, then surely there are 'subjections' having to do with subjects and subjectivity.

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Emotions are rational section to epistemology. Emotional walls are good at keeping the outside world from getting in but they're terrible at keeping the inside world from getting out.

Single point of light, one-to-many bits of info given by one bit of info — spatial, temporal, temperature.

If language was subjective, then why not also traffic laws?
Just as everyone imposing their own individual system of traffic law onto the roads would lead to lots of crashes and death, so too would everyone making their own system of language lead to lots of verbal crashes and conceptual deaths (that is, death of the mutual intelligibility of concepts).
So to avoid death, there is a standardized rule-set everyone must universally concede to. Some rules may be sub-optimal or unjust and a similar universal concession gets occasionally made to augment the rule-set. It should be noted that despite however arbitrary the modifications may be, once the modification is made it is no longer arbitrary; everyone must once again concede to the newly augmented universal rule-set or the otherwise easily avoidable deaths will pile up.
Not only does this mean language is objective, it makes the existence of centralized arbitrating bodies of languages an ethical imperative.

:: Metaepistemology And Its Actuation Through Cuil Theory ::

"And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh."
Friedrich Nietzsche

[96] Žižek's *Don't Act. Just Think.* video makes good points on this.

ustified true belief, as the classical definition says, and Gettier critiques,

wouldn't holding two sides of an existentially contradictory statement to both be true be the same as knowing one of them was true?

For example, if we were to say that some object X both did and did not exist, then one of these must be the case, either object X does exist or it doesn't, or I'd even grant para-consistent logic, where we might say both are true, it doesn't matter because somewhere in the assertion is a truth, something that is the case. In this example, since one side (or both) are the case, then if we believe both sides to be true then we believe that object X is/isn't the case, and verily in actuality object X really is/isn't the case, meaning we have the True and the Belief of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Further, we also have Justification, because (given formal logic) one side /must/ be the case, either object X exists or it doesn't (or both qua para-consistent logic), meaning we are at least half justified in believing object X is/isn't the case because at least half of the assertion /must/ be true. This showcases that to simultaneously believe some object X both does and does not exist is to have knowledge about one side of the assertion. It could be said, given the standard definition of knowledge being Justified True Belief, that since we believe some object X exists, if the object is granted to actually exist (if it is the case), and we are justified in this belief, then we actually know object X exists. Similarly with the versa vice situation, we believe object X does not exist, it can be granted that it is actually the case that object X does not exist, and we are justified in believing this, ergo we know object X does not exist.

A potential objection may be that it is not possible in principle to hold both sides of such a view simultaneously else we perverse the law of non-contradiction which would mean to assert both sides of an existential contradiction be true is to assert nonsense, and yet it is the case that one side actually be correct, and it is the case that para-consistent logic is taken as non-nonsense so I don't see this objection holding much water without further exploring it.

That being said, if we grant that we have knowledge when holding an existential contradiction to be valid, then surely if we assert that both knowledge is possible and knowledge is not possible, then we know something about this system, as we are justified in believing at least one of the sides, and the side we are justified in believing is actually the case, so tautologically we know it to be so. What I mean is- if we simultaneously hold knowledge to both be and not be possible, then we know something about this para-consistent system.

This is not a paradox, as this is not actually contradictory because merely asserting a contradiction does not make a contradiction true, it instead means one side or aspect of the contradiction is false. Nota bene, I am also not saying knowledge is paradoxical here, as again I am merely asserting, without base, that knowledge is and is not possible, there is nothing in this framework of knowledge that is itself contradictory, so the epistemological framework isn't paradoxical here. The assertion is an existential contradiction, but it is not paradoxical.

I also do not see this as circular as I anticipate this might be the line of reasoning given in a strong objection. If this was circular, there would be multiple premises or axioms that referenced themselves in continuous succession. For example, one might've asked, "How do we know knowledge is possible?" Traditionally we might've answered that we cannot know knowledge is possible without first assuming that knowledge is possible, right? At some point it has to be baselessly granted that knowledge be possible in order for us to assert that we know knowledge is possible, and this relies on two principles that reference each other, the first being the definition of knowledge (as axiom) and the second being that some premise be true (that something actually be the case in reality), we believe it to be true, and we are justified in that belief. But how can we be justified here without baselessly assuming justification is valid? This is turtles all the way down, it always seems to ultimately wind back up at baseless assertions or arbitrary axioms that only work because they circularly justify themselves. Given multiple principles, my meta-epistemological claim could be considered circular, but how many principles are actually involved in this meta-epistemological assertion?

If we grant one and only one principle, then even if it references itself, that does not make it circular, it instead makes it self-actuation, pseudo-tautological so to speak, as it would be its own justification (I realize the use of the same words under their different definitions may be confusing here,

but this a paper on the meta after all). So what if the principle at play is simply self-actuation itself? If the principle employed in these existential contradictions is only that we acknowledge the existential contradictions are actually contradictory, meaning one side /must/ be the case because the other side is a non-case, then doesn't knowledge follow apodictically? Must it not follow that one side be the case? You might say this sounds awfully like the Law of Non-Contradiction, but how do we know the Law of Non-Contradiction is true in the first place? If we say the Law of Non-Contradiction is /not/ true, then by definition it would be the case that something can both be and not be at the same time in the same regard, which would mean the Law of Non-Contradiction would both be true and not true (the case and not the case) at the same time in the same regard, which would mean at least half of that assertion were true (because something is the case). And now we're back at something very similar to the initial example, where something existentially contradictory is at least half true, but this time it's about whether or not things can be true in principle and since we demonstrate that something is the case (read: true) and it is also the case that something is /not/ the case (read: true that something is not true) we then see that the Law of Non-Contradiction self-actuates, meaning the Law of Non-Contradiction is a self-actuatory principle.

Applying this self-actuation test back to epistemology now, we see that knowledge is in principle possible without predicating it on a baseless assumption, as either knowledge is or is not in principle possible and therefore to assert that knowledge is in principle not possible is to assert you could not know that to be the case, which makes it a baseless assertion, but to assert that knowledge is possible is to make possible qua that assertion that you know knowledge is possible, as the principle self-actuates qua that assertion.

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:: Principle Epistemic Conditions ::

"In order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)."
Wittgenstein

To place a limit on thought is to think both sides of the limit. While there is a love-hate relationship the philosophical community has with that statement, there is a real issue that occurs when you separate the epistemic from the metaphysical components here. For example, if we are to say there are objects that exist that are in principle unknowable, then how could it be the case that the objects even exist? And even if they did, to what affect would they exist? There would be no knowable interaction between the object and others.

The problem here is that asserting there are objects that exist that are unknowable in principle is to not only make a positive metaphysical claim, but also a positive epistemic one, as the claim is reducible to, "There are pieces of knowledge (objects produce information) that are in principle unknowable." That claim is self-contradictory, because how could you claim knowledge is unknowable, especially in principle? The default stance to reconcile this issue is to say that all knowledge is in principle knowable (else we perverse the definition of knowledge), and even if humans are cognitively limited, that does not mean there are no potential knowers incapable of any/all given pieces of knowledge. We find then that if an object exists (objects are reducible to information) then it is knowable.

If you disagree, remember, the claim that there are objects or knowledge that exists that are in principle unknowable is the *positive* claim, and I am not asserting that these things exist, and with a positive claim comes the burden of proof.[97] Understand that to disagree with me is to assert that you can demonstrate the existence of something that is in principle impossible to demonstrate. I await polemic tears.

The quote at the beginning of this section does not say thought itself is limitless; Wittgenstein used it to set up the limits we can draw, but as far as the limits themselves go it would be goofy to speak on them as being something we don't understand or have information beyond. This means that while our cognition may be limited, that while knowers may have limits to the *amounts* they can know, that it does not mean we do not understand there is information we do not know, nor that that information is in principle beyond knowing altogether by any knowers. One of the things we shall see here is that 'unknowable' things that are 'unknowable' in principle are not simply things that are unknown, but things that cannot be knowledge, which means that there are no informationally reducible facts or truths about those things and therefore no affect those things have on existence. Verily it is now demonstrated that 'unknowable' things that are 'unknowable' in principle are things that simply do not exist.

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[97] http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/phil_of_religion_text/CHAPTER_5_ARGUMENTS_EXPERIENCE/Burden-of-Proof.htm

:: Epistemology And Three Base Assumptions ::

"You hesitate momentarily before allowing yourself to assume the locus of all knowledge."
RedDyeNumber4

How knowledge is possible without first assuming knowledge is possible, if not by rescuing epistemology from its annihilation and mitigating issues of the three base assumptions?

How do we know knowledge is possible without first assuming knowledge is possible?
Attack the first base assumption, defer resentment to MECH section.
Assume the opposites, similar to Gorgia, and see where it takes you.

George Orwell's exercise in trying to prove the Earth is spherical as a layman — http://alexpeak.com/twr/hdykteir/

In 7th grade my friends half-seriously hypothesized that men drive differently than women because men have dicks. It was subsequently proposed that amongst men, the races that were better or worse at driving on average were so because they had differently sized dicks than the average male. Now while the intent and form of the joke came from a childish place, my friends were not the type to give-up; they always committed to a bit, which is what makes them great comedians. So in our commitment, we pursued the hypothesis with a pseudo-scientific method of experimentation and collected data from our parents and others we observed driving. This is still a running joke between my friends to this day, and now that we all drive, we have even more evidence for the initial claims. An understanding of reality developed from this joke we made when we were significantly younger, and we now all know the joke was true. They say that experience is the largest factor in relation to driving skill[98] which is why younger drivers get into more crashes than experienced drivers, but that doesn't explain the difference in the disproportionate amounts of crashes between the genders[99] [100]. Our hypothesis was based on comfort: men sit with their legs further apart than women, and the larger their penis/testicles, the more space between the legs appears when they sit to allow them to stay comfortable. So we found through observation and testing that men tend to be more relaxed while driving than women, and men with larger penises/testicles have to recline slightly further than men with smaller penises/testicles. The more relaxed you are, the more likely you are to have a longer delay in your response time, which puts you in more risk of causing an accident. This falls right in line with the cited studies. It's not by accident that a joke which strongly resonated with us had some hold to reality. The saying is that, "It's only funny if it's true." This means comedy can be used as a predictive system for learning about reality, which fits base assumptions 2 &3, the two assumptions required to know things.

Difference between objectivity and subjectivity showcased by distrust of senses, as senses don't "fully accurately" or "wholly report" information, meaning subjectivity is just the lack of a complete objective measurement, but is not the lack of objective measure completely.

Epistemelogical Anarchism, the idea that science is indifferent to knowledge or ethics —
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemological_anarchism

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[98] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9672/
[99] http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810853.pdf
[100] http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/1007/83596.0001.001.pdf

:: Potential Epistemological Reconciliation ::

"It's fortunate that the only things that matter are things that are salient."
Model Of Ensemble

I've been trying to work around Kant's views that our access to knowledge is by the pre-defined framework we're forced to interpret information through (space and time most notably, as well as other categories). He and many others since have argued that the framework used for this interpretation means reality actually conforms to how we interpret it, which is supposed to be how we can know things about reality, because our filters are accurate filters (this is not literally what Kant said, I know, spare me). But this seems problematic as it does not solve the 'ultimate' series of epistemological questions, e.g. how reality is before we apply our filters. So it's argued that because we can't /ultimately/ know reality, we then only know of the phenomenal world qua logic or empiricism and the nomenal world (things in themselves) cannot be known at all; this is to say that the real world (reality itself) is just totally outside our direct access and therefore entirely unknowable.

This view is widely accepted, is the standard contemporary view, and unjustly so, because assuming there are things in themselves from which knowledge is impossible makes it so that there could be an epistemologically opaque box somewhere in the universe that contains within it information that would make it the case that knowledge for not just itself, but for all things, is impossible. This means that if you say there is no way to have knowledge of certain things, not just for humans, but for any thinking objects, then it's more than possible that knowledge could be an inherently fallacious architecture to begin with, putting us in a state of epistemological annihilation. Since it's logically inconsistent to say we could know something unknowable, and since it's logically inconsistent to say we can know of reality if reality is unknowable, then it must be the case that reality is knowable, all aspects of it (else we risk the opaque box), and directly so (by direct I just mean our access can be objective).

I understand the desire to argue for/against those last two paragraphs, but that's only our starting point, so we're going to take them as a granted and try to reconcile the issue from there. I don't think a purely analytic or a purely empirical epistemology resolves the 'ultimate' series of questions that I just mentioned, as analytic knowledge (a priori) doesn't give you access to all knowledge (as already explicated) and empirical knowledge (a posteriori) doesn't give you access to all knowledge (or any knowledge depending on how seriously you take Hume's problem of induction), yet as if dialectically divided akin to a mind-body distinction respectively, it seems that in tandem analytic and empirical frameworks make up the entirety of knowledge. I am not talking about what we simply are capable of knowing as humans, but all possible knowledge of all things by any knowers, divided categorically between relational recognition (a priori / relation of ideas) and material instantiates (a posteriori / matters of fact).

Kant's "synthetic a priori" category of knowledge (which he created partly in response to Hume's category of 'nonsense') should not be thought of as a separate and distinct category but rather a mesh of the two primary categories I just delineated (an aside to clarify, the a priori / a posteriori dialectical architecture can indeed account for the entirety of knowledge, as can an analytic / synthetic dialectical architecture, but Kant didn't see a need to separate them, so he didn't). However Kant said that the "analytic a posteriori" category of knowledge was nonsense, as empirical objects are external to our definitions of them. But this is at the core of the problem I wish to reconcile. I will now attempt to make the case that analytic a posteriori knowledge is not only not nonsense, but is our direct access to knowledge of reality (as far as I'm aware this has not been accomplished yet).

An analytic a posteriori framework would be something that is true by virtue of its semantic (what it means) dependent on experience (or empirical evidence). This means that experience is not contingent, it is necessary to have experience in order to have this knowledge, and this also means that it is true by definition, making the semantic of the experience tautological. When viewed this way it doesn't seem so impossible, as surely the semantic of something is derived from the thing itself, and lest we risk our careers as philosophers, we would say experience as qualia is the thing itself.

With that just said, maybe you could all help clarify this for me, as my understanding of qualia is that qualia is of things like our experience of red itself, separate from the object producing red, but also separate from the definition of red, but only with both those things (the object itself and the definition)

do we know the experience to be of red. It's possible that I have a misunderstanding of qualia (or any of the other shit I've talked about here, I mean I'm totally aware I'm only a few genes away from throwing my own feces) and so maybe you guys could correct me, but if my understanding is accurate, then by what I've just said it would make qualia an analytic a posteriori category of knowledge, meaning our conscious experience is a direct tap into reality. I am also arguing for this under the notion that qualia is a physical instantiate of reality, meaning it physically exists and is a direct participant/component of reality, with reality being defined as everything that is the case.

The standard retort to this as being a basis for knowledge are derivatives of Descartes' whole, "but how does I trusts my eyes when there could be an evil demon deceiving mine eyes bruh?" and about general issues of sensory perception being faulty etc, but all categories of knowledge can be inaccurate from time to time, the inaccuracy is only a jeopardizing issue if the category is /always/ inaccurate, and it's not. Further, if all experience is deception, it would still be the case that you're experiencing the deception, which would still be a component of reality, which still makes your experience by semantic that of reality.

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:: Quantity Of Experience Dependant On Intelligence ::

"If you know too much, then you ain't gunna know enough."
Riff Raff [101]

Those who think and process information at a faster rate 'experience' more in a given second than those who think and process slower, leading to a more intelligent person 'living' more in a day than a lesser intelligent person. Intelligence is being defined as, "the processing speed of a person's brain," and we know this can be increased by myelination of the neurons inside the brain, as well as number of folds the brain makes. This is something we've known about the brain for quite a while now, it's nothing new. That being said, you can actively myelinate your brain by constantly stimulating it and challenging it to process things it has difficulty handling.

An example of where this is exercised is in education. Education, or really the active process of learning, is directly an example of when you can consciously change your brain chemistry, by myelinating it. This myelination is often valued poorly by those with poor myelination, but to others who have exercised it often, and have become more intelligent because of it, they tend to see its importance.

On top of it just being a very powerful tool that is mostly responsible for driving processing speed in the human brain, it has an interesting affect on what the conscious brain is capable of perceiving. Let's take a step back for a moment and say that you don't understand or agree on what and how myelination is being defined and used here. Could you not still admit that intelligence can be developed and strengthened? To deny that would be to deny that people are more intelligent than they were when they were infants, which would be ridiculous to deny. So we can all agree that there are people who process information faster than others, even if we don't all agree on the science behind it, right?

Let's define 1 Tick as 1/100th of a second, and define 1 Calculation as 1,000 synaptic firings (or "chemical data transfer between neurons" if you feel that's a better description). So our variable parameters are thus:

1 Tick = 1/100th Seconds
1 Calculation = 1,000 Neuronal Firings

Let's say that on average, Zork's brain can make 3 Calculations in 1 Tick, and Zuthulu's brain can make 30 Calculations in 1 Tick, then it is safe to say that on average, Zuthulu's brain can process ten times the amount of information per Tick than Zork's.

The difference between processing power of human brain's is often this great or greater (not even taking into consideration the mentally handicapped). So if a person's brain can process input faster than another person's brain for a given second, then we can also safely say that there is allocation in the brain-power of the more intelligent person to process more input in that second than the other person's.

What this means- your brain does not idle to compensate for you being more intelligent than everyone below the curve, instead it keeps feeding input and environmental stimulus to you at a faster rate than those less intelligent (and vice versa to those more intelligent than yourself), and if the environment does not supply you with enough stimulus, your brain will come up with its own stimuli to compensate (these are usually experienced in the forms of introspective thoughts, or logical stimulants about internally perceived subjects). You brain always wants you to keep thinking, because thinking itself is what constitutes your consciousness, and to stop thinking would be to kill your consciousness.

And what that *means- even though a stupid person and an intelligent person can both perceive a whole second of life, the intelligent person perceived more during that second than the stupid person. The intelligent person* experienced *more during that second than the stupid person. The intelligent person consciously* lived *more during that second than the stupid person.*

This is something to rejoice about, because it means that if you expand the exposure on your camera, you can take more light in; if you expand the container you fish in, you can catch more fish; if you expand your consciousness, you can experience more in your day-to-day life.

I just recently referenced this in another thread, but take this into consideration, "If you have a golf-ball-sized

[101] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yfP7qK0khuQ

consciousness, when you read a book, you'll have a golf-ball-sized understanding; ... and as you go about your day, a golf-ball-sized happiness." — David Lynch

Metalogic

:: Metahumor ::

"Truth is a matter that can withstand mockery... Whatever cannot withstand satire is false."
Peter Sloterdijk

If some system, set of ideas, or way of thinking is externally invalid by way of formal logic then that system, set of ideas, or way of thinking will also have some internal problem that by its own rules allows some inconsistency which results in total collapse of the system. This is evidence then that formal logic is not just an arbiter of consistency but that any framework which correctly adjudicates consistency will arrive at and be fully equivalent to the framework of formal logic we already have.

"You take a logic class but are never told what the being of logic is. This is like asking what shovels are and being put to digging holes."
W.V.D. Busby

t'd be wise at this point to note that the quotee's last name phonetically is "slaughter dyke," which when paired with his first name (commonly nicknamed Dick) becomes a statement about masculinity destroying lesbianism. Let this be a jumping point for our first topic — the acuteness of wordplay in relation to logical awareness; and furthermore a realization that mockery of a person's name in relation to his quote about humor and logic is being used to show relation of humor and logic within itself.

There is a large push against language and the "non-objective nature" of human communication in contemporary philosophy, but most of the communication about it has been through the medium of human language. Hypocrisy fares well in modernity. There have been attempts to 'better' communicate through other mediums but all have failed as no medium is as agreed-upon or efficient as verbal aesthetic language. It should be noted that interjecting a different framework into a communication line of any kind always leads to both the new interjected framework and the old framework failing, as concepts are only accurately shared when transferred over an agreed (mutually understood) medium. For example, if you wanted to communicate with ants, you wouldn't speak German to them, instead you release air-borne chemicals that affect their sensory-receptors. You adopt their framework to communicate with them. Similarly, aliens that are the same factor more intelligent to us than we are to the insects of Earth would not use their framework of communication to try to contact us, as the complexity (scaled proportionately from factor of intelligence) of their language would not be comprehendible by humans. Instead they would have to adopt one of our pre-existing frameworks of verbal aesthetic language to communicate with us in German (or English, or Bulgarian, pick from the basket).

But the question is not of whether or not we'd understand alien life, the question is why you would ever interject a new framework into a communication line to begin with, as that always leads to both the new and the old failing. Note also that frameworks don't have to be disproportionately scaled in factor of intelligibility. On a same-level comprehension factor, two frameworks, similar frameworks even, still act poorly as communicators when meshed. An example would be an English-speaking person and a German-speaking person speaking English and German, respectively, to each other with both persons unlearned to any language but their initial one. Very little effective communication is wrought from such a scenario. The importance of same-level frameworks having poor meshing qualities comes about when you consider things like the dualist versus monist debates on philosophy of mind. The fundamental issue of mind spawning from the brain, and whether or not mind resides solely in the

brain, is never reconciled as both sides presume their respective frameworks to be true in order to first view philosophy of mind as such.

This is where cuil theory can step in as a meshing frame, amalgamating and dashing-out frameworks at will, to serve as a bridge for other frameworks. In this sense, cuil theory is the base frame on which all others can derive.

Gömböc arguments: self-righting argument forms. Possible intersection of cybernetics and problemology.

The notion that there are questions whose answers we will never have, either because more questions will arise, or because the answers are beyond our comprehension, is broken and tired. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we find that to place a limit on thought is to think both sides of the limit. We have hit the cognitive threshold, we are just capable enough to formalize our thoughts and tap into universal reason and we find there is nothing beyond that which we can think of.

Meta-Argumentation used as the abstraction-reification structure for cuil theory, example:
P1: If P1 & P2 are true, then the argument is sound.
P2: P1 & P2 are true.
.`. The argument is sound.
This is an argument about itself, self-referencing, without being circular, and it's validity is only possible through its own self-actuatory reification. Does this do anything for meta-logic?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore's_paradox
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_analysis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

Example of meta-level abstract self-reference that reifies, "Prescient is the man who claims himself as such and later finds himself to actually be so."

Law of Comedy- There's nothing you can't make funny — Talking Funny, anything off limits to joke about? Like rape? — https://www.youtube.com/v/OKY6BGcx37k?start=2464&end=2665

Those unfamiliar with the Cuil (ʔ)[102] will have a hard time reading the rest of this, so I'll try to clear the Cuil nature of reality up for you real quick-like.

"Cuil"[103] started as a Google-staff-derivative search engine, was quickly found to be as the kids say, "A bag of dicks," and became the butt of many jokes involving metahumor. The tangential qualities of high-level ʔ texts are in relation to the tangential quality of the search results you would get using the Cuil search engine itself.[104] This is best exemplified in the origination of using ʔ as the marker for abstractions from reality.[105] [106] A good example of textual ʔ in action would be the referential abstractions made by Yellephant, "I mouse over the upvote icon. My finger twitches involuntarily as I think of my mother singing. My mother drops a dish, which shatters into a handful of corners of the room. The corners collaborate. Their consensus is angry, and my argument is invalid. A jury of my peers deems me a collection of disappointments. I am allowed a drink of water. A fountain asks me whether I've heard of my mother. I respond in the negative. A jury of my peers deems me a fraud. My mother names a fountain in my honor. I mouse over the upvote icon."[107] There are often repeated lines in

[102] http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/interrobang
[103] http://www.cuil.pt/
[104] http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/
[105] http://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/7da5i/police_raids_reveal_baby_farms/c06cqxb
[106] http://redd.it/7da5i
[107] http://www.reddit.com/r/videos/comments/xofrp/cuil_theory/c5of8jx

textual ⁉ used to show that tangential statements can still be in single level relational abstractions to the original topic, no matter how tangential the statements seem to get.

The shorthand for Cuil, the Interrobang (⁉), is itself an abstraction from the word Cuil, self-referencing the shapes of the letters for **C u i l** as if planned by a Meta mastermind, "Rotating the interrobang 180 degrees for **C** and **i**, 90 degrees clockwise for **u**, and remove the dot and C for the **l**."[108] This is believed to be an unintentional consequence of the symbolic choice for Cuil, and yet no other pre-existing symbol would have been more suited. Let's consider this our first clue that the cosmic farce plays into the Meta, knowing what it is and referencing itself justly (our second axiom exposed).

Before we really get into the formal and symbolic nature of Cuil Theory related to that of Formal Logic, it would also be wise to note that this paper sources itself on several occasions, not just as reference to something said earlier, but uses the entirety of the document, as a whole, as a source. It sources itself, which within the framework of the paper is a valid tactic; it's a self-referencing abstraction, a true unison between Meta and Cuil Theory. This is not to be taken lightly as this serves to provide more proof for the validity of said unison, as it is that unison which allows such a thing to take place to begin with.[109] And as Fake Slavoj Zizek (@fakezizek) said, "Citing oneself is an important pillar of intellectual ecology in these challenging times."[110] The self-actuation is present thusly.

Formal Logic

Formal Logic not equal base reality.
Cuil Theory equal to base reality.
Formal Logic works towards a conclusion, Cuil Theory works away from reality. Photo negatives of each other.
. `.

All Truths are tautologies and all tautologies are true; All tautologies are true because of law of non-contradiction-> if A is and not is, then A does not equal A.

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:: Meta Reification; Meta-Logic & The Self-Application Process ::

quick demonstration against the Münchhausen Trilemma, which is the idea that all truths are unprovable without relying on circular, regressive, or dogmatic arguments, is the following:

> P1 It is impossible to prove any truth without appealing to circular, regressive, or dogmatic arguments.
> P2 This is a proof.
> ∴1 This proof is true only in virtue of circular, regressive, or dogmatic arguments.

This alone would be sufficient in showing the Münchhausen Trilemma is paradoxical and thereby must be false, but if more is needed to convince you, I continue:

> P3 This proof is circular, regressive, or dogmatic, but there is no way of determining which without relying on another circular, regressive, or dogmatic argument, ad infinitum.
> ∴2 This proof is regressive (as it relies on infinite regress).
> ∴3 We have just determined what kind of proof this is finitely, so this proof cannot be regressive.

And just like that, Hans Albert's universe implodes. I personally appreciate the subtlety of the trilemma and the way Albert formalized it, but he clearly didn't follow through on its consequences, as

[108] http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/interrobang
[109] https://snerx.com/Brostoyevsky.pdf
[110] https://twitter.com/fakezizek/status/16933822419435520

the above demonstrates internal inconsistency. Most worldviews fold under the self-application process used above, yet very few people use this process to check their worldview. Maybe this self-application process is flawed. Let's do the really meta thing and see what happens when the self-application process is applied to itself.

> P1: Applying any argument or proof to itself, to seat the argument or proof inside itself, is the self-application of that argument or proof.
> P2: This is a proof.
> ∴ This proof is self-applied.

And just like that, the universe explodes. But why am I saying this an explosion instead of an implosion? Why should the universe come rushing out of this instead of collapsing in on itself? To start, there is no overt contradiction. While you can claim tautological circularity, that does not make this a paradox, there is no internal inconsistency. The law of non-contradiction is not violated here, so there is no implosion.

The bigger and more interesting claim we can make is that there is also no *external* inconsistency. I posit that there exists no entity or state of affairs in reality that could undo self-application, meaning that anything that exists, even things that exist as false things, do so only in virtue of their possibility to undergo the self-application process. This follows from arguments made much earlier in this book in the metametaphysics chapter wherein I claim there is a predicate of predicates by which we have an absolute basis of fundamental reality that exists as pure logic, but since this self-application proof can also function as a separate and distinct argument for the existence of itself, I now claim this self-application proof proves that there really is some existent thing like a self-applied entity, to which we could then derive all the other properties of reality just the same as I did in the metametaphysics chapter.

To make this more concrete, consider that the six fundamental logical operators (*not*, *and*, *or*, *if/then*, *equivalence*, and *makes/conclusion*) can not only derive all the other advanced operators (like *xor*, *xnor/iff*, and the rest), but can also derive each other. From any one base operator, you can apply itself recursively to attain the function of any other base operator.

From a series of NOT gates, hardware engineers attain AND functions, and vice versa from AND gates they attain NOT functions. This also works for OR gates and so on. So the operations of logic come as concomitants, for to have any of them is to have all of them. This alone should be sufficient in showing that logic recursively self-actuates.

N.b., this is not circular since we don't need to assume the antecedent truth of the other operators to derive them as true consequents, and it's not axiomatic reasoning either since we can start under the assumption the operators are not true and just the same derive them as true. Further, we can derive the operators both internally by the rules of the operators themselves and externally by non-deductive methods like the inductive reasoning implied by their reification as logic *gates* in hardware engineering.

Since deductive and inductive reasoning both substantiate, and can be predicated by, the logical operators, this suggests they are essential to all existent things in such a way that we could not say a thing was existent without using or also implying first the existence of the logical operators. This means we have a meta-logic. When we put meta-logic through the self-application process, it reifies logic, as shown with the description of gates.

I am trying to say and argue for a lot here, and in a very concise space, but I wish to convey an otherwise simple idea through this complicated description I've given so far — that logic is primary to existence and that anything that exists does so as some actuation of logic, making existence and logic indistinct. A lot more could be said about how this evinces a collapse between kinds of being like the abstract and concrete domains, but I hope the arguments in the metametaphysics chapter sufficiently covered anything that needed to be said on that topic.

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:: Numbers Don't Real ::

Kidding on the square.

Asdf.

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:: Other Fake Problems ::

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Linguistic relativists noticed our alphabet doesn't have to be in the order we've put it in. Congratulations, you understand that the initial assignments of values in human-constructed systems is arbitrary. This does not mean however, that arbitrary assignment of values beforehand means the values stay arbitrary afterhand. Thinking that it does mean that however, is a common misunderstanding of how conceptual systems work. While yes, in English (and it's various dialect sub-languages), our alphabet *could* have been in a different order, it is not the case that it any longer *can*. Certainly not in the current standard that's globally regulated by Oxford.

This means, following Wittgenstein's argument that there are no private languages (a bit in itself which should show you that language is objectively tied to reality in some manner), we find that words are no longer arbitrary. If you said that the public definition of a word that someone used was not the same definition you use, that someone else's meaning is not what a word means to yourself, you could only do so while simultaneously conceding that what the word means to you is not English.

Since English is the public standardized and agreed upon dictionary set that English-speaking people use, if we are to be intellectually honest in saying we are speaking English, then we have agreed upon a dictionary set that is by virtue of our agreement an objective method by which to communicate. The objectivity is not simply gained from our agreement (correspondence theory) but by the standardized protocol that allows words to mutually map to the same concepts in two separate individual's minds, as that is what public definition is by the Wittgensteinian sense.

In regards to the issue of arbitrary assignment, now that language itself is established in our framework, I'm saying it's no longer a social construct. This is akin to saying that Euclidean geometry was started as a system of measurement by Euclid arbitrarily, but now we use it as an objective methodology within geometric framework. You might say however that geometry is thought to measure an external reality outside ourselves and so it is not identical to language, making it a bad analogy. But this presupposes that language isn't the same thing. If you are to say we aren't assessing external reality with language, that is to say if we aren't measuring and probing and evaluating our environments, then you are also to say you have a malformed concept of language, because when you speak to people you are communicating information. Does a Geiger counter not also communicate information to its listener? It wouldn't be fair to view language any differently than maths or programmed input-output devices in this sense, meaning that language, just like Geometry, is to measure an external reality outside ourselves.

Language is more robust than pure maths however, in that it can also measure internal systems. Language has the capacity to transmit both the introspicere and the outrospicere in this regard. It is the umbrella of the dialectic of communication itself. This affirms even more so now that language is not arbitrary after the fact, that it be objective in its methodology, and that language is tied to reality as it is intended to inform on such. So why then be a contrarian and say your truth is different than mine, that your definition is different than mine, when we know definitions not to be personal but to be public and made so by standardized sets? It seems this contrarian tendency only occurs when people lack this understanding of what language is and how it is intended to function. This lack of understanding is where the majority of the accusations that appeal to definition[111] be fallacious come from.

That being said, there is still a valid frame in which you could say that appeal to definition is fallacious; that frame being when a public definition has been implemented correctly by virtue of its

[111] http://www.logicallyfallacious.com/index.php/logical-fallacies/27-appeal-to-definition

own public semantic and yet still misrepresents reality. Socrates showed us that these types of definitions are either too broad or too narrow, and that these definitions ought to change in attempts to better map them to reality which can be done via the Socratic method.

So while there is a valid way to change a definition, and that the methodology for such be valid when the definition ought to change to conform to reality, this is not a submission that language be subjective after the fact, as we find that when it does conform to reality it does objectively so. If anything this demonstrates that language is dynamically robust and capable of adapting as needed, while still showing that from a pool of subjectivity, objectivity is reached, that from arbitrary assignment beforehand you do not get arbitrary assignment afterhand.

Dreckarian framework is trash framework — http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dreck
Fallacy of the Stolen Concept rights the wrongs of definitions, "You would be using a concept while denying knowledge that is needed to understand that concept in the first place." — http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/index.php/blog/64-attacking-rand

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Meta-logical puzzle:
There are two kinds of things - things that can be categorized and things that can't. That which can't be categorized is clearly the thing that can't be categorized. These things we call uncategorizacal. And yet these uncategorizacal things are things we have categorized as such; they are categorized as 'things' and so have category yet again. Are not all things of the same kind, then? So are there two kinds of things or just one?

Retelling of Russell's Paradox — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_paradox
Reconciled by the Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory — http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory/ZF.html
Refitted by Grelling-Nelson paradox — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grelling%E2%80%93Nelson_paradox

Category-hood and Set-hood are not the same. Set is the itemization of like-things, and category is a property of things. In this sense, Russell's Paradox does not adequately represent Snax's Paradox (they cannot be categorized under the same set of paradoxes).

Cuil Theory applied to jokes of an ethical nature; it's funny when someone falls down the stairs (shadenfreude) but it's funnier when it's a fat person, as it's more logical- they were more apt to experience gravity and gravity was more apt to effect their actions.

6/7/15, Silicon Valley; Binding Arbitration (Schrödinger's Cat episode).
Gilfoyle invokes Schrödinger's Cat, the example used to help understand quantum states, as a means to say that a Condor egg on a webcam whose mother hasn't returned for two weeks is in an unknowable state of being either dead or alive, and that by contacting the preservation organization alerting them to the issue would mean further investigation would reveal if the egg was really dead or not, meaning the person who reports the issue is effectively responsible for killing the egg (if it's found to be dead) as it would otherwise continue existing in a state of being both dead and alive.
Jared Dunn later points out that the same reasoning would make everyone at an open casket funeral a murderer.

This illustrates the failing of Schrödinger's schema in that discovery of truth doesn't actuate the truth after the fact, otherwise archaeologists actually birth into existence the artifacts they find when digging, meaning the ground when un-dug would have to exist in a state of both having and not-having artifacts and only after digging do any artifacts start to exist.

Properly formed questions, meaning questions that aren't malformed (meaning we are excluding open questions), are functions. Responses are different than answers in that there are 'good' or 'correct' answers to questions, and therefore properly formed questions have a one-to-one input-output, making them like mathematical functions.

The Atlantic's article on college campus pc comedy culture — http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/thats-not-funny/399335/
Humor is not derived from suffering, it is derived from an awareness of illogicism.
Cuil Mathematics — http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/mathematics-of-cuil
Theorized levels — http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/theorized-levels-of-cuil

:: The Foundational Problem with Comparative Analyses of Frameworks in Ethics ::

There are no limits except for those we impose on ourselves. However, I temper this sentiment with the knowledge that every corpse on Everest was once an extremely motivated person.

uppose aliens came to us, with faster-than-light travel, a substantially better and more profound understanding of mathematics and logic, and seemed superior in every other measurable way. Suppose also that they had an otherwise similar axiology, a similar system of values to humans — their functionings and resultant behaviors were not opaque to us. Suppose finally that they agreed to a contract that stated they would not harm us. Right after, they invade and kill billions of people, subjugating the survivors.

What went wrong? It's technically awkward and more like abject hand-waving to say the aliens were superior than us in every way except, somehow, ethics. The aliens know it's wrong to not honor your contracts, much less kill people, so why are billions dead? They give us their reason.

The aliens knew we had a history of opportunistic violence and that given the right opportunistic pressures we would one day kill all the aliens, thereby disallowing them from engaging in future contracts with other species. They state that honoring the contract to not harm us would have precluded them from honoring thousands of future contracts, and that since there is a literal quantifiably greater honor in the thousands of future contracts, it was obviously ethical to dishonor this one. The simple utilitarian calculus necessitated a first strike, and the aliens, like many humans, believe utilitarianism is the one true ethical system despite the Repugnant Conclusion[112] and other problems[113] in population ethics, so the murdered utilitarians should have no issue with the obvious utility in them being murdered here.[114]

However, many of the survivors respond that precisely what it means for a contract to be honorable is that you follow through on it as a matter of principle despite any perceived negative future consequences and that you would simply not make the contract in the first place if you didn't believe you could follow through on it, and anything else is counter to honor, which is what we often call cowardice. The aliens and humans have a back-and-forth as to whether or not honoring certain agreements is courageous or stupid, but the line between those is not important; the aliens remain cowards for massacring a significantly weaker opponent despite no actual threat posed by us.

The problem is not that the aliens are utilitarians, the problem is that utility only counts as justification to cowards. The aliens' axiology aligns with cowardice over honor, possibility over actuality. Were we to be virtue theorists instead of utilitarians, we would know cowardice is a vice, and vices are evil, so we would conclude that the aliens are evil because their ethics are fundamentally predicated off of vice — they lead viceful lives that actively harm those around them and they must thereby be fundamentally bad people. But just the same, to the utilitarian, virtue theorists' behaviors knowingly run counter to what is good in utilitarianism, making the virtue theorists fundamentally bad people. This is true of any normative framework compared to any other normative framework. They all necessitate the evil of persons that act in accordance with *wrong belief* rather than persons who simply *act wrong*. This leads to a suspicion that they are all wrong if any of them are right.

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[112] From chapter 17 of *Reasons and Persons* by Derek Parfit - https://www.stafforini.com/docs/Parfit%20-%20Reasons%20and%20persons.pdf

[113] *Utilitarianism in Crisis* by Samuel Dale - https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/bioethics/article/view/6082

[114] For humor, it's worth thinking about whether surviving human utilitarians should commit suicide to preserve the utility of the alien species' survival. Any surviving human would threaten the objectively greater utility of the aliens, after all. Basically I'm saying Jeremy Bentham is a joke and it's a neon sign of stupidity that utilitarianism has caught on.

If ethics is to be useful to us, or do any work whatsoever in describing the good as distinct from the evil in the world, it would be quite the problem to find that no normative system can meaningfully describe the other normative systems as good or evil in a way those other systems couldn't just as easily justify with their own descriptions. Ruh-roh.

We are not saying that normative ethics is meaningless because more than one framework exists or that all normative frameworks are wrong because they simply disagree on what is good. As a comparative analysis between any or all normative frameworks, given any scenario in which the frameworks return conflicting answers, it becomes clear that we must instead rely on external non-normative systems to conduct the analysis, and *that* is the fundamental problem here. E.g., does utilitarianism, or virtue theory, or Kantianism, or any other framework actually get us what we want in some particular dilemma? This is not an ethical question, it's an empirical one.[115]

The big right hand-hand hook is that raw empirical data is not unto itself a normative framework, and, as the interpreters of that data, we have suspended our ethical toolkit because the question we are asking directly draws that toolkit into the question, leaving us with no toolkit to properly interpret if the data we collect on it is good or evil. This problem circularly re-inscribes itself here. We don't have a leg to stand on.

Because of this, any particular ethics will always be structurally incapable of justifying itself against any other particular ethics. This is evinced not only by the mountains of papers published against every standard view in history showcasing loop-holes[116] [117], inconsistencies[118] [119], or *outright failure to preclude the genocide of our entire species*, but also by the fact that none of them work in assessing the others in a meaningful way that don't sufficiently preclude themselves from being meaningful assessors.

For this we ought to abandon particular ethics in favor of a meta-ethics where we can derive consistent, objective, universal, totalizing, and absolute properties of ethics that recursively self-actuate, solving the problem of not being able to self-justify as well as solving the problems that arise from comparative analysis between different framings of ethical ideation. The next section describes what this meta-ethics looks like and how it functions.

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:: Metaethics ::

ABSTRACT: Arguments for a version of moral realism stemming from logical absolutism are made and several common objections to it are addressed, like the problem of agreement and Moore's open question. Showcases for how an objective basis for ethics gives rise to universal and tautologically-actuated truths for moral behavior are given. There is also a push against saying that ethical statements merely relate to the world, and rather that the world itself has an ethical property, which is why some things *must* be right or wrong. This is to say that there are certain aspects of an objective ethics that must be the case apodictically, and that because of this, no other basis for meta-ethics can be justified.

"All of humanity's problems stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone."
Blaise Pascal

[115] Similar questions and interesting counter-questions are raised in *Social Psychology And Virtue Ethics* by Christian Miller - https://users.wfu.edu/millerc/Virtue%20Ethics%20Paper.pdf
[116] *The Problem With Manipulation* by Patricia Greenspan - https://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Res/manip.html
[117] *The Problem with Negligence* by Matt King - https://philpapers.org/archive/KINTPW.pdf
[118] *Why Is It Possible To Enhance Moral Status And Why Doing So Is Wrong?* by Nicholas Agar - https://jme.bmj.com/content/39/2/67.full
[119] *Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and humans for the greater good* by Caviola et al. - https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fxge0000988

thical framework based in an objective medium, meaning formal logical predication, is not only possible but gives definite and universal answers about moral behaviors and actions. This means that we can say with ease that behaviors and actions are objectively 'right' or 'wrong', without room for subjectivity. We can do this by setting up definitions of objectivity, ethics, and personhood that actuate 'the good'. I want to also make clear at the beginning here that 'ethics' and 'morality' are different things, and that I believe 'moral realism' to be a misnomer whose nomenclature should otherwise be 'ethical realism', so all references in the paper to 'morality' or 'morals' are to be understood not as cultural or social norms but as references to formal normative ethical frameworks.

I'm going to spend some time with the definitions at the start here because everything follows from these. When speaking of objectivity I don't simply mean that objects exist and we can know things about their relations, nor that we are to be without bias, but rather that objectivity is the state in which subjects are inconsequential. This means that subjective opinion is not relevantly significant or even significantly relevant to whether or not a relation between objects exists, and therefore if it is the case that there is a relation between objects, then we know something objective about reality. Objectivity is of the *objective world* so factual claims and things that are semantically true, like tautological systems, necessarily follow.

'Ethics' are interpersonal behaviors and actions, or actions that hold affect on other persons, that fail to escape the import of analytical tools. To fend off an objection before it arises, under this definition, we still have ethical obligations to ourselves (and posterity) due to a present action by a person having future effect on a person; your present self is different than your future self (plenty of justification for this will come later). And while we do have ethical obligations to ourselves, we don't have ethical obligations to rocks; rocks are not persons. This is not consequentialist — matters of consequence or 'utility' are irresolvable until the end-state of the universe is given since the causal chain in consequentialist frameworks has its line drawn arbitrarily and no definite point in time can be given with justification tying that later event to a responsibility of its prior causes. So when we use the term ethics here we are talking about whether acts are good or evil in themselves, not whether they were right or wrong given some other agent or actor in a system. More narrowly, ethical systems are reducible to concerns about conscious experience and its changes as given by *direct* causal agency. All statements regarding changes to one's state of being or modes of accountability are factual claims — claims about the state of affairs in the objective world. This means that since people are things with the capacity to suffer (among other experiences) that people's cognitive states have an objective grounding with respect to our brains — your mental well-being as cognitive or psychological health is then an objective concern. To reiterate, ethics is qua the relation of thinking objects we call people and so the ethical realm is exhausted by the interpersonal realm (substantiated later).

'Personhood' is defined as having two necessary conditions, founded on the notion of a 'thinking object', that sufficiently form the 'person' semantic. If we are to say some object has personhood then it is a *thinking* object, with the two conditions that it has secondary theory of mind and prescience (dolphins are granted personhood given this definition). Without secondary theory of mind, meaning without the capacity to recognize other minds exist and discern that each other mind has different levels of information contained in them, a person cannot be aware that there are other thinking things, meaning it cannot knowingly incur interpersonal relations with other people and so it does not have the capacity for ethical decisions. And if an object is without prescience, meaning without the capacity to accurately plan and predict future events, then it cannot come about epistemic conditions of the distant future that would follow from their actions, which means they could not reasonably predict the effect or direct outcome of most actions they perform. Since awareness of acts and their direct consequences in relation to other people are parts of any ethical framework you'll ever read about, these are necessary conditions for defining personhood.

If anything that follows from objective ethics is to be contested, the contest will ultimately be about the terms just defined; all conclusions are drawn directly from these definitions. The definition of 'objective ethics' is then one that accounts for interpersonal behaviors and actions that hold affect on *thinking things* with the capacity to account for these affects themselves in objective systems. This is not the same as Randian objective ethics, or a sort of scientific positivism that would claim science can answer our moral questions, but rather a pure form of moral realism whereby our statements regarding

the ethics of actions and behaviors relate to objective reality and objective reality itself has the property of ethical action and behavior.

Tautological frameworks like Randian ethics don't do the work because nothing is known tautologically. For example, when asked if murder is wrong, tautologically we should immediately know it to be wrong because by definition murder is the killing of an innocent person. If they're innocent of the killing then it was wrong to kill them by definition alone. While this is tautologically actuated, it doesn't tell us anything about the nature of the action, only the nature of the tautology. Additionally, there are no predictive powers granted by tautologically-based ethics.

An approach by *scientism* would say empirical evidence is the only form of evidence we need to answer ethical questions. Here we quickly run into is-ought situations like David Brink notes in *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics*,[120] where we are made to say that whatever is disproportionately regular, whatever has the strong majority of natural behavior, is the way it *ought* to be, meaning things like homosexuality are ethically impermissible simply because it is not the most *frequent* behavior given a general poll. The problem here is not that scientific positivism leads to sayings of regularity, but that it assigns moral value to things that do not otherwise have any ethical import. And even though positivists don't claim ethical talk is about the world (because they are non-cognitivists), it still follows that ethical statements built on scientific claims then run into this problem. We see that given the definition of ethics established earlier (if there is no interpersonal behavior or actions that hold affect on other persons, then there is no ethic), sexuality as merely biological drive or preference is outside the domain of ethics. You might say that obviously sexuality leads to sexual actions and behaviors between persons, and in this regard there is relevant interpersonal relations, but until this occurs there is nothing to say is of ethical import as no interpersonal actions or behaviors occur from simply *having* sexuality. So a scientism or positivist view of objective ethics is problematic for this is-ought issue.

Objective ethics as we're discussing it is a compatibilist fusion of the two frameworks just discussed. For example, we know murder is wrong by definition, but when we ask why is it that we can be wronged by killing in the first place, our answer seemingly can't come from tautologies, so the scientific understanding that people are tied to their bodies takes over, and as such, to incur damage to the well-being of a person's body to the extent that it reduces or ends the body in a way that the person also ends, is to perverse the notion that there is interpersonal action or behavior occurring, which is to perverse the semantic of ethics itself (as defined earlier), which is how we can know killing people to be unethical. Note *this* does follow by definition, but it is tied to a scientific understanding of persons, cased in objective reality. This gives rise to the capacity of knowing when something is inherently unethical, as ethical definitions tied to objective reality can become perverse when the tie of interpersonal action or behavior is self-defeated (this is why the ethical realm is exhausted by the interpersonal realm, as mentioned earlier). This is also how we can know unethicisms to be irrational, as you have to perverse the property granting your action in the first place in order to commit unethicisms; when killing, you end the capacity for that interpersonal relation, a capacity that was a necessary condition for ending it, thus creating the perversion (it is both literally and figuratively a *self*-defeating action).

So the controversy of saying ethical facts are reducible to natural facts shouldn't be so controversial here, as this is not saying that science tells us what is good or evil, but that since good and evil are tied to objective reality, that science can help inform us on how close to good or evil an action is. This is also not to say definitions are assigned arbitrarily, as this is set up in such a way that it could not possibly be the case otherwise. For example, it could not possibly be the case that ethics be defined as anything broader than, "interpersonal behavior and actions, or actions that hold affect on other persons," for if we were to define it as anything broader whatsoever, the augmented definition would be akin to, "impersonal behavior and actions, or actions that hold affect on persons," which is to start to permit teleological explanations of boulders for killing those under it as explanations for the action that held affect on a person, and yet this seems absurd for obvious reasons, and justly so, as any definition broader than the one initially given starts to permit things that are clearly not of the semantic 'ethics'. So note that the 'good' then is not defined arbitrarily, but is a direct consequence of the definitions initially given, and apodictically so.

[120] Brink, David Owen. "Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics." *The Philosophical Review* 101, no. 2 (1992), 458-460.

A common objection to this form of moral realism is *the problem of agreement*. The problem of agreement is loosely that different cultures and persons disagree on the 'oughts' of life (or on the definition of ethics), so clearly there must not be objective universal rights and wrongs. But, as David Enoch showcases in *How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?*[121], many problems of moral disagreement are not particularly devastating to the moral realist, as they are still addressable by realism. He explains that cultural disagreements are not universal disagreements, and I mean this to say that the universals in question can still be proposed to exist, even if people disagree on their instantiation, like how you can disagree one object with another object makes for two objects in categorical total and this does not make invalid that one and one make two; even if everyone disagreed that one plus one equaled two, everyone would simply be wrong, not the maths behind the statement. Even for the rights and wrongs that are not so readily available by definition (like we had with 'murder'), it is still the case that values are reducible to facts, and I do mean reducible here, as in values are only relevantly meaningful on a factual level, which G. E. Moore objects to in a few paragraphs; what we value (for example- healthy bodies and healthy brains) are of factual (read: scientific) relevance. This extends to all values, even ones like compassion and fairness, as a compassionate or fair act is still one that occurs 'out there', in objective reality. It is still something that we can know to be the case in an objective sense.

Questions of what we ought to do and what a 'good' life looks like, even though people disagree on them, are all questions whose answers are reducible to factual statements because they relate to behaviors and acts that occur in objective reality. Values reducing to facts means we can measure the well-being of persons both as individuals, and collectively as a society, objectively. So the problem of agreement being an issue for moral realism is countered if we accept the notion that we needn't all agree on what we consider ethically right and wrong because whatever values we do end up saying are right and wrong are still reducible to facts and therefore can be universalized as such. If we accept the piles of research and data on what a healthy organ (say, a liver) looks like as being objective, then we must accept the piles of research and data on what a healthy relationship (say, parent-to-child) looks like as being objective as well.

More narrowly here, 'health' is not a subjective concern; there is a clear and distinct difference between a healthy person and a sick one, and there is a clear and distinct difference between a healthy brain and a malfunctioning one, or even further, healthy emotive states and conditions, and harmful emotive states and conditions. This means there is also a clear and distinct difference between a healthy relationship between persons (or a person and society) and an unhealthy relationship between persons. If you return with the counter that the definition of health has changed over time, it is still clear that it is an objective issue when it comes to the physical body and brain of a person as to whether or not the body or brain is healthy, or whether the brain (read: person) is benefited in health by maintaining some relationship to or about other brains (read: persons). Questions of well-being then are not subjective questions. This distinction is important for noting regularity in treatment of values, as we can still agree that a healthy body is healthy, in a scientific sense, even if we didn't agree that health was more valuable than sickness. So even if we were to drastically augment our three initial definitions as to explicitly require severe harm to other persons, this would still be ethics occurring in an objective system, meaning it's not subjective.

Briefly aside, to subjectivist notions akin to cultural relativism, remember that culture changes us by changing our cognitive states. This means the cultures that promote bodily or cognitive health are objectively better cultures than the ones that harm our bodily or cognitive health. So cultural relativism suffers greatly in this regard, as there are clearly some cultures that are significantly more harmful than others. As Sam Harris points out, we know subjecting children to pain, violence, and public humiliation, generally speaking, does not spawn healthy emotional development and healthy behavior and actions.[122] This is a factual statement, about objective reality, that directly invokes interpersonal physical actions, which we know are actions that have ethical import. Because of that, we know a culture that regularly subjects children to pain, violence, and public humiliation is a culture (at least that component of that culture) that is objectively evil, or ethically wrong.

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[121] Enoch, David. "How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?" *J Ethics The Journal of Ethics* 13, no. 1 (2008): 15-50.

[122] Accessed March 13, 2016. http://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right/transcript?language=en#t-373000

G. E. Moore objects to this version of moral realism by saying that ethical statements cannot be reduced to non-ethical statements, so the 'good' thing to do is not of empirical datum.[123] This is called the "open-question argument" and follows more formally as:

Premise 1: If X is (analytically equivalent to) good, then the question "Is it true that X is good?" is meaningless.

Premise 2: The question "Is it true that X is good?" is not meaningless (i.e. it is an open question).

Conclusion: X is not (analytically equivalent to) good.

For example, the question of whether a bachelor is married is meaningless as it's a closed question, by definition it could not be the case that a bachelor is married, but the question of whether Quinten is a bachelor is an open question because it could or could not be the case that Quinten is a bachelor. Moore is saying that because whether things are 'good' or not is open, they cannot be reduced to closed factual statements. Specific to ethics, the question of whether or not happiness is good is an open question (or so says Moore) as it is not tautologically given that happiness be good. So there isn't supposed to be any specific piece of empirical evidence about happiness that directly equates to the 'good'.

This objection works off the notion that language isn't itself fully objective, or that words aren't semantics reducible to objects or categories of objects and their relations. In this sense, especially with what we've already discussed, the objection is countered by framing 'the good' as a category of objects and relations, whose instantiates are tokens of the 'good' type. To be more transparent here, if thinking objects are granted the capacity of knowing when something is inherently unethical (as ethical definitions tied to objective reality can become perverse when the tie of interpersonal action or behavior is self-defeated) and this is a true capacity, then 'the good' is the state of affairs in objective reality that actuates the instantiation or promotion of actions and behaviors (the act itself or its consequences) that affirms the relations between these thinking objects. This is to involve our earlier definitions, as again, it's reasonable to hold awareness of acts and their consequences in relation to other people as part of ethical systems, so the promotion of interpersonal relations (meaning their continuity rather than discontinuity) then is ethical by definition, and tied to objective reality at that. This means Moore is wrong, as we can have ethical statements reduced to non-ethical statements in the sense that things that merely are the case (things that are 'out there' in objective reality) are things that can have ethical relations, and so ethical statements are statements about objective reality. This also means that, unlike what Moore thinks, ethical questions are closed questions, not open ones. For example, that Quinten be married or not is not ultimately an open question, as it is either the case that he is married or it is the case that he is not, it cannot be both and so Quinten falls into one and only one case, and not knowing the answer to this question should not mean that the question will always be 'open', it just means that the question is open to you specifically because you don't have the information to close it. So to further assert that a question being open is supposed to show that it cannot in principle be closed and have a definite answer is nonsense.

With finesse now, there is no is-ought at play here, as we wouldn't be so obtuse to suggest that this means what *is* the case is what *ought* to be the case, but rather we realize what's being said is that what *ought* to be the case can be instantiated as what *is* the case. So by way of transitive casing we can see the conceptual abstraction of ethical actions and behaviors reified, and further that this proves semantically that ethics is of objective concern.

So to bring to conclusion and retreat from the hut in low tides that is moral anti-realism, certain human behaviors and actions lead to healthy interpersonal actions, or in a general sense well-being, and certain human behaviors and actions work against well-being, and that well-being is of a factual nature, meaning it's of objective value, so we can know ethical behaviors and actions to be objectively right or objectively wrong.

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[123] Moore, G. E. "Principia Ethica," p 27. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903.

[EDIT]: On their deathbeds, many people say it is better to live a life without regrets, that there are things they wish they had done but didn't get to do. I think this is quite backwards. You should live a life full of deep regrets, otherwise it wasn't a very funny life.

:: Arguments Against Love, Sexuality, and Natalism ::

The flesh is willing but the spirit is weak.

ove, for this section, will refer to the kind of emotion associated with sexual attraction and reproductive behaviors. Sexuality refers to sexual attraction to like-kind organisms for the purpose or result of reproduction. Natalism refers to a worldview that promotes the reproduction of human life, specifically via child-bearing and parenthood. There should be a clear teleological or narrative trajectory here — that natalism is the starting position of reproduction being good, as a mere proposition, that sexuality is the biological imperative towards reproduction, and love is the sometimes discursive or conscious actions taken towards enacting reproduction. These three things together form a sort of reproduction trinity; I will argue against all three individually and then I will argue against all of them together — that if any one of these 3 things is wrong, then they all are.

The general view I am presenting here can be thought of sloganistically as, "we must seize the means of reproduction," or at the very least, have a fundamentally better understanding of it so that it doesn't continue to run rampant and destroy the planet.

I will ignore standard arguments for love like those from Plato's *Symposium* and instead give a quote from one of the founding society members, Lynn:

> The late astronomer Carl Sagan made a good point when he said that people's warlike tendencies may destroy global society, and that extraterrestrial societies might find them puzzling. However, it is also true that human love is an incredibly destructive force. Human greed is very often driven by the desire for love, as wasteful, otherwise pointless displays of material consumption are often an essential part of finding a mate. If hate will result in nuclear winter, love is putting us on the path to catastrophic climate change. Love also blinds one to the faults of human beings, and creates a toxic atmosphere of tolerance where these fatal flaws are essentially allowed to remain totally unchecked, notwithstanding claims one who feels love towards others makes to the contrary. Extraterrestrial societies that tolerate anything like human love probably do not last very long. Ones that survive to become spacefarers probably do not know anything we would recognize as love. Either they never knew it or, perhaps more likely, they have found a way to engineer it out of their being and put their primitive past behind them for good.

People talk about things like the environmental impact of oil or Bitcoin, but the vast majority of material consumption, and thereby the environmental impact of the global economy, has to do with status displays akin to peacocking. This means love is a destructive, not a productive, force.

It gets worse. If you observe the behaviors of the paranoid schizophrenic, of those in severe states of psychosis, their entire lives become fixated on one thing, as if everything is in connection to that thing, as if the lyrics of songs on the radio are sending them messages about the thing, as if the thing is the only thing that matters. Does this sound familiar? Not so coincidentally we call it 'madly' in love. Love is a cognitive failure, a systematic shutdown of mental faculties in the exact same manner of cluster A personality disorders (often leaking into clusters B and C as well).[124] We think this is normal if they say they are in love and the object of their love is another person, but under any other circumstance we would observe these behaviors and then immediately recommend psychiatric treatment, both as a problem requiring chemical medication and as a psychological trauma needing therapy.

People treat heartbreak with therapy too, sometimes. Why not also with anti-psychotics? It's hard to see any real difference in their behaviors or in their brain scans. Those who have the failing of romantic love are indistinguishable from those who have the failing of schizoid disorders, save that the schizoid loves something other than a human partner. But both have a mental disorder.

On sexuality, one could argue that the growing percentage of the asexual in society is a trending consequence of systemic relationship failure, or that a steady decline of emotional intelligence also probably explains this trend of younger people not desiring romantic relationships. In any case, I posit that sexuality is inherently absurd and ultimately unjustifiable. You can point to biological necessity for

[124] This is an argument W.V.D. Busby gave during a lecture in January, 2023.

survival of the species, but procreation for species survival is not an individual requirement, it's a requirement of the species as an amalgam, meaning that no individual is required to procreate for the species to survive but rather some conglomerate needs to procreate. There is no individual responsibility here, if you don't want to procreate you don't need to and the species does not cease to exist by your lack of individual contribution. The absurdity then is that since no one is required to procreate, there is also no amalgam you could deign as being required to procreate either, and yet without an amalgam procreating, the species does not survive.

Additionally, of all the biological urges, sexual urges are the only ones not required for the individual to survive. Hunger, sleep, breathing — all the other biological urges are necessary for the individual to persist, but orgasm is not. So there is no biological necessity for individual sexuality.

If you move then to arguing that sexuality is required or necessitated in some other way for human relationships to be possible or healthy or maintained or whatever, consider that sexual orientation in the vast majority of people is highly restrictive and limiting, usually resulting in possible attraction to less than half the available population. We make friendships and relations with people that we aren't sexually attracted to all the time and this doesn't seem to really reduce the pleasure attained by those relations for most people, but even if it did, most people would then only be capable of sexual relations with a swiftly minoritizing number of others. I argue that since sexuality could not be consistently or universally applied to society by an individual because of its restrictive nature, it thereby cannot be inherently good. If this is not clear, refer to Kantian or other universalization frameworks in ethics for how this operates. Since it is not inherently good, it at best has a neutral and ineffective application in the world, and at worst it is a great evil that causes massive psychological and environmental harm.

On top of all this, the fact that almost no one knows where their sexuality comes from beyond standard biological or classical Freudian explanations means they are operating under the principle that, "they are just born that way," as if that acts as a justification for their sexuality. The sexual orientation that makes people more likely to rape is an orientation they are supposedly born with, but would we say that justifies them going out and raping? Of course not, that would be absurd and it's absurd for obvious and intuitive reasons that don't take a nuanced understanding of formal ethics to realize. It is the same for the other orientations; being born with an orientation is no justification for enacting it. What this means is that most people cannot justify their sexuality and that enacting your sexuality anyways would be pathological in a Žižekian sense. And yes, a pathology is a mental disorder.

While less interesting, we can also attack the notion that people are born with their sexuality. I think this is overtly false. Children do not have sexuality. And before you try to argue against that statement, think about what you would really be saying there. Children are by definition pre-pubescent, which means they cannot possibly take part in the act of procreation, and are thus inherently non-sexual. So you are not born with your sexuality. This means it must be trained into you; the source of that training being nature or nurture or some mix of the two is no longer relevant since either way it is a *training* and not a given component of your discursive existence.

With love and sexuality down, we move to natalism. There are various interesting anti-natalist arguments you can find from other philosophers, but the main argument I want to look at is with natalism in the context of ethical frameworks in the near future. What I mean by this is that I believe natalism doesn't have a place in a world with severe overpopulation. A lot of laypeople think the planet is currently overpopulated, which is not true, the problem a small handful of cities face is *overcrowding*, not *overpopulation*, and the problems of overpopulation regarding food supplies and things of that nature will take many more decades to really effect everyone globally, so I'm not making the claim that natalism is wrong because we're overpopulated, I'm making the claim that natalism is wrong because it's *going* to make us overpopulated. The component of natalism that says reproduction should be promoted qua child-bearing and parenthood is the problem here because child-bearing and parenthood are quantitatively ambiguous outcomes. When a human becomes pregnant it is not known beforehand if they will become pregnant with one child, or two, or eight. And further, 'parenthood' as a concept leaves the door wide open for many pregnancies by the same parent.

Because natalism necessitates human pregnancy, there becomes an exponential growth rate of the global population that is simply not tenable. Look at a chart of the global population over the last

few hundred years and you see a giant exponential spike, like a wall against an otherwise flat land.[125] This is not okay, this doesn't end well. Several think tanks have said the problem will correct itself because with less food available less people will procreate, and while less food is a light suppressant on geographic birthrates, we don't have to look further than the least fed people to see the highest birthrates and wonder if the academics really figured this one out. African countries with serious food shortages have no shortage of pregnancies nor number of children birthed per pregnancy.[126] This, as our global trajectory, is not viable. We cannot sustain this path.

Cixin Liu defined cosmic sociology as having two axioms: that survival is the primary need of civilization, and that civilization continuously grows and expands while the total matter in the universe remains constant.[127] From this he formulates the notion of 'the dark forest', built off David Brin's hypothetical solution to the Fermi paradox; it's a good solution because it's simple and obvious — if populations grow exponentially, and thereby spread at exponential rates, then the universe will run out of space very fast and different populations will have to fight for resources that are available at exponentially decreasing rates. The only solution is linear (meaning controlled) growth or perfectly static population sizes. Natalism is antithetical to this, and so natalism can only result in galactic hyper-war. This is a very real notion, and despite how quickly it escalates otherwise small problems, or how absurd you think it sounds, it is correct and it means natalism cannot possibly be inherently good.

I have argued against natalism, sexuality, and love individually, but now you should consider how they work together. As stated in the introduction to this section, natalism is the starting position of reproduction being good, as a mere proposition, sexuality is the biological imperative towards that reproduction, love is the sometimes discursive or conscious actions taken towards enacting reproduction, and these three things together form a sort of reproduction trinity. Because of this I believe that each relies on the other, and so if any one of them is wrong, then they all fail.

So finally, if anything I've said makes sense and you think there may be a real problem here, then what are the potential solutions for these problems? I believe an anti-natalist position works well in solving part but not all of this. I think asexualism may be another requirement, and even possibly the active repression of sexual love, but what do I know?

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:: Normative Ethics And Rationality From Means Vs. Ends ::

"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains."
Jean-Jacques Rousseau

"That the purpose of life was not the maintenance of well-being, but some intensification and refining of consciousness, some enlargement of knowledge."
Aldous Huxley

Why universalizability is required not only for unethicisms like Kant said but for ethicisms as well in relation to rationality.

I sometimes tell people that since we've already made the mistake of becoming friends, there's no need to apologize to each other for anything. I mean this half-seriously. I hope that for my friends, meeting me was their greatest mistake, since knowing that it's not would mean they've yet to make their greatest mistake, and that leaves the door open for all kinds of horrific things to happen to them.

"The purposeful act of ending human life was considered the most heinous of crimes... How small-minded and hypocritical mortal man was, for even as they despise the takers of life, they loved nature — which, in those days, took every human life ever conceived. Nature deemed that to be born was an automatic sentence to death," from

[125] Expand 'All our charts on World Population Growth' and select 'Historical world population: comparison of different sources' here - https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth.
[126] Evinced here - https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2015/02/06/the-size-of-it.
[127] From his book *The Dark Forest*.

The Toll by Neal Shusterman. This serves as an inversion of the naturalistic fallacy — that precisely because death is natural it is wrong.

If you agree that the question that oughtn't be asked when relating to other persons is to whether something is a means or an ends, then let's explore this. If you are using someone purely as a means, then it's wrong, as per Kantian ethics (or general intuitions), but if you are to use them purely as an ends, then there is a hidden premise most people don't realize, that the ends are made replaceable, and I'll explain why.

Take sexuality for example, where having sex with people as a means of having sex, and not an ends of relating to other persons, is considered ethically wrong. This is all well and good, but the problem is that the ends of merely relating to another person are also fallacious. If you believe sexuality is a positive relational tool, a means of relation to other persons, with other persons as the ends in themselves here, then why limit the tool to just one other person? Why not indiscriminately have sex with all available persons for the ends of relating to them in a positive ethical stance? Sexuality isn't viewed this way, most people are monogamous yet claim their interpersonally shared sexuality is a positive tool that strengthens relations, further they do not extend this positive tool to anyone other than one person (usually). They will often argue, whilst maintaining sexuality is a positive relational tool, that you shouldn't use it on more than one person. This is hypocrisy.

The hidden premise that they do not want to accept is that sexuality, like all other positive relational tools, is not special or exclusive to one person, but that it can apply to all available persons in no meaningfully committed way. Their propensity to desire a special or exclusive relation is purely based on the biological imperative that such relations be exclusive, and not reducible to any rationally consistent argument.

So, if you are to claim that your sexuality can be a positive thing, then you are to be irrationally hetero or homo sexual, or rationally pan-sexual. The third option, when most people realize they cannot be pan-sexual, is to maintain rationality by being asexual, and abstaining from shared sexuality altogether and never engaging in something that is supposed to be an ethical tool that you yourself cannot actually be expected to apply universally.

Note this argument format is not specific to sexuality, it applies to all cases of means vs. ends, and it is not specific to Kantian ethics, as all normative frameworks have universals they assert whereby failure to adhere to them is deemed irrational, which means that what we have here shows all means-tools /must/ be universalized in order to stay rational about their usage. This is not a critique of Kant's framework, but a critique of all normative frameworks, as this is showcasing that there are implications that most people don't realize or cannot actually follow through on themselves, making most people irrational by definition.

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:: Ethics, No Longer Relatively Subjective ::

Every day man chooses between the pain of discipline and the pain of regret.
Jim Rohn paraphrase

If it is true that cosmic comedy is what metaphysics is existent as, then the subsequent modes of *testing hold on reality* that follow allows ethics to be in direct play with philosophy once again as ethics would become a metaphysical-epistemic function. It is impossible for ethics to be philosophical if not concerned with the nature of being itself, and as such only holds ties to philosophy when the nature of being is itself one of humor. In this sense, all things aware of it can actively participate in philosophy and thus in the nature of being itself as long as they participate in the humor. The mind interaction that spawns humopr is then what we call ethics, as it is the study of how things aware of humor participate in the humor. The humorists are then considered to all have minds, as they must all be aware of humor, and as such the study of ethics is once again re-admitted into philosophy. The metaethics chapter goes deeper into this framework.

Definition of ethics (vs. morality).
Delineation between pleasure (body) and amusement (mind).
Definition of thinking objects (as persons).
Definition of ethical imperatives.

From the metaphilosophy chapter —

Ethics does not fall into the same sphere, however, as ethics is the study of mind-interactions (less curtly, of "good and evil" between those conducting it).[128] *There is no ethic where there is no mind, and as such Ethics is not a concern of philosophy. Similarly, what has been labeled, "Philosophy of Mind," is also relegated to "non-philosophy" under this Metaphilosophical framework. Mind-works would be expected to be taken under the wings of psychology or neurosciences, so while yes, psychology and neurosciences will probably consume the entirety of the study of mind, ethics may yet fall back into our philosophical graces for comedic reasons.*

If it is true that cosmic comedy is what metaphysics is existent as, then humor, and the subsequent modes of testing hold on reality that follow, allows ethics to be in direct play with philosophy once again. In fact, I posit that it is impossible for ethics to be philosophical if not concerned with the nature of being itself, and as such only holds ties to philosophy when the nature of being is itself one of fuckery. In this sense, all things aware of it can actively participate in philosophy and thus in the nature of being itself as long as they participate in the humor. The mind interaction that spawns humor is then what we call ethics, as it is the study of how things aware of humor participate in the humor. The humorists are then considered to all have minds, as they must all be aware of humor, and as such the study of ethics is once again re-admitted into philosophy. The ethics chapter delves deeper into this framework for ethics, so we'll save that for then.

Classical Hedonism as a Combatant Against Our Age of Philistines.

Coming into this I was of the mindset that death is undesirable, but only to the point that I was hoping an aide for dealing with the 'inevitability' of it would be given. My wish to accept the inevitable was not stayed, instead I invectively desire against all death of persons and have come to the idea that not only is it not inevitable, but holds ethical imperative against it, as something we ought to cease. Some additional transhumanist and futurist readings were used to develop my notions of defeating death, but those were superficial as they only suggest a defeat of biological death, and I am speaking of the entirety of death.

Epicurus said a few things that upon first listening might make one obsequious to the idea of death, such as, "Death means absence of sensation. The Good is easy to obtain. Evil is easy to bear."[129] And while all three propositions may be true, and may make one feel as though death is like a Socratic notion whereby a single night of sleep is the same experience as death, the absence of sensation (as a finality of *being*) is not itself easy to bear. You might argue that *easiness of bearing* is malformed in concept, as when one is dead there is no sensation and thus no slider-scale of ease by which to gauge

[128] http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/
[129] Choron, Jacques. "Death Is Nothing to Us." *In Death and Western Thought*. New York, New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1973.

the bearing, however this itself is the problem, as death makes otherwise consistent things inconsistent. It is for this reason that we must no further risk our careers as philosophers than we would risk the notion that death be something that brings us truth or anything desirable akin to truth. In fact, it seems that by Epicurus' own words we might make a case for the unethicism of death, as he says, "vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man,"[130] and as such it would be vain to suggest death is a healing of suffering or a bringer of truth.

It seems that to suffer life is to suffer knowledge, as to be sensing is to be knowing, and only the ignorant and sophists would choose not knowing over knowing, so we see it clearly now that if one is to claim they seek truth, that if one is to claim they are a philosopher, they must also affirm their desire to life as a desire to know. Further, that where there are no persons, there are no ethics. To end personal interactions, to end minds altogether, would mean to end ethics, and so by virtue of the existence of ethics itself it must be said that we shouldn't wish to end minds for fear of ending ethics. This isn't an argument against killing itself, as I am not saying killing is inherently wrong here (that is a different discussion altogether), I am saying that death itself is inherently wrong as it perverses the state of ethics itself, a meta-negation of the concept, reified by its person ended. This showcases a self-actuatory system of ethics whereby it *must* be the case that death is unethical, else you perverse the notion of ethics altogether and self-defeat your own objections within the framework.

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[130] Ibid.

:: The Ethical Framework Of Humor; Self-Identity As Vice ::

To those who think otherwise, you are all defined as cisgender: 1. Actual gender.

Self-identity is ridiculous. To illustrate: if an eight-year-old identifies as eighty, we know he is wrong. Age is not a social construct, it is an objective measurement of physical existence, similar to gender and race. But the argument is that identity is not of the object but of the subject (as nothing other than what society deems to fit a category, hence the "social construct"), meaning what you identify as has nothing to do with the mode in which you physically exist but rather the mode in which you think you exist. However, this only works if the subject itself exists, and so if it does not, then there is nothing but the thinking object which we use 'self' as shorthand to describe. I deny the subject exists (negative claims bear no burden of proof[131]) and as such, it is up to others to demonstrate the subject exists separate and in line with Occam's Razor as explaining more in a simpler fashion than "thinking objects" do. So as it stands, self-identity is nonsense and claiming to be a different gender, race, age, etcetera, outside of what you currently physically exist as, is nonsense. Let's address each of these points with more rigor.

To start, you could say that it's all a social construct, nothing is objective, contrarian this, contrarian that, etcetera; what we find however is that arbitrary assignment of a system of measurement beforehand does not make the system of measurement arbitrary after the fact. What that means is while yes, a 'year' could have been the same amount of time as a vibration of an electron or it could be used to describe an orbit of Earth around its star, in either case we now have an established unit of measurement (regardless of what title we assign it) by which to objectively measure things. I humbly await the sophist SJW tears over this, but in case it wasn't pictorially diagrammed for you, this showcases that gender and race are also not social constructs, they exist within scientific framework and for the purpose of physical measurement.

Claims at the subject as self have been made from very early on. Berkeley, for example, thought he could establish the existence of the subject by immediate inference from our ideas or percepts[132] and Descartes has his famous, "Cogito, ergo sum," but an interesting thing about Descartes that a lot of the dilettantes of philosophy seem to miss is that he never followed through with his own strategy. He wanted to methodologically doubt everything and see what remained (more or less); what would stay "clear and distinct" without being immediately destroyed by the doubt he cast. However, he never methodologically doubted certainty itself, which would have revealed issues with the "clear and distinct" ideas he was certain of. This may have been because he was also under pressures of the church and other various factors, but it remains the case that if you doubt certainty itself (meaning bringing into question whether or not it's possible to be certain of something), you throw away any certainty that you were doubting it to begin with. His system quickly falls apart because he puts himself in this box that he cannot escape with methodological doubt, which means he also cannot claim knowledge in any form, as everything de-solidifies when put through this framework (he was working in an invalid frame, after all, falsifiability is a an important thing in philosophy, science is not the only field that requires it).

That being said, "Cogito ergo sum," meaning, "I think therefore I am," begs the question. 'I' think, therefore, 'I' am, presupposes you exist in order to say that it is you that is thinking which is then used to conclude that you exist. It begs the question harder than any other famous philosophy quote that I know of (spare any note of 'I' here). The reason he did that is probably because he realized he was going to be in a box so he took the sloppy shortcut out. Regardless his reasons, it's fallacious, and what's more fallacious is saying that because something is thinking, that the 'something' is a subject.

Both Berkeley and Descartes (as well as anyone presenting the same or similar argument) have been well-noted to create this fallacy- that a thinking thing necessarily be a subject independent or distinct from the object in which thought or perception filters. We find that rather the object of our bodies, that which allows us to perceive the world to begin with, requires no further explanation other than the object itself as being what is perceiving and subsequently also what is thinking. So to pretzel us back to the original argument, we can know that Ockham's Razor is in effect here, that unless a simpler explanation can account for just as much and just as accurately, there is no reason to make the jump to

[131] http://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/CHAPTER_5_ARGUMENTS_EXPERIENCE/Burden-of-Proof.htm
[132] https://www.facebook.com/groups/filosoph/permalink/877830785586433/

the idea that subjects exist as 'self'. All references to 'self' are shorthand references to thinking objects (like 'I', 'he', 'she', etcetera).

There is an interesting ethical implication of this however, in that saying a subject doesn't exist (only thinking objects) we are left without any subjectivity when it comes to mind-interaction. 'Ethics' as used in this paper is defined as any interactions between minded things, with that interaction getting categorized as good, evil, or neutral (it will be explained later why this must be the definition of ethics). Interactions are defined as any physical contact or action, as well as any direct communication; minded things are defined as things with theory of mind (not only self-aware, but aware that other things can and do have selves). The significance this has on ethics is that it showcases that ethics be objective, as mind-interaction is done between objects, not subjects, and as such, those interactions are objectively good, evil, or neutral.

We will get into Humor Ethics, illogicism, and anti-cuils as the basis of humor recognition and therefore the basis of unethicisms in the next area of the Ethics section, but for now just take note that there's probably a reason that those with strong identity are strongly made fun of (let the imagery of SJWs, overweight feminists, and vegans flow through you and hopefully find their way down the autism whirlpool that is surface-internet correctness). We will also see that it is the case that things that be ironic are unethical in the sense that hypocritical things, things that go against their own universals or definitions (anything that self-defeats), be humorous. So all that being said, strong self-identity is a vice, and loss of self-identity is the *man-behind-the-curtain-revealed* virtue of the illusory 'self'.

How is this framework of identity humor reconciled to those that deny (or stand aside) Humor Ethics? The traditional Virtue-Vice systems define extremes of human nature as being the vices and the happy median as being the virtue[133] (or a middle plus one stance, to avoid being totally agnostic while still maintaining a non-being of extremism). In this way we can view the vices of self-identity as any strong identity in any direction, as those are all the extreme ends of self-identity, for example: if you strongly identify as a woman, if you strongly identify as an otherkin, if you strongly identify as having any specific race, gender, sexuality, religion, culture, or specific mode of being. These are all vices in this regard as they are all extremes, but keep in mind these are always a specificity of being, and that these modes of being have the over-arching category of 'personhood'. This then raises the question of whether or not strongly identifying as a person (human or not) also leads to extremism in self-identity and thus be viceful itself.

If we are to say there is no strong or weak identification of something that neutrally *is*, then this is to say that anything with theory of mind has personhood by definition and thus is not weak or strong in identifying as such, but rather correct or incorrect. To pretzel us back through the argument here, all self-identities are views on modes of being with specificity, but the base mode of being is as a person, and so all specificity of being has the over-arching category of 'personhood'. So no, it would not viceful to identify as being a person, as you have only identified that you have a self, and as such a self-identity of personhood is simply self-identification itself. But one does not simply self-identify self-identification itself. Self-identification itself does not reconcile the categories of things people self-identify as, and so indeed to identify strongly as a person is still viceful in terms of virtue-vice extremism systems. The reconciliation of self-identity is the loss of self-identity in virtue-vice systems, meaning you don't strongly identify as anything (possibly other than unspecific being). The only neutral point in all forms of self-identification is to have no self-identification at all (strongly or weakly). In this way we can know the loss of self-identity or non-self-identity be the virtuous thing (withholding that you can still adequately use some of these identifiers to deconstruct persons in a scientific framework).

A quick re-iteration on the 'self' as being illusory- if there is no subject called the 'self', the 'self' is merely shorthand for the thinking objects we are. If you are to say that you are the summation of all the things you've ever done and ever thought, then it follows that you aren't 'whole' until your death, where you cease to commit action and thought; however this is delusional as you always exist in the state of your totality, meaning you are always the summation of all the things you've ever done and thought as a hundred percent of those things always exist presently. That being said, the self as a summation of actions and thoughts doesn't actually exist because time doesn't actually exist (send dissent to the Metaphysics section); the 'self' is shorthand for the thinking object we identify, nothing

[133] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/

more, and since it's yet been demonstrated that the thinking object exists apodictically it is fair to say that we shouldn't even strongly identify as the shorthanded version of the 'self'.

How does this play out then in real-world instantiations of thought? The first place to start is when you wake up by not immediately saying, "I be like a woman today," or, "I be like a sapiosexual white dude today," but rather, "I be," and questionably so. Now you may also see that humor, the testing of one's hold on reality, in relation to self-identity as being the identification of your existence within reality, be the correct ethical action to take against those with strong self-identity as laid out by this schema and the postceding framework of this treatise. The ethical underpinnings of humor are present.

It's fair if you take this with a grain of salt (changing your worldview rarely happens swiftly). Speaking of salt, I should be receiving a reward for having the best pretzel stand around, but I fear the philosophical contemporaries that lay eyes upon this treatise lack the taste needed for such heavily oiled breading (metajokes++).

Why open the Ethics section with something like this? It helps showcase the frame we're working in, where the lack of a subject means interacting thinking objects (the basis of Ethics) is an objective thing, lacking in subjectivity. It also helps showcase the odd equivocation from 'subject' as a logical preposition to 'subject' as a dualistic property of reality, and that 'subject' when used here is used to describe the 'self' as noted earlier. That being said, since we can know the self to be illusory, the 'subject' is also as such. We now lay the subjectivists to rest as we move on to what may truly be called Objective Ethics.

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:: Specific To Sexuality; Ethical Imperatives ::

*"I'm not with you because of what family, society, life tried to instill in me from day one. The way the world is, how seldom it is that you meet that one person who just *gets* you — it's so rare. My parents didn't really have it. There were no examples set for me in the world of male-female relationships. And to cut oneself off from finding that person, to immediately halve your options by eliminating the possibility of finding that one person within your own gender, that just seemed stupid to me. So I didn't... I remembered why I opened the door to women in the first place: to not limit the likelihood of finding that one person who'd complement me so completely."*
Alyssa from Chasing Amy

Biological imperative is not the be-all end-all when it comes to ethics. We find that if there is any conscious or cognitive thing, capable of reason tied to the biological imperative, then the rational side defeats the biological side. For example, many female rape victims report vaginal lubrication before or during their rape. We do not count this biological response as the be-all end-all proof that she was not actually raped. We understand that biological imperative actually works against the rational thinking object here, in that you were biologically forced to be sexually aroused even though you consciously did not want to be. In this way we know that ethical imperative is not derived directly from biological imperative.

We do admit however, that biological imperative can inform ethical imperative and when there is no rational side to appeal to, we defer to the biological imperative. For example, those who dislike chocolate. People who do not like the taste of chocolate do not do so because they've reasoned out that since the majority of people like chocolate, they will decide to be different; you do not manually change the biophysiological response your tongue reports when chocolate is present, as it is just a primitive biophysiological response. Your tongue simply by nature or nurture of genetic and other biological or chemical factors reports the presence of chocolate positively or negatively (or a shade in-between). So we see here in the absence of a conscious rationality we defer to the biological imperative. However, you may note that there is no ethical imperative that then follows. There is no good or evil that follows from a biological disposition of flavor preference. This is the case for all things where conscious rationality is not possible, as without the presence of minds, there is no ethics.

So sexuality beyond a biological imperative as derived from the need to procreate for the sole purpose of continuing a species is a fallacious concept as described in the "Ethical Framework of Humor; Self-Identity as Vice" section in this chapter on ethics. The question becomes whether or not there is an ethical imperative to having or exercising sexuality. As just noted, the biological imperative is present, as mortal organisms require procreation to keep their type of life existent, but we can grow people in test tubes now so there is no longer a biological necessity for procreation facilitated by sexual acts. The biological imperative is then disregarded.

Pair this with the understanding that humans are the only species on the planet that no longer experience natural selection. We have no predators above us, we seldom have environmental factors that we cannot control, we don't let our weak die, we don't let disease kill us; by every traditionally measurable way we no longer experience natural selection (in first-world countries). So there's no longer a biological imperative that can be reasonably tied to any ethical assertions. Our population is more than sufficient to grantee that our species will survive (and can be maintained as such via test tube farms), barring alien invasion or planetary annihilation, but at those points it wouldn't matter how many more breeders we had. There doesn't then seem to follow any ethical imperative for sexual procreation save religious assertions which lack substantiation due to previously discussed issues in the Science & Religion chapter. So no imperative for sexual procreation, but there is also no imperative against it unless some species-ending overpopulation happens, but that seems implausible and a little self-defeating. What then of *having* sexuality?

Currently we understand baseline sexuality as being a mixture of nature and nurture, but regardless if it's more nature or more nurture, or full one or the other, we'd still reduce it as a bio-physiological imperative that, once cognition has matured to secondary theory of mind (which is where we start our standard for higher intelligence and personhood), is out of our conscious control. This

means if you are heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, pansexual, snowflakesexual, etcetera, you do not have conscious manual control to flip a switch and simply change sexualities. Surely for this we say biological imperative exists, and having sexuality is not an ethical issue, but a purely biological one. But then what of those who do not have sexuality? And while admittedly I have not stated anything of ethical imperative *against* sexuality yet, we also have no ethical imperative *for* sexuality, so we fall back to saying there is no deliberation of sexual acts you can commit towards other persons that can be validated ethically.

What function does simply having sexuality perform then when cut off from carrying out sexual acts? From here we delineate between biological imperative and social imperative, where social imperative may be the only framework under which ethical imperatives may be asserted.

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:: The Joke Plays Into The Ethic ::

With great power comes great fuckery.

An understanding of the Dichotomy of Action[134] is important so as to differentiate between verbal and physical comedy. There are two different kinds of action Humans can commit to the outside world- verbal and physical. They say actions speak louder than words, but then they also say that the pen is mightier than the sword. The Dichotomy of Action is aimed to clear up how powerless and weak the verbal category is.

What is meant by 'verbal' action is anything that is spoken or heard with auditory perception, written or seen with visual perception, typed/texted, enumerated, or utilized under the conventional forms of linguistics and communication (not including body language). What is meant by 'physical' action is pretty much any action that falls outside of the verbal category, for example- your heart pumping, your hands shaking, your fist hitting, and things of that nature.

Now let me be very clear- verbal action matters not. There is nothing you can ever verbally commit that will have intentionally controllable direct effect on another mind. What I mean by this is that the speaker (person committing verbal action) is not the one who chooses to get offended by what is said, it is the perceiver of what's being said that chooses to get offended, or happy, or melancholy, etcetera. You might say, "well what if someone says they're going to kill you? Doesn't that have direct effect?" And while yes, it does, the speaker is also implying direct physical action on top of their verbal action, so the two categories are one in the same in this scenario qua meta-reification. If by way of verbal action you directly imply physical action, the verbal becomes just the same as if the physical were invoked. Implying physical via verbal is what bridges the two categories. What I mean by this is that if you are to verbally threaten someone's life directly, it is the same as physically threatening that person's life, as your meta-reified intent is the same in both cases.

Why say all this? Unless someone is speaking about direct physical action towards another person, you have no proper justification to be offended by anything they say. If you are offended, keep in mind that was your choice, not theirs. Words only have as much emotional connotation as you hold them to, as language is not subjective. The best response to your own offense is humor, as Seneca pointed out that, "No one is laughable who laughs at himself." In this way we see an escape strategy from our own emotional bias to choose to be offended when really we ought not.

There is a bit of a taboo against using certain words in our society. We are told these certain words are bad, but cannot ascertain as to why they are objectively evil, or why they are supposedly better or worse ethically than any other word. All words hold the same base objective value (a word can only hold a value of 1 or 0, either the word has a semantic or it doesn't). If you choose to be so deeply offended by a specific word, why not just as easily choose to *not* be offended by it?

We find society is principally opposed to censorship when they see what it is that's being censored, and so there will be wordage used in this paper that would otherwise have been excluded under different circumstances. You will have seen some words not commonly found in formal papers in the definition list at the beginning of this treatise; if you are offended by them or the way in which I've used wordage, then this isn't a paper you should be reading, but it's probably too late to be telling you that.

So anyways, Comedy is divided according to the Dichotomy of Action in that verbal comedy hardly ever incurs as much anger as physical comedy. Sure we've all seen people lose their shit over a facebook flame war, but less than one percent of one percent of one percent of the time is physical action ever pursued over it (hardly anyone gets shot over a facebook comment). On the flip side, physical comedy in the real world is almost never well-received, and there are plenty of "pranks gone wrong" videos you can watch that prove this.[135] [136] This divide in comedy helps create the ethical basis later discussed.

[134] http://www.scienceforums.com/topic/27401-the-dichotomy-of-action/
[135] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylY6-7vAefE
[136] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsHLMDc-Z-c

Morality and Ethics are not the same thing; define each.
Define Personal Identity and Personhood separately.
How to define mind, note the factorial difference between self-awareness and awareness of other selves.
One ought to believe that fucking with people be the correct course of action when presented with a situation in which the other party is unwilling to concede to truth. In this sense we can justifiably say that fuckery is an ethical imperative. So in my infinitely wise and humble opinion, fucking with people is the same as formal rigorous philosophical discussion.

Intent does not matter, most do not intend what they think is evil, the act itself is right or wrong and you intend the act to happen, making your intent right or wrong after the fact. Since intent doesn't matter, having bad intent doesn't make you a bad person?

Dog Ethics.

Comedy increases as knowledge does- the more you know, the more you can intentionally act upon.

Caring is the crutch, desensitization is the cure. Hakuna Matata means no worries for the rest of your days, it's our problem-free philosophy. Literally translates to no problems.

Subjectivism creates an ethical kibitzer.

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:: Feminism Versus Masculinism as a Virtue-Vice System ::

Gender extremes are both viceful weaknesses; females with slightly higher testosterone (tomboys) or males with slightly lower testosterone (nerds) have higher IQs and end up being more successful on average.
http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger's_Rapist

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The body is not the master of the mind. Sure, you need to keep your body alive to keep your mind alive, but in a master-slave complex it is not the slaves that need the master but rather the master that needs the slaves. In this sense, the mind is the master of the body. Keeping in line with this, all external systems of control, like hard narcotics, cigarettes, sex, religion, coffee, (sleep?) these are all viceful as you do not need them to keep the machine running, yet they have direct altering affect on the mind. Things that alter your mind-state in ways that you cannot manually or actively immediately alter back are things that are considered to force said alterations. The experiences under forced mind-states are not genuine, as the genuine by definition cannot be forced. Of course you can't murder someone and then say you were smoking a cigarette during the whole ordeal and thus it wasn't genuinely you that committed the murder, so there must be different levels of genuine being that are tangentially tied to the base mind-state, similar to the level of abstractions from reality in Cuil Theory. Atheist, Apolitical, Asexual, freedom from external systems of control.

Ceased- deceased and ceaseless as vices with ceasing as the virtue. All living things become base virtuous, all ceasing things become base virtuous.

This first section was written for the Global Challenges Foundation's *New Shape Prize* in 2017. They asked participants for submissions explaining new ideas for governmental architecture, fixes, and replacements, primarily to mitigate the failures of the United Nations as a governing body. Snax wrote and submitted this work on 2017/9/27. The section after this was written several years in advance (in 2012) and was the ideation for the New Shape submission. It details the technical aspects of the system more robustly.

> *"You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust your bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly to confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and expressions of humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole, the global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat."*
>
> *John Barlow*

> *"Freedom of speech is demanded by people who wish to abandon the freedom of thought."*
>
> *Kierkegaard*

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:: A New Shape ::

ABSTRACT: A crypto-government with absolute transparency, a pure-democracy-like fair law-proposing and voting platform with incentivisation to vote and a robust delegation system, full manual control and granulation of personal privacy, a trust-less internally regulated cryptocurrency that dynamically inflates and deflates proportionately to the number of citizens, and standardized protocols and APIs for federated interconnectivity and communications between crypto-governments, all contained in a polymorphic client that can re-code itself upon acceptance of new laws that require changes in the code of the system is proposed as a solution to the challenges and concerns outlined by the New Shape competition. Argumentation for how the proposed crypto-government relates to and fixes specific outlined problems is given after the model is fully described, as well as details on the relatively low cost this entire project would require.

For the environmental and posterity concerns mentioned on your site, certain economic and financial frameworks need to be in play first, and for those frameworks to operate smoothly, certain governmental architecture needs to come before that, so I focus on architectural options rather than particular policies, as asked for. There are three sections which I outline: a governmental architecture, an economic and financial framework that can follow from that, and environmental & posterity measures that follow from both of those.

Before all of that however, I want to be clear on what the scope of discourse is that this proposal is supposed to fill. The criteria for the challenge mentioned on your site say several things that come across as overtly contradictory or highly improbable, specifically the desire for the proposal to answer or fix issues with the UN, a multi-continent governing body, by replacing it with something that can effectively make decisions *and enforce them*, without having it be controversial, or further, without it requiring significant change of individual states nor limiting the sovereignty of those states. This seems

a contradiction déclaré, but I think there is a small space by which you could win the majority of citizens of some given geographical region and coax them into adopting a new system in a way that would allow for a peaceful replacement of governmental architecture similar to the crowd-sourced constitutional remake of the Icelandic government not too long ago.

Additionally there is a request in the challenge criteria to deal with issues like over-population, but to do so without, "seriously harm[ing] the vital interests of inhabitants of other countries, or of humanity as a whole,"[137] and also to have, "respect for the equal value of all human beings."[138] Without implementing a voluntary eugenics program or something akin to China's one-child policy, there is no room for a robust population-control program that meets these requests, so when touching on the posterity concerns later, I am dealing with ways to make policies happen, not which policies to favor.

With all that said, what I am proposing most simply is a crypto-government, similar to and based on the whitepaper and philosophy behind the first major cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. I am, however, aware that cryptocurrencies are limited in some regards and I attempt to anticipate issues and objections to my proposed system by explicating distinctions between cryptocurrencies and my proposed system. I am also aware that other candidates may be proposing their own crypto-governments, so I hope to cover more bases with very light technical specifications that they may have missed.

GOVERNMENT:

I understand most problems of government to be due to corruption either of individuals or the system itself, and so removing the capacity for corruption *ab initio* solves these problems. I take additional problems to be due to failures in efficacy or poorly educated decision-making by an electorate. Light specifications for the proposed architecture are aimed at fixing these problems, *inter alia*.

Many cryptocurrencies have proven excellent voting platforms, and so building a cryptocurrency protocol with voting explicitly intended, and with votes being separate and distinct entities from the currency, would allow for a completely secure and trust-less automated voting platform. As with almost all cryptocurrency protocols, every action that took place on it would also be fully transparent and publicly auditable. You can pair a law-proposition function with the voting function to turn a software client of this system into a fully-featured governmental law-making and voting system with no room for double-counting or miscounted votes.

A hard-coded time restraint can be implemented whereby a month is given for proposed laws to be reviewed or filtered and a month-long voting period is given for citizens or officials to cast decisions on proposed laws, at the end of which the laws are automatically added into the publicly enforceable sphere by the system (a list of passed and rejected laws is easily viewable akin to the list of transactions on cryptocurrency networks). The times are arbitrary, what's important here is recognizing that this would *force* a turnover time much shorter than any current government and creates a level of efficiency not possible with any contemporary governmental architecture.

Concerns of hackability or code corruption for a digitized government like this are serious, but akin to how many cryptocurrencies now require a 95% or even 99% majority in order to falsify transactions, and how multiple protocols are dynamically shifted and used to verify or hash transactions, the technical and hardware requirements necessary to manipulate a system like this approach practical impossibility rather quickly. N.b., cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin have never had their security breached or backbones devastated and despite this they are continually becoming even more secure, which means security threats for a cryptographic government as proposed start to look minimal. It'd be conservative to say that those who are majorly concerned here are overly worried.

With regards to the flexibility of such a system that uses a standardized and seemingly unchanging protocol (or set of protocols) as its backbone, allowing the system to hard-fork the architecture if there is mass-adoption of a new system mitigates inflexibility. However, hard-forking may be very dangerous and may make the governmental body unstable. Another possibility is in having polymorphic clients that can re-code and re-compile themselves upon passing of laws that specify changes in code sections of the clients or protocols used.

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[137] Accessed 2017/9/25; https://www.globalchallenges.org/en/the-prize/criteria
[138] Ibid.

If built as a pure, 'flat', or 'direct' democratic platform, or even as a representative republic, the issue of motivating citizens to regularly vote becomes pressing, but incentivisation is not difficult, especially if it results in tax cuts. Better yet, junk the requirements for citizens to cast *their* vote *themselves*, and implement a delegation system. A delegation system whereby you can chose particular persons (an arbitrary total number of persons) that you agree with politically, whose vote then has *your* vote tacked onto it, would be a system whereby citizens that are too busy with other jobs or endeavors can still have political influence without the investment of time into researching laws that a professional politician exhibits. This would fill the space of representative governance. If persons X and Y in your delegates list vote differently on a given law or policy, then the mechanics of this can be togglable between favoring person X over Y when disagreements occur or only tacking your vote when both X and Y vote the same way on the law. The ways in which your vote can be appended to your delegate list are easily extendable and don't even have to be built into the architecture directly since API scripts can be made for these kinds of actions.

Most of the features mentioned throughout this section are optional and pseudo-arbitrary; you could code and build a crypto-government platform however you wished. The only important feature that ought to be required and ought not be arbitrary for the first government of this kind is the careful outline and standardization of information handling and sharing protocols, so as to allow the ease of making this technology a federated one capable of separating and fractionalizing as desired by individual states but also capable of unifying and sharing at any level and for any scope they require as well. I believe this is actually the only way in which governments can start to have a true and robust sovereignty amongst themselves, but this isn't about political theory so I'll leave it at that.

Conversion to this kind of system would require that a geographic area adopting this system already have a robust internet infrastructure, and so this could not be widely adopted in most poorer countries currently. It can however be mass-adopted in most of the Americas and Europe, and the psychologically assuaging rhetoric around this could be such that it is merely an online portal for directly participating in and with your government.

I believe an elevated electorate would also be required for cathexis in this system, to make it work as smoothly as possible, and so I believe a shift in education to be very important, one where formal logic and critical thinking become a standardized part of all education tracks. Even a full resurgence in classical studies would be better than what the current international standard is so robust philosophical understandings of society would be taken into account when dealing with politics, but again this submission isn't about political theory so I'll lay aside this belief.

As an end comment to this section, and somewhat unrelated to the aims of the competition this is being submitted to, you could allow for robust profiles of citizens within a crypto-government, much like a social network but with everything except citizen ID completely hidden and private by default. This would allow for an API-key setup where citizens can dish-out information and hook into other systems with fine-granular and complete control over their own privacy. This level of control over your privacy, ultimate and complete control over it, most would consider to be a basic human right, yet currently no citizen of any nation has this level of access and control over their own information. Depending on what metrics were kept internally in a citizen's profile by this crypto-government, you could automate things like the sharing of medical records between multiple health-care providers, or automate the filling-out of forms for getting a drivers license, or create highly accurate and complete statistics or demographics using public metadata; there are many possibilities for an architecture this free and robust.

ECONOMICS/FINANCIALS:

I understand most problems of currency and subsequently the economic frameworks that cloche them to be due to the properties of the given currency as deflationary or inflationary. E.g., economic systems built on deflationary currencies (like when we were on the gold standard) limit social projects and capacity for national defense in crippling ways. The blame of economic flensing resulting in phrases like, "guns or butter," is not to be placed on the *scarcity* of a deflationary currency but on the *deflation itself*. Conversely, economic systems built on inflationary currencies (like any government-backed fiat) debase their currencies into oblivion and then necessarily require the mass-moving of debt to stabilize themselves. I also understand that sequela of unchecked corporate power is the creation of preternatural monsters that expend no effort to make salutary their existence. I believe a severe

reduction in the function of stock markets, and things of that nature, will significantly reduce this most dangerous power. This is how I understand most economic problems to be situated, and so I will propose fixes for these now, given this understanding.

Having a cryptocurrency paired and directly integrated with the crypto-government I have proposed in the prior section would allow for a level of control and functionality of currency not before possible. On this, I propose the cryptocurrency used by this system be neither a static inflationary currency (like most proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies) nor a static deflationary currency (like Bitcoin and its direct derivates) but rather a dynamically expanding and contracting currency that mints (thereby inflating) coins directly proportionate to the number of citizens added to the government registry (due to births or change of citizenship) and sinks or destroys (thereby deflating) coins directly proportionate to the number of citizens removed from the government registry (due to death or change of citizenship to another state). Built-in automated money sinks to permanently destroy currency is relatively easy to implement and would make this framework perfectly stable.

This means that there will always be an average total of 100 coins per person (the number is arbitrary for this example). The reason for doing this is to resolve not only the maladies of inflation and deflation, but to eliminate core problems with resulting capitalist and socialist policies, as I will limn. The way currency be doled out and taken in this proposed framework is per-citizen and by whether or not the citizen is still living. To make this very clear, you could not inherit a large fortune upon the death of a relative in this system, for upon death all currency registered to a citizen is automatically taken by the system and sunk or distributed to government-funded programs. Upon turning the legal adult age in this system your entire crypto-share is unlocked and sent to you so you can start your adult life.

The 100 coins that everyone has on average, which will actually be disproportionately distributed due to entrepreneurship, can be given as a lump sum or in installments across many months to young citizens for them to use as they please (automated by the cryptocurrency protocol). This can be problematic as it can lead to wild and risky investments, but it will also eliminate the need for a universal basic income, which is a good thing. Being able to properly manage a sum of money that is exactly proportionate to the average cash-worth of all citizens will mean you won't have to worry about going broke when you don't have a job. Many traditional systemic issues of unfair class balance can't exist in this kind of financial framework.

You could, of course, build the cryptocurrency to be handled completely differently than I've proposed, but I find that doing so would be deleterious. What I have proposed is the best of both worlds, as it allows you to start in the middle of middle class, the way ideal capitalism says you're supposed to start, and any significant gain or loss, any significant movement up or down, would be almost entirely due to your actual merit without being laden with the adversities of childhood poverty or other restraints. It props you up as you are *starting* life, in the way ideal socialism says capital is supposed to be appropriated, without over-spent 'safety nets' for people who chose to fall *later* in life. This framework obviates solutions to perennial problems in economics and I believe it also allows for smoother funding of environmental and posterity measures as discussed in the next section.

As some end notes to this section, it should be said that a crypto-government as I've proposed, which mints and controls its currency internally and completely automatically, can regulate the collection and use of taxation in a fully automated manner, without the involvement of any human hands that would otherwise bring with them the capacity for corrupting this process. You could even design the system such that every single transaction had built-in taxes, much like VAT, and no citizen would then ever have to file taxes, as tax reports could be collected free and instantly by examining the blockchain (read: public ledger) of the cryptocurrency; there would be no tax loop-holes for people to abuse. Additionally, you could do away with taxes altogether and instead have the government automatically mint coins for its own use proportionate to some percentage of the total population. This would be used for the same thing that taxes would have been otherwise used for, the only difference being that this would change the total number of coins that existed per person, but the system would still be perfectly proportionate so it wouldn't matter too much. There are a lot of easily implementable options here.

On this, since the regulation of the currency can be fully automated instantly and for free by the internal maths of the crypto-government tout court, no banks are necessary and banking in general would become a superfluous social oddity. As with the intent of many of the early cryptocurrency

adopters, an upside would be the ineluctable result of razing all banking institutions. To end this note on institutional changes, a hard cap on the average number of coins per citizen means a hard cap on the psychology behind the aims of investments that average citizens are willing to take the risk for, and as such, a cap on the amount of money being poured into stocks. My views on this are tentative, but I believe this will be a great aid in seeing the vicious side of corporatism diminished.

ENVIRONMENT/POSTERITY:

I understand environmental concerns to primarily stem *not* from our concern of the environment qua the purity of the environment, but from our concern of maintaining an environment stable and safe enough for us to survive in it. This means that when dealing with climate concerns we do not typically care if other organisms survive for their own sake, as evolution loves extinction, but instead the care related to other organisms is in the indication that their failure to survive is a marker for our own coming failure to survive. The concern then is whether humans will perish because we have failed to maintain a static environment suitable to our current needs.

I don't think many fixes for this situation are available outside of specific policies dealing with population reduction (less consumers means less emitters) or heavy investment into technologies that eat or solidify CO_2 and CO_2e. The funding for these technologies flows almost frictionlessly when people get direct votes or when policy has an incredibly fast turn-around time, which means that unless the governmental architecture I am proposing (or something like it) gets implemented, we won't be seeing mass-support or adoption of substantial environment-saving technologies nearly as fast as we need it.

Population control is important for its own sake, but it is also a means by which to control environmental damage, so unless a governmental architecture arises that can fluidly manage and easily scale to the total number of persons on the planet, of which architecture I have proposed, I don't see population getting locked down smoothly or in any internationally agreed upon way any time soon.

An incredibly expensive solution to population growth and climate control, which has been proposed by many people for many decades now, is to start work on building artificial environments off-world, either as massive space stations, or by terraforming neighboring planets and moons, but if we could do that then we could just terraform Earth's climates back to whatever we liked. I don't see these solutions happening in any reasonable amount of time, no matter how much money is thrown at them, so again, without the proper governmental architecture the problems of population growth and climate change are but the internecine before total collapse of man by his own handiwork.

For argumentation demonstrating how the proposed model meets your assessment criteria, I think some of that burden has been lifted in the description of the model itself, but I'll go point-for-point now in how I believe the proposed model fulfills what you're looking for.

1. Core Values: The governmental architecture as proposed makes possible a pure or 'flat' democratic system, either for all citizens or for the elected members representing those citizens. This makes possible an Athenian-like democracy globally scalable for the first time in history, which should be a clear indication that any egalitarian views you have on human equality is met in spades and that this is possibly the only way in which certain rights to political access can even be guaranteed.

2. Decision-Making Capacity: This criterion is especially met by the proposed model, as the forcing of fast turn-around times on policy is built into the system and can be modified and finessed to your liking.

3. Effectiveness: While the system would be very capable of handling global challenges (you'd simply have to download a client), ensuring the implementation of decisions will require the use of traditional channels. For example, a law or set of policies passed requiring car manufacturers to reduce overall vehicle emissions would still need human inspectors to come in and ensure the policies were being followed. No system *itself* can do this part of the human transaction. If the proposed model is adopted by a state or international governing body, attaining the cooperation of the required

institutions would not be as difficult and you could fairly confidently ensure the implementation of just about any decision.

4. Resources and Financing: I think this may be the best part, because if you targeted the right coding circles you could amalgamate enough crypto-nerds to do the whole thing for free. Maybe this is optimistic, but the pessimistic route is still fairly optimistic. The system as proposed is merely a piece of software, granted it would be a very large and complicated piece of software, but software nonetheless, so its costs would only be in paying the programmers who design and build it. After that point, you wouldn't even have to pay for the electricity to use it (although you probably should) since the system would be distributed across a global network and hosted by all the users that run the client software (like any given hard-node of a cryptocurrency). The citizens would foot the electric bill, but you could account for this and offset the cost internally if you wanted to. Other than paying for a website and thousands of man-hours of coding time, this costs nothing, making the whole thing relatively cheap overall and significantly cheaper than building a whole new political infrastructure to replace the UN.

5. Trust and Insight: This one is knocked out of the park as well since all governmental actions would be completely transparent and publicly auditable via the blockchain. Levels of insight not previously possible (at least not without governments spying on its citizens) are attained by running scans of metadata on citizen interactions and votes in the proposed model. You could create perfectly accurate representations of per-demographic behavior and vote choices by matching votes from citizens with their race, sex, age, and other metrics, for example. You would still not be able to see who specifically voted for what, as individual citizen profiles, as outlined earlier, would be private by default. You could design the cryptographic backbone to allow access to specific citizen's metadata always or only after a citizen has specified its allowance, the option for both or something different altogether is possible and easy enough to enact with this architecture.

6. Flexibility: As just described in the Trust and Insight response, and as described with the mention of polymorphic code much earlier, not only are there myriad options for building this kind of system in whichever configuration you like, but once it's built it can be changed, either through hard-forks or polymorphic engines, and conform to whatever specifications the designers desire, making this architecture flexible and dynamic without having to amend a constitution every time you want to make a fundamental change. This may be too flexible, but if that's a concern then you could just as easily hard-code the system to be more limited.

7. Protection Against the Abuse of Power: If instantiated as a pure or 'flat' democratic system, there could not be any exceptional favoring of special interests of individuals, groups, or organizations without gaining a majority vote (or supermajority, the amount is arbitrary). If there is concern of a coercive majority or constant minority group being persecuted, then the proposed delegation system should mitigate that (for reasons of political science that I don't think are appropriate to get into here), and if that fails then traditional channels and institutions can be called on for handling these issues. With regards to interfering with the internal affairs of nation-states, this would only be possible if the proposed model existed as a governmental body on top of or along-side of some other government bounded by geography, and the crypto-government had authority over the bounded government. This would be like how the Fed acts as a centralized governing body over all of the American states. This is only possible if it is explicitly implemented for this reason right from the start, so if you think this is a problem, then simply don't implement it that way and you avert the crisis.

8. Accountability: As proposed, and as the government would be completely transparent, it would be easy to hold people accountable since political action inside the system could be made widely known fairly arbitrarily. You could make the voting system entirely for representatives, but without privacy control, and have all their voting be completely public, forcing individuals to always be tied to every vote. Politicians could try to hold private votes but that could be made illegal and result in their removal from office. There are lots of options, you could build the software multiple times and try different versions to see which options work best, the opportunities are all here.

I'll close with these words. The internet was the democratization of information, the invention of the internet marked the first time in history that information could flow frictionlessly. Bitcoin was the democratization of currency, the invention of Bitcoin marked the first time in history that currency could flow frictionlessly. A crypto-government would be the democratization of raw power, a crypto-government would mark the first time in history that power could flow truly frictionlessly.

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:: Cybernetic Governance ::

"Terrified of virtual bogeymen we know only from the Evening News, we have asked the government for shorter chains and smaller cages. And, market driven as ever, it has been obliging us."

Perry Barlow

Sometimes protecting people means giving them a place to belong.

"Reminder that there are classes of people who play dress up, speak in Latin, are said to be smart but are usually dumb as shit and have low disgust threshold, who work in professions that inform the definition of legal concepts."

W.V.D. Busby

"When trying to convince someone of something, make them laugh."

W.V.D. Busby

"The united states government is so secure in its power, it lets you have free speech."

W.V.D. Busby

The failure of realpolitik is evidenced by its self-defeating definitional usage. The idea that realistic or practical politics be based solely on practical and material factors rather than ideological predispositions is an ideological predisposition that politics be based solely on practical and material factors. So realpolitik does not stand on its own. What ideology then stands as a valid ideology while maintaining strong ties to practical and material matters in an ethically positive manner?

Talk about the government system itself, and the matters of efficiency.
no property taxes, the state doesn't own land
no military, "a government without a military is like a fish without a bicycle."
no opaque actions, code is open-source and gov actions are publicly listed
crowd-sourced constitution —

We don't have Pure Democracy in America, we don't even have normal democracy, instead we have an electoral college and a separated group of individuals that rule (around 2% of 1% of 1% of the total population) that we throw into a room in hopes that they will vote on laws and make decisions in favor of how we'd vote and make them. This isn't democracy, this is a weak Representative Republic. This is similar to what most other "democracies" in the world have, and this huge disproportionment in power needs to change. For the sake of one day lifting the imaginary lines in the ground that we use to divide ourselves with and pretend make us different, for the sake of being able to explore and expand into space and not fight over who owns the territory, for the sake of lifting up the 99.9998% of society that has little to no political power, and for the sake of being able to gradually and peacefully transition the human race into a singular government system, this change needs to happen soon.

So What Is A "Pure Democracy"?

It's a system in which the people being governed have direct control over what the government does. In an absolute pure democracy, there would be no elected officials within the government, the system would sustain itself, and any decisions that needed to be made would be collaborated on by any and all people within the system, all having an equal say in it (as far as voting goes). To stop a large flow of poorly-written or deeply flawed bills being presented, there would be a system of registration put in place where in order to be a law-writer you would have to pass a legality test, a scientific literacy, history literacy, and a mathematics literacy test. The laws then made would go through an initial phase of being up-voted or down-voted to be presented in the next major voting phase in which everyone in the nation has a choice of deciding whether or not the bill is passed.

Why Isn't A Pure Democracy Already In Place?

Power — It requires people to step down from their already prescribed positions of rule.
Intelligence — It requires people to take the time to intelligently and presciently design a system governed by the whole of the people, not an isolated group of them; as well as intelligence to propose decent laws and intelligence to vote on them.
Motivation — It requires people to keep up with what their country is doing on a regular basis, and to be actively involved in it.
Congregation — It would normally require everyone to meet up at the ol' Greek forum to discuss the month's topics, which is hard to do with 300 million people.

Solutions To Each Problem, Why The System Can Be Implemented Now, And Why It Should Be

Power — This new system will start off with no one holding government power over any of the other citizens, making it so no one has to step down from their rule, and so current world leaders don't lose power but so that current world citizens gain power.
Intelligence — There are, despite popular belief, an Intelligencia out there that is capable of formulating a self-sustaining system that would make this possible, as well as more practical over other currently instantiated systems. Having this type of government function off the backbone of a cryptocurrency network would mean high security and an easy, smooth transition of systems. The voting can be dealt with via a multi-pool delegation system that acts as a decentralized voter pool.
Motivation — Me and almost everyone else reading this is motivated enough to take part in it, as is everyone who applies to be a citizen, and anyone who uses cryptocurrency or arguably even the internet. Becoming a citizen under this government would imply you want to take part in its affairs, otherwise why join a nation that gives you such a magnitude of control over it only to let it control you through your inactivity? You'd be defeating the purpose.
Congregation — The only non-ego aspect of the reasons these systems of Pure Democracy aren't in place as current major world governments is the congregation aspect. Not everyone in the country can fly over to D.C. every month for a meet-and-greet over the war politics, and up until the last couple decades, there wasn't really a system in which large volumes of people could communicate simultaneously with each other. But you're reading this now, and you're reading this from a system that would allow a Pure Democracy to take place.

The flaws in my list are human flaws, stopping us from advancing socially, so I guess they'll just be a human-hump to get over in terms of implementing a Purely Democratic system. So aside from those, why don't we try to start implementing a more democratic system like this now?

After discussing this with many people, the most common objection to the idea, the only one really, is that voting over the internet can be hacked, rigged, and easily corrupted, and while this is true, voting via paper is more easily rigged than any of the major voting engines on the web. By utilizing a distributed cryptographic network, we could design a totally fortified system. There are ways to stop hacking cold in its tracks, the Bitcoin network or other cryptocurrency networks would provide an easy fix for any potential hacking. Much like you can't double-spend transactions on the Bitcoin network, you won't be

able to double-vote. It would be practically impossible to poison Bitcoin's network, making this an incredibly secure system. If we use the Bitcoin network and a 51% attack is a possible threat, then using a cryptocurrency based on the x11 algo or a PoW/PoS hybrid would provide a higher degree of security. Keep in mind security only gets better and we're starting with a system that hasn't been hacked at any point in history so far.

The Delegation System

Low intelligence, laziness, or lack of time to spend on law-reviewing and voting is a major potential issue with this kind of government. To mitigate this problem, the delegation system will be used. Voting can be incentivized through tax breaks, but voting is essential in a system like this and many people (Americans especially) aren't interested or don't have the time to make educated votes, so a delegation system fixes this. If you list two people you know to have political and governance intellect as your delegates in the client, then whatever they vote on, your vote gets tacked on to; they vote for you essentially. This is like how America's representative republic currently works, however, a major difference is that centralization and power of influence over the vote cannot be maintained by delegates. If the two or more (up to an infinite amount) people you have as your delegate vote differently on a law, then your vote is not cast either way unless you manually choose to vote on that law. All your listed delegates must agree on their vote for a law, or have not voted on that law in order for your vote to be tacked on. Having this multi-pool system of delegates will remove the "mob rule" effect from systems of pure democracy.

Using Cryptocurrency To Power This Kind Of System

The changing environment of the crypto world can potentially pose a threat to the security of this government system's network. We will need to have a platform that can variably change major aspects out without invoking a hard fork; this is critical to this kind of government being successful. For example, if the government starts off using Bitcoin as the backbone, and both the SHA-256 algo and Bitcoin blockchain become less than desirable, then the network must be able to dynamically switch algorithms and blockchains. The algo aspect currently seems impossible to do but debate on this is still open (discussion on polymorphic code has been proposed but I'm not too sure about it). An easy way to do the blockchain aspect is to have the government platform use its own blockchain as an intermediary blockchain, relaying all blockchain info from the Bitcoin network blockchain that the citizens of the government platform conduct back through the government blockchain on top of any transactions/voting/etcetera that they do on the government network. Having everyone on the government system use the x11 algos but still relay the information from the Bitcoin blockchain could be a way to allow for network meshing. This would essentially act as a mirror or latent archive system on the government networks part, but a huge advantage it would contain is being able to adopt many other crypto's blockchains into its own. Because of this nature, I propose we call this intermediary-amalgamation-blockchain the **Borg Blockchain**. I realize this will not be so easy to implement, but it's dynamic & variable modules like this that need to be implemented if a government system like the one proposed is to work effectively.

A huge advantage having such a variable system would also offer is that any duplicated government systems that spawn from this (like the hundreds of altcoins from Bitcoin) will be able to intercommunicate, much like how all Etherium applications can intercommunicate. Talk has been had about just using the Etherium platform as the base of this government system but it seems that there may not be enough variable change allowed. Talks about this are still open for discussion.

Further Specifics Of The Software That Will Need To Be Met

Fair Client Distribution: The client that runs this government and its network must be a "fair" client, meaning all users with the client must have the same options available to them (view all local/province/national laws that can be voted on, view news feed, etc). In order to use the client with

its normal functionality, you must be registered as a citizen within the network. This can be automated like the registration & verification process of crypto exchange markets. If a citizen has rights stripped, then the client registered to them becomes non-functional. This means that yes, there will be a solid tie between your identity and your client. The only practical way I can think of to make this work with all the other aspects of the system is to have your wallet double as your client so that your wallet is your client. Losing your wallet will then mean losing your identity in the network. There are probably other ways to fix this that I am not currently thinking of, feel free to propose better ideas.

In-Client Registration: In-client registration for citizenship will be required for this to work, registering on a webpage will make the government system too centralized and weak to attacks. In-client registration for voting and law-making will also be necessary to make this system work. The client must be able to dynamically update the registration processes for all these tasks based on the criteria the network agrees to standardize for registration. This means that if literacy tests become a requirement to register to vote, the client must display the literacy tests as part of the voter registration by pulling the registration process off the network. A way to make this implementation easy is to have these modules be part of the blockchain, and the most recent agreed-upon version of the module is what is loaded when attempting to register. Which version of the registration process that becomes the "most recent agreed-upon version" will be based on the version adopted via law during the voting cycles. This means the registration process will initially start with no requirements besides citizenship to the network.

Code Spliced Into Client by Laws Passed Through the Network: This brings about another potential implementation issue. Laws that effect the code of the network must be marked as such, and what module of the software they target must be included in the law (in special parameters to be parsed by the clients later). If a law that says a change to the client code is required, then the proposed change in code must be attached, and upon passing the law, the clients must be able to understand a change has been made and must allow the users to update their clients to a newer compile of the code via in-client alerts or notifications. Doing this, paired with yearly client blackouts, will create a version of a "soft-fork". What I mean by yearly client blackout, is that the client software must disallow users the normal functionality after a year has passed since the software's installation. After a year, when you open the client, a window should come up saying that it's been a year and that you have to update your client to the most recent compile. By forcing client updates, it's possible to force a switch of major software aspects like from SHA to Scrypt without worrying about people not adopting the new software after the fork. This would only really come into play if a major change is made to the network or client functionality by citizen-defined law.

Self-Sustaining System Through Polymorphic Code: That last paragraph made me think about something. While crypto touts being decentralized and trustless, everyone must still rely on the developers for the client in order to access the network. This would become problematic if laws affecting the code of the client or functionality of the network are passed, because the developers of this system will be the ones responsible for implementing that change for others. There's two ways to make this problem go away, the first being some government-affiliated organization is kept responsible for constant compiles and distributions of the system's code, or the initial client comes with a built-in compiler and polymorphically updates and adapts with the network. I don't think either of these options is satisfactory. If a law is passed saying a change needs to be made to the client code or the network functionality, the network in its entirety and all individual clients must be able to sense the change and know if a client isn't updated, automatically blocking the out-of-date clients so no hard forks happen. Self-blocking and self-updating clients would be necessary for this system to work. A "current network state" and "current client state" would have to match in order for your client to connect to the network, not like most crypto where you can have their oldest client and still connect.

GUI/In-Client Chat: The client must be incredibly clean and easy to use even with its high amount of functionality. GUI designers will have no problem with this. If the proposed three area-types for laws is agreed upon when building this system, then the client must be able to show local-area, provincial, and national laws as clearly delineated separate categories. The window displaying a selected individual law

must display two comment sections with it, one where the commenters voted for the selected law, the other where the commenters voted against the selected law. The comments will be able to be up-voted or down-voted, so citizens can see the top arguments for or against a proposed law. This type of stuff is not essential to the system, but it will certainly make the system more enjoyable to use and thus strengthen the system.

Smart Contracting: Smart contracting and any other automated legal processes that can be built into the network are good, to allow for the most legal automation possible (as this is the only way to currently make an online government effective). Real-world implementation and upholding of contracts of this nature will require participants to honor the contracts, or local law-enforcement to consider this government a legitimate form of law, and to have the local law-enforcement honor the contract in place of those who don't (i.e. punish those who break the law). This also means that proposed laws must have a menu or some direct functional controls to tie parts of their proposed laws to the smart contracts of the network (if a law passes or some condition in the law is met after it's passed, then the condition for the named smart contract in the law gets met). Smart contracts must be open to "unforeseen government conditions". If a bunch of contracts are made, and a law is passed saying the contracts are invalid, the network must be able to nullify the contracts via command of the passed law.

Blockchain Size: Issues about the size of the blockchain have been discussed. A network that carries currency transactions as well as voting, smart contracting, and other features will have a large blockchain. Proof hybrids seem to minimize this problem, as well as having "Light Blocks". The Light Block concept goes that if after a day you have around 20,000 blocks, you can generate a hash of that day's blocks and you are left with only one block for that day. This would make it feasible for people to use the client on a mass scale. Downloading the full blockchain can be incentivized either through allowing Staking only on full nodes, or through other methods. I am not too worried about the size of the blockchain though, let me know if I should be.

Public vs. Anonymous Presence: By default, you will be fully anonymous to other users on the network, however, you can broadcast your identity, and any or all votes you make. This means your name and identity on the network can be public and also show how you voted on any law in the system. You can also be anonymous and still show how you voted on any or all laws passed through the system. This is handy for delegates to display what they represent in order to get people to tack their votes onto said delegates. The transparency of your identity on the network is entirely up to the user, the user can even make their financial transactions fully public as well if they truly wanted (like how it currently is for Bitcoin).

Delegation System: When someone adds a network identity (person) to their delegate list, the delegate should get a notification showing that someone added them, and who that person is if that person's identity is public. Removal notifications should also appear. Being able to turn these notifications on and off is important. By default, you will be an available delegate, others can list your client address in their delegation pool list. An option to turn off delegation should be available if you don't want others listing you in their pool.

Law-Writing System: There needs to be a tripcode or some script-proof human-input requirement when submitting a law into the system, so law-writers can't spam laws. There should also be a limitation on the number of laws a person can submit per-day and the number of laws the entire network can submit per-day so the network isn't flooded with new laws all the time beyond the point of human management.

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:: A System Of Crediting Is Superior To A System Of Currencies ::

Stuff about governance being regulatory interactions, and thereby politics is not necessary, but social statuatation qua currency is regulatory in the same sense, making economics a governmental function.

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:: Meta-Aesthetics ::

"Goethe's doctrine of colors, which are so clear and simple, are still denied by the physicists; and thus Goethe himself has had to learn what a much harder position one has if one promises men instruction than if one promises them amusement. Hence it is much more fortunate to be born a poet than a philosopher."
Arthur Schopenhauer

"Why weep over this one moment when the whole of life calls for tears?"
Seneca

The non-distinction between high and low art.
Whether or not you make something functional is ultimately an aesthetic choice, which is why aesthetics are of ethical concern and can be objectively evaluated.

THE LAWS OF COMEDY
1. There is nothing you can't make funny.
2. If a lie is funnier than the truth, always go with the lie.
3. Up or down, punch lines.

Magnus Enquist gives arguments for culture as a basis of intelligence and problem-solving rather than genetics.[139] It could support the idea that people who reject religion and being cultured are going to be fundamentally less intelligent.[140] As Jerrán put it, "Since corporate economic interests are antithetical to the development of culture (Didney and such) we can start to see the degradation of systems and what leads to inevitable collapse. Without leisure time or available luxuries away from the thought of survival, we stagnate."

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A closing note to this chapter, I think an amusing way to judge the weight of philosophical texts would be to standardize an unpacking system, where in order to make a text accessible it be re-written in simple language. The texts that end up being reduced the most after the re-writes would be the fluff texts, the weaker texts from the weaker philosophers; conversely the texts that end up being expanded the most after the re-writes would be the most 'dense' and overly complicated. The texts that change the least would then be the most interesting since they would be most straightforwardly informative.

[139] *Why are humans so different from other animals?* https://youtu.be/vTSFmmvGX-c
[140] Magnus Enquist and friends' work on *Cumulative Culture and Explosive Demographic Transitions* (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11135-007-9070-x) and *Regulatory Traits: Cultural Influences on Cultural Evolution* (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-37577-4_9)

:: Philosophical State Of The Union ::

"For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods."
Aristotle

uch like the advent of the Socratics rising over the Pre-Socratics, as Truth and search for objectivity does over relativism and subjectivity, there must be a modern resurgence, a second large wave to crash down on the knowing shores. Much like the popular contemporary ideas of ancient times that *no one steps into the same river twice* being met with the ideas that categories can contain dynamic and changing things leaving them static ideas (leaving the river the same to be stepped in) and the contrarian's best friend being the *Law of Non-Contradiction*, there must be an ideological combatant to the postmodern ideas of perspectivism and cultural relativity that have worked their ways back upstream. As the contrarian sands stretch everlong out into the low of the tides of justice and good reason, the glimmer on them lasts for only a few hours longer as the dusk crawls across the sky and the first frothings of the waves and heavy crash that is humor into the postmodernist sands comes down. Down it comes as the umbrella *Meta-Physical*, down it comes as the ethics of humor, down it comes as the militant ad hominem inverse rectification of the bastard arguments attacking the evil nature of the sophists, the contrarians, and the misinformationists alike with all their hipsteries.

With the three wise men of Athens typhooning the relativists into obscurity, they bestowed three distinct levels of thought ready to be re-met upon the modern Athenian stage. The Ancient powers-that-be came in the order of questioning everything, delineating all, and actuating the system that validates all others. In this sense it was Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, unified as Atlas, that hold up all other postceding philosophers the world over. A rebirthing of each, and of each of their distinct levels of thought is typhooning itself back into society as Atlas shrugs the weight of the world off his ancient shoulders into the shallow waters on the shore of this cosmic farce.

As it was Socrates that methodologically asked 'why', so it is Quinten Rodriguez that methodologically asks, "Why not?"

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If you've read this entire work and you think it's nonsense, then it's wasted your time. A work designed to show the universe functions as comedy has wasted your time? Then you accept the worldview. Keep reading, do what you consider to be wasteful as that will defeat any counters you have *of* the view.

However, if you thought the work wasn't nonsense but it took you this long to realize none of this was meant to be taken seriously, then you have also wasted your time. Taking a book designed to show the universe functions as comedy, seriously, has wasted your time. This worldview can't be true as Truth is a serious matter. Keep reading, do what you consider to not be wasteful as surely that won't defeat any arguments you have *for* the worldview.

Any disagreement with the metaphysical view of cosmic comedy self-defeats. To deny it is to accept that it was in play in the first place. To accept it is to deny it should be taken seriously. But what good would taking that which portrays the universe non-seriously, seriously do? Go knowing that cosmic comedy is the case while also not going very seriously about it.

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The Inimical

- Praxis & Cathexis as Literal Flesh & Bone -

Not by ethnicity, sex, nation, or creed, but by fat and skeleton.

The fat were always so boastful in their intellectual opulence — they gave rodomontade of and for their mental jowls, their seeping excess of knowledge and praxis. This hincty conversion of almost the entirety of their communication became itself a form of knowledge and subject of academic discussion from which the fat accumulated. This pore-expansion is the very thing utopia is built on, it is the means by which society advances and it is seen as nothing but beautiful because of this. To be fat is to be aesthetic. To be fat is to be virtuous and true, to be successful and accomplished. To be fat is to be conqueror of the notion of civilization itself.

The skeletons are not to the fat in dialectical opposition nor are they *in their dialogues*, for the fat are unconcerned by them. The skeletons are not in antimony with utopia nor its antithesis. The skeletons rose alongside the fat and are merely additional. The skeletons are the excess to the fat. The skeletons are the deliquescent of utopian society, the skeletons are the ones who lack structure. This is the consequence of mental midgetry, intellectual paucity, in the utopian. The skeletons are disgusting to look at, bare and without feature or expression; the very fact that they can still move is considered jocular since the lack of cognitive animation should predicate the lack of bodily animation and yet they continue their motions as if they were of the fat.

This is utopia after all, and so there is nothing unearned, nothing overachieved or underachieved. Everyone is as skinny or as voluptuous as they make themselves to be. The mind is its own invocation and its own meritorious bachelor however it wills itself, no skeleton ever has any excuse to not be fat. This fact alone splits utopia perfectly in half — there are no thinly ribbed internment corpses, no sufferers of mediocre middle day meals — there is only fat and skeleton.

Of these two social clades, the portentous and the excoriated, there are no friends, and this is justice, as there is simply no need for friendship in places where there is nothing to befriend. Of these two social clades, the parapets and the posts, there is no violence, and this is justice, as there is simply no need for violence when craven skeletons imbue no threat to the candor of fat. This is utopia. No one who shouldn't do, *doesn't do*, and those who do, *should*.

Utopia is recent but well understood. In this nouveau perfection of society, this parousia of social harmony and *end to civilization*, we attain a single malady. The malady is not well understood. This single mistake is believed to be the only connective tissue in utopia. The lack of assimilation of fat by skeleton or of skeleton by fat should have otherwise flensed the fat from the skeletons during accouchement of utopia, but this single strand of connective tissue holds the two together and it is the only example anyone seems to be able to find where this happens in utopia.

Reluctant to prolix, the fat explain, "Of the fat and skeletons there is exactly one exemplar fat and exactly one exemplar skeleton, with an exactitude that could not be greater than one, for one of exactitude. The two, of which are unique in their extremity of their clades, are the only two members of their respective clades that interact with a member of the other clade. What's more is the mansard of impossibility this reaches, for this hill they climb is two-fold: not only do they interact with the other, but the other interacts with them. You see they are the only two members of utopia that deviate, and further *they deviate together*."

No skeleton ever understands this glossolalia from the fat, but they do joke that fat is always acerbic. Reluctant to being concise, the skeletons explain it, "There's only one friendship in utopia between a fat and a skeleton, and that's between Intelligence and Stupidity." To contextualize, in utopia the skeletons are incapable of speaking on anything abstractly and so they assign names as synecdoche's based on how the fat describe their clade members.

Intelligence was the most overflowing of the fat, and she was seen as not only the greatest mind to ever matriculate in society but also as the stelae of *mind itself*. Stupidity had the purest nacre of the skeletons, and he was seen as the most toothless and spineless poltroon, was seen as the lack of *body*

itself. Of course, all that is seen and all the seeing in utopia is done by the fat, for skeletons don't have eyes to see with.

And how could they? "Those squishy rounds would just roll right out of your sockets, like trundling fist-sized sea-slugs. Why would you want to see anyways? A skeleton's ennui would extend to sight, you'd just complain of this very visual vemödalen that everything you see has been seen before," the fat explain to the skeletons. No skeleton ever remarks directly to the fat after this explanation but a skeleton did once say that it was odd how the fat burden themselves to constantly remind the skeletons about it. Another time, in what was thought to be a skeletal conclave, a skeleton questioned the nature of how they could be certain that the fat did in fact themselves have eyes, but was quickly reminded by an interrupting fat that the skeleton could not see, so he could not be shown, and so it was no use asking.

Intelligence and Stupidity were not appositional to these typical communications between fat and skeleton. Intelligence and Stupidity publicly engaged in coquetries with each other — the only known instance of this happening between fat and skeletons. If it were not for their accelerated standings in their own clades, both Intelligence and Stupidity would surely have been ostracized from utopia. No members of utopia ever attempted to trammel this relation but most were uneased by it. No members of utopia ever insulted the pair when they were within earshot, but many questions were asked, "To be fat is to be aesthetic and skeletons are disgusting to look at, so what is gained in their unity?" The quizzical returned with, "To be fat is to be conqueror of the notion of civilization itself and skeletons are the ones who lack structure, so what is gained in their unity?"

If their relation wasn't well understood, the pair's answers were less understood still. The pair would always answer in unison, as if their answers were the connective tissue itself, "What is *of* one is *for* the other, and without which *neither could not*." Both aesthetic and disgust in each answer, both civilized and erratic in each answer, "What hollow of bone attracts the flesh is the juice of fat that attracts its decay."

These answers never satisfied either clade, but they also failed to satisfy desire for expulsion or machination, so they simply served as a jongleur social oddity to everyone except the pair themselves. As utopia became aged, the pair would make increasingly more statements the rest never understood. To everyone, the statements sounded the same, equally unintelligible, and so were treated the same, culminating in the first such statement being repeated as a marker for all further statements by the pair. From inception then, all statements of this unity in utopia were repeated, "This oily sheen you call fat and burn for intellectual warmth, this praise above the limn-person you call skeleton and snap for brittle echolocation, this parochial jouissance you call clade and make into the oracular, is all the mountebank of lalochezia; the real release returns recursively as its own overtly obviated object. What you call fat and skeleton is but unmasked and masked. What prized pride is put to propitiate the virtues of expressiveness by the fat is *the true lack of expression,* for the motives behind those virtues are fully transparent and unmasked. What ineluctable intransigency immutably imputes the vapidness of the skeleton is *the truly inimical act*, for this masking makes opaque the walls around its rampage."

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:: Notes and Miscellaneous ::

The opening quote to this book was one from Wittgenstein, "A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes." However, the title of this book clearly states that I am not joking, which means I make no illusions about this book being either serious or good. The background color chosen for the digital version of the book is a gray-brown, because most of the content of this book is shit. Investigating the footnotes in this book will lead you to find that a large number of them don't explicitly say or imply the conclusion that they were cited for, as many of the footnotes in this book were just to make myself laugh. Also, I used ChatGPT to generate the symbolic forms of several of the arguments given throughout the book.

This book used to be called *Meta-Physical*, a pun about the meta components to physical comedy. Alternative titles I considered were *Clown School*, *Wrong Again, Dipshit, Fuck You, Stupid*, and *The Coomer's Guide to the Galaxy*.

Unwitting contributors to this book:

- W.V.D. Busby
- Dennis LaRue
- Ming-han Liu
- Albert Castro

Comedy — the intentional acts done to provoke laughter or amusement.
Joke — A specific action or iteration of comedy; a specific action done with humorous intent.
Intention — determined or predicted actions or results from a capable system.
Humor (and sense of) — an idea or action that provokes laughter or amusement in/from one's self.
Farce — comedy that entertains through exaggeration and improbability.
Funny — an event or concept, with or without intent, found to cause amusement.
Amusement — the state or source-object of being amused (both as having satisfied conditions for it).
Metahumor — a joke that is self-referential or a joke scenario aware that it is in a joke.
Cuil Theory (represented by '₱') — Levels of abstraction from reality; can be used to rate the world on a scale of strangeness and surrealism.[141]
Poe's Law — without clear indication of a speaker's intent, it's difficult to tell the difference between sincere extremism and parody of said extremism.
The Dichotomy of Action — schema that shows that a separation exists between verbal action and physical action, that a bridge exists between the gap when one references the other, and that when they aren't bridged verbal action holds no power whatsoever.
Pretzeling — intertwining two ends of a schema or conversation to show their interplay without directly connecting the ends; not the same as, or to be confused with, circular reasoning.[142]
Fuckery — the testing of one's self or of other's selves in relation to theory of mind and hold on reality, which ultimately boils down to what may appear to be nonsense, for the intent of amusement.

Philosophy of Cuil — http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/philosophy-of-cuil
Impact of Cuil — http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/impact-of-cuil
Narration — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfdEdE96En0
Gervais' Principles of Comedy — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTl_xjOyZsc
Heckler's Veto — http://www.wsj.com/articles/barry-a-fisher-free-speechs-shrinking-circle-of-friends-1419899071
Futility Comedy:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Austin_suicide_attack
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvin_Heemeyer

Comedy not derived from suffering, Nietzsche got it backwards.
Mostly model of ensemble:
Fictionalism reaps the benefits of a discourse without paying an ontological bill.
Human universal: ideological crypsis.
The difficulty in crafting noun phrases abstract enough that people won't pattern-match them to a single distracting example.
The behavioral profiles of people who've never taken an opportunity to be very confused about something important to them.
Have you tried inhabiting a narrative wherein the universe naturally solves the problem over time?
Everybody chanting in perfect synchrony: "WE ARE NON-CONFORMIST"
Have you tried denying the nature of the power relationships between those who interact with the problem?
Have you tried having your spirit crushed by the problem, then carrying on with whatever parts of a life you can still live out of inertia?
Have you tried simply having the qualia characteristic of not having the problem? Everyone without the problem does this, it works for them.
Have you tried making the problem a part of your identity?
Have you tried summoning a more powerful problem to deal with the original problem?
Have you tried *not* being tormented by visions of who you might've been were it not for the problem?
Modest proposal: replace college w/gym. Equal signaling value Conscientiousness/conformity/discounting; cheaper; objective; health benefits; progressive not regressive; real RCT transfer to IQ, not hollow; positive externality for looks; increasingly useful in newer environments.

[141] A wiki started around this joke—http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/what-is-cuil-theory
[142] Larue, Dennis; lectures through the months of September to December, 2014.