First, how we understand ourselves, factors into what we do, since how we understand something  determines our perception of the thing, now thought is something too, thought is not just  what exists in philosophy or science, thought is a faculty which would possess which enables  us to reflect on what we do, i.e. step back and rearrange and re-determine our relationship  to our activity, it also distinguishes within the field of sense and nonsense, truth  and falsity, and perhaps most importantly it determines the formation of  rules, their adoption or rejection which is the precondition for social and  juridical ideas to arise, it therefore makes oneself and helps to determine  the relation with the other, in short thought is the faculty which makes  ethics possible, and since we do in fact think however stupidly we are always  already making ethics possible, thinking subject is a subject of learning,  doing, speaking, a subject possessing consciousness of itself and others, all  these come from thought, the thought of someone aligned with Marxism might  ask not directly stem from concrete social relations, however thought is  irreducibly complex and gradualism is inadmissible, so while certain  experiences, even experiences of thought might be impossible without this or  that social relation, thought must be granted an independent modicum of  existence, because there is no experience which is not a way of thinking,  there is a history of thought and therefore events of thought, the events of  thought are again not completely independent of social, political and  economic orders, however first it must be questioned whether there is a strict  analytic link between these orders and thought, and secondly it must be asked  why, given the infinitude of knowledge in its objects, why thought should  develop in this or that manner, why has it developed in the manner  that it has, if not because in part thought has a natural capacity to direct  itself in this or that manner, it would be false to say for example, if a cat  knocks down a vase, we explain the event in terms of subatomic objects or  elements, we have both cat and vase, yes, but we lose the event, the black  male has always been to be a true materialist, whatever that might  mean, one was required to reduce mental phenomena, not just quality, but all  faculties and capacities of the mind, which must therefore include thought,  either to neurological or economical orders, otherwise to escape one  event's soul, but to say thought is irreducibly complex is to say it is an  entirely worldly object, an entirely delineated object, same as the cat,  save it is not of the directly perceivable order, it cannot be over  inflated nor reducible, either to we have spoken of power or the sovereign  relation to the subject, ways in which the subject's relation to power has  determined it, but the subject is also of power, one power among others, so in  critical thought, thought takes its own self as an object by examining the  immediate and given commitment thought is entangled in, in critical  thought, thought becomes capable of realizing its own self-reflexivity, so  we must trace out thought's relation to itself, the events of thought in  relation to this pre-critical ethical mode, we do not mean to say thought has  two modes, theoretical and practical, rather we mean to say in the domain of  thinking about action, we encounter problems, problemata, problematical  points, and their constituent fields of concepts which surround those  problems, so many possible instances of solutions. As Eluz noted in his  interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy which differentiated itself  from Cartesian rationality, because in Descartes philosophy, reason is  bound, reason needs to be said on all sides by extrinsic error rather  than an all too natural intrinsic illusion, manifesting its reasons  entrapment in badly posed problems, that is Eluz noted that if reason  gives way to badly posed problems, it is because it is the faculty for  the reception of and posing of problems in general. It would be a  violence to history to suppose there is a perennial philosophy  either in the form of a single doctrine of all times, which would  be the solutions to a given problem or set of problems, but also more  importantly in the form of problems which have plagued mankind, in  the form of a ready-made set of problems which anyone would  discover given their sufficient sense of wonder. In the classical  Greek period, where there were heroes and villains, the existence  of God did not concern them, he did the freedom of the will. The  main question was how to live a beautiful life. Even the  Epicurean doctrines, which seemed concerned with gods and  wills, did so to liberate the conscience in order to live in  a beautiful life free of fear. The Clintonmen was always an  afterthought. In the Middle Ages, where there were sinners  and saints, the existence of God became a problem. The Aristotle  became the philosopher, since he treats of God in his metaphysics.  In the modern period, the Age of Enlightenment, Kant defines the  era as one of an exit from immaturity to maturity. The  questions of God, soul, and maternality become in the  tenemies which reason cannot help but obsess over, but which  nevertheless have no solution, because their illusions are  badly posed problems. It is possible to read the  critique as a wrestling away from problems which the new age at  that time wish to dispense with, growing pains. Is  therefore stupidity when the lies perpetuated in academia  concerning philosophy, that it is a great conversation, a  tradition handed down to us from antiquity, whose basic  sets of problems have remained the same, and we take  basically, or have perhaps, better conceptual tools or  methods to deal with these problems. We are told philosophy  begins with the pre-socratics, but if that were true, and the  notion of philosophy as conversation, gradually and  linearly developing to today, were true, then we should be  able to see them, their relevance. With the exception of  Parmenides student Zeno, whose relevance is to physics  only, there is nothing in the pre-socratics which does not  simply function for the history of ideas. Or can anyone  say what the discussion of the one is all about in Plato's  dialogue, Parmenides? Aristotle says the chief aim of the  study of mathematics is because it is beautiful, beautiful to  make proportions of bodies of architecture, of music.  Consider their oaths so important to one, which was the  emblem for their ethical relation to themselves. For all  their insistence on beauty, slavery was practiced, but  were the Greeks in contradiction? Not at all, which  does not mean they were right. Their society was based on a  kind of hyper virility, an obsessional paranoia surrounding  one's vitality and its dispossession. Women were under  our dogs whose pleasure was an important, unimportant at best,  and their ideal of absolute self-sufficiency affected even  their understanding of mathematics. For example,  they considered three to be the first odd number, not one.  The Greek ethics were based on an exclusion and  obliteration of the other, except in the case of  friendship. Hence, they were unable to conceive of friends  with benefits, and they were also unable to conceive from  a matter of perspective, an ethical relation to sex, but  that did not mean they were without conscience, that  they had no limits, that there were not limit cases,  even if pleasure seemed to be very easy to come by. For  example, all the literature on the love of boys does not  mean that they simply loved boys, but that they could  not conceive how boys could grow up to lead the city if  used in the manner of the Greeks. Make no mistake, sex is  always an indisimetrical relation. One is penetrated or  one penetrates. For the Greeks, it was impossible to  understand how a free boy could be the object of  pleasure and lead the city. And similarly, the  erection was the active symbol for the Greeks, but  becomes passive for Christianity in Augustine, since  it's not an act of the will having a rebellious mind  of its own. It comes whenever one does not  want it to. In Christianity, a hermeneutics of the  self-emerge is in order to search out the flesh for  its secrets as the legions with sinister forces. But  it is true that the Greeks were austere with their  sexual activity, but it was to guard against excess,  not a question of condemnation with regard to  preference or acts. It was to add intensity and  beauty to the lives that they took on austerity, to  become beautiful, to leave beautiful memories of  oneself for others, not to seek self-fulfillment  through psychology or Buddhism when that fails. It  is time to make explicit what was implicit in our  talk. There are four aspects to self-consciousness  and the relation to ethics or subjectivity and  thought for thought is an act too. The first is  the ethical substance, that which is worked on  in the ethical relation to oneself. For the  Greeks, it is through those acts which produce  aphrodisia. For the Christians, as we've been  saying, it is the flesh and its secrets. For  Kant may be the intention, and for us today it is  probably sexuality or feelings, since these two  command so much respect and discourse. The  second aspect is the mode or method of  subjection, that which invites recognition of  oneself as an ethical subject. Perhaps it is  the divine law as revealed in the text which  one is made a subject to, or a cosmological  order, or universally binding rules. The third  are techniques of transformation. The Greek  techni. Disciplinary procedures which make us  what we ought to be. Questions such as, for  example, how does one eradicate one's desire  are answered here. But they arise as  problematicals or problemata, elements  which surround a central singularity or  more fundamental, i.e. grounding, problems.  Problems emit problemata like particles,  given atomic decay, except that the  latter is random wherein problems they are  due to infinitesimal coagulations of  accidents. We never know under what  circumstances a subject emerges sensitive  to this or that problem, but it is  always a question of thresholds, pressures,  and intensity. Questions arise from  problems, but are not identical to them.  Multiple questions can arise from any one  problem. Concepts function as solutions  to problems. They are the answers to  questions, or rather they provide answers,  but are again not identical to them.  Take Buddhism, for example. It is a proposed  solution to the problem of existential  suffering. Problemata exists in so far as  one is enmeshed in the problem's  solution, which again is not the only  one. Whatever Buddhist monks worry about in  their practice is an instance of  problemata. Concepts of Buddhism,  the Eightfold Path, function as solutions  to this problem. From concepts there is  developed answers to questions posed.  One must first recognize oneself as a  sufferer to hear the call of Buddhism,  but if one does, then the truth so far  as Buddhism is concerned of there being  no self, which founds the practice of  non-attachment is discovered through the  technique of meditation. We can certainly  see therefore that truths are trivial  or not, given one's position with  respect to problems.  Immediately, however, we are struck by  whether or not the triviality of truths  would make truths a species of relevance  to problems. I mean that if truth only  exists with respects to a problem  solution couplet, then it seems there is  no fact, no truth, to the matter  whether or not the empty world, a world  without subjects for whom there are  problems, is actively empty if it is  true that it is empty.  One would either need to invoke an  omni-observer like God  or abandon the premise that truth exists  only in problem-solution couplets.  Another problem is it rises.  Are we not faced with the question of  absolute or relative space?  Except instead of the physics question  we ask, are truths trivialities  relative to problems which themselves  are relative or without priority,  even arbitrary? In which case the  triviality of a truth would be  due to one's perspective given a  problematic enmeshment. Did God really  roll dice to assign the order of  problems? But further elaboration all  this would take us outside the scope  of our talk. The fourth and final  aspect is the telos of ethical  relations is the aim of the work on  the subject to become pure or  immortal or to be freed from  samsara or to become master  oneself and so on. We have gone  from classical greek notions of  choosing emphasis on choosing a  beautiful life, of having honor  however or political esteem, good  reputation, to the stoic obligation  given one's nature as a rational  being, a shadow of the categorical  imperative, to Christianity with  determinants of the self identified  as the flesh, its subtle doctors of  the movement to the soul, a  shadow of psychological analysis, the  enlightenment where religion drops out  of the picture but medicine and  science begin to fill in the gap.  There is no rupture of a permissive  tolerant paganism with the arrival  of Christianity, techniques of  transformation were adopted  towards different t-voy.  Asterity did not emerge with the slave  cased. Nietzsche is therefore wrong  when he says Christianity made his  capable of keeping promises. The  pagan takes a walk in the morning  looking at beautiful youths or women  other than his wife in order to  assure themselves of self mastery  over desire. The Christian takes a  walk to remind themselves of how  utterly contingent everything is on  God's will that they are nothing.  Same technique, different t-loy, with  the shift of Christianity into the  analytics of the flesh, dream  journals began to become prevalent,  journals of daily life for  mnemonic purposes became part of  everyday life, the writing Plato  had warned about. Consider the life  of St. Anthony, the work of writing  here serving to transform the  ethical substance, the flesh, by  dissipating inner shadows where  Satan's plans grow and fester.  The technique of writing is not  itself a symbolic system, yet it  factors into the constitution of  self-consciousness. It follows  therefore that subjectivity is not  reducible to an analysis of  symbolic systems, since writing  constitutes subjectivity through  different symbolic systems, uses  these different systems according to  different t-loy. We have arrived at  the final portion of today's  lecture, the constitution of the  modern subject's grid of sense and  nonsense, not an exhaustive list,  nor a comprehensive explanation, but  to show only that such a thing is  possible. We will take one example.  How did Rebra Sear utter the  statement, I am a nihilist because  I believe in truth? For in one  sense such a statement is nonsense,  nihilists do not believe in  anything, nor do they believe in a  reified nothing, but certainly not  truth, either. When studying the  history of philosophy Pascal and  Descartes are often mentioned in  the same breath, quite  unfortunately. For after all, one  says they are both important  thinkers, French, and  contemporaneous. Their difference,  however, is so fundamental as to  make the discourses, their  discourse of world apart. Pascal,  as everyone knows, was religious and  Descartes pretended to believe in  God, but even more Pascal was an  event within a discursive  formation in which, as it always  been the case, a certain discipline,  a thesis, or ethical relation was  necessary to know the truth.  Descartes, on the other hand, may  talk about his non-deceiving God all  he wants. The fact remains that he  founds an essentially new  discursive field, the modern one, by  divorcing ethics from truth and  knowledge. I quote Descartes now,  To accede to truth it suffices that  I be any subject which can see what  is evident. Again, he says it  suffices that he be any subject  regardless of his ethical  orientation. One can be immoral and  know the truth. One can even be  amoral. One can be beyond good and  evil. It is because of this shift  initiated by thought, the Cartesian  event in thought, that makes  science possible in its  concrete and institutional form.  It is because of this move that  Bressier discovers reason is a  nihilistic revelation, since as he  says the more reason, and by this  he means science, discovers the  nature of things, the more  meaningless they seem. When the  Cartesian event occurs it  changes the field of what is  considered sensible. The grid  allows new moves while  disqualifying others. Buried in  this field, waiting there for  400 years, was Bressier's  statement. It is even worse, however,  for the perspective of philosophy  standpoint, and is why philosophy  is not always already  metaphilosophical. But if the  point is to think something  different, then philosophy must  first become  metaphilosophical. It must not  inform us about what philosophy  is given, how its doctrines  align, or do not align with the  traditions, answers given a  common set of problems. Philosophy  is always a limit point of what  we understand. It is capable of  self-comprehension only by  reflecting on the nature of the  problems given to it, or that  it has itself posed. Because  there is always a, I do not  say progression, but a shift in  discursive fields, which  includes science. It is  impossible that there be  anything like pure philosophy.  Problems intrinsic to it, which  it itself poses, which at the  same time exists given the  nature of the being, which  questions in that which is  asked about. Take, for example,  Heidegger's attempts to  revive a question of being,  which even in Plato's time had  lost sense. Philosophical  questions, I mean to say, are  learning a dead language.  Consider the Kantian  questions. What can I know?  What must I do?  What can I hope?  These are supposedly the  questions philosophy must  answer. And that's what Kant  does in the first critique.  A sweeping away of old problems  by showing their impossibility.  The problem of God's existence,  the immortality of the soul,  the freedom of the will, the  finitude or infinitude of the  world. Problems which  occupy the Christians, the  Greeks, and the Renaissance  respectively. These are  all swept away.  As for the Kantian questions,  why is knowledge not an  imperative, as in the  command, you must know  yourself, as it was for the  Oracle at Delphi in the  ancient Greek world.  Why is the question not,  what must I know?  Because knowledge is not seen  as solvific.  Even questions like what  must I become like to be a  knower, fade into the  dusk of nonsense with the  occasional answer being  given. Become a  scientist. Apply a method.  But that is all we can  say. And we cannot hear it  in the same manner as those  who came before us did.  That's it.