

:: A Fast Formal Proof for Relational Objects as a Distinct Ontological Category ::



Dualism classically divides the world between the abstract and the concrete, or between form and matter, or noumenal and phenomenal, or type and token, and so on. This essay exploits a perennial issue with many different dualistic frameworks that have a binary divide upon where *concreta* and *abstracta* both operate by means of some *relata*. By incorporating some maths, I give argumentation that *relata* is a distinct ontological category necessitated by dualism, muddying the traditional dualistic frameworks and forcing either a pluralistic or monistic case for reality.

The transitive property in math, which is that if $A = B$, and $B = C$, then A also equals C , demonstrates that multiple abstract objects can be equivalent or made the same as concomitants. I open this topic with the question as to what the status of the object of equivalence itself is. If we take the identity property in maths (which is semantically equivalent to tautology), where simply $A = A$, and ask if either A or A are also equivalent to their equivalency, to the relation that coordinates their shared properties, which is to say equal to the equals sign itself, then we return strange answers.

Starting from the assumption that yes, A and A are not only qualitatively indistinct from each other but also from their relational capacities (necessitated by their equivalence), then it is the case that $A = = = A$. This can be verbalized as, " A is equal to the equivalency of being equal to A ." We can then raise the question of whether A or A is also equivalent to this new relation ($= = =$), and the initial assumption says that the answer would be yes again, resulting in the new statement that $A = = = = A$. The problem with this should start becoming clear now, as it is *turtles all the way down*; we can always create a relational equivalency to the relational equivalencies between A and A if we start with the 'yes' assumption.

As we also know from maths, as a value asymptotically approaches zero, an infinite value becomes functionally and semantically equivalent to zero. Another way to say this is that the number $0.\overline{001}$ is equal to 0. I posit that by adding relational equivalencies between A and A we are increasing the literal conceptual distance between A and A , which means the normally close and strong conceptual bond that relation maintains is getting weakened. Since the conceptual distance between these conceptual objects is infinitely expanding, their relation is also infinitely weakening, and analogous to the asymptote example we can know that an infinitely weak relation is the same as having no relation at all. We somewhat quixotically find now that $A \neq A$.

This not only breaks the law of identity in maths, but the law of non-contradiction in logic since from ' A equals A ' we derive that ' A does not equal A ' at the same time and in much the same regard. This makes it the case that the initial assumption was wrong and that instead A must be qualitatively distinct from its relational capacities. I believe this is clear demonstration that *abstracta* and *concreta* are qualitatively distinct from *relata* such that *relata* is its own category of being.

In anticipation of a quick objection here, the same problem occurs whenever you have more than one of the same kind of concrete object, e.g. two tables - by what means do we relate these concrete objects as being the same kind of object? In traditional dualism we say the ideal form, or the type of these tokens is what coordinates them, but of course types can be objects unto themselves and the *relating action* between the type and its token is known to be problematic by almost every metaphysician in history, so ubiquitously that it would be almost wrong to include a citation for it.

So we have a third category of being called *relata*, or relational objects, but by turning dualism into a pluralism I don't think we solve any classical problems - we make it worse instead. This is because the same argument I used to tease out the existence of relational objects can be applied back onto itself. Formal proof itself is a relational organization between several abstract or concrete objects, making proof *relata*. Is one relational object equivalent to any other relational object? If we say yes, we get the same

derivation as two paragraphs ago, so we find that we must say no. A quick obviation - if a table holds some relation to the chairs seated around it, this is a different *kind* of relation than the table's relation to its maker, or its geolocation, etcetera, making *all* relations individuated as unique in kind.

Ultimately, I believe this applies to all individuated objects in the world, no matter how we formalize their categorical multiplicity of kinds, but I haven't actually done that work here, so I'll let someone smarter than myself respond to this with a more comprehensive view. Until then, the standard intuition might say pluralism explodes the same way dualism does, and infinitely so, until we have nothing but one single amoebas category of all individuated things, landing us ultimately at a monistic architecture for reality. But we don't have to play the game of saving intuitions.